PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe

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Modern Nondemocratic Regimes

DEMOCRATIC transition and consolidation involve the movement from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime. However, specific polities may vary immensely in the *paths* available for transition and the unfinished *tasks* the new democracy must face before it is consolidated. Our central endeavor in the next two chapters is to show how and why much—though of course not all—of such variation can be explained by prior regime type.

For over a quarter of a century the dominant conceptual framework among analysts interested in classifying the different political systems in the world has been the tripartite distinction between democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes. New paradigms emerge because they help analysts see commonalities and implications they had previously overlooked. When Juan Linz wrote his 1964 article "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," he wanted to call attention to the fact that between what then were seen as the two major stable political poles—the democratic pole and the totalitarian pole—there existed a form of polity that had its own internal logic and was a steady regime type. Though this type was nondemocratic, Linz argued that it was fundamentally different from a totalitarian regime on four key dimensions—pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization. This was of course what he termed an *authoritarian regime*. He defined them as: "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones."[1]

In the 1960s, as analysts attempted to construct categories with which to compare and contrast all the systems in the world, the authoritarian category proved useful. As the new paradigm took hold among comparativists, two somewhat surprising conclusions emerged. First, it became increasingly apparent that more regimes were "authoritarian" than were "totalitarian" or "democratic" combined.[2]

Authoritarian regimes were thus the modal category of regime type in the modern world. Second, authoritarian regimes were not necessarily in transition to a different type of regime. As Linz's studies of Spain in the 1950s and early 1960s showed, the four distinctive dimensions of an authoritarian regime—limited pluralism, mentality, somewhat constrained leadership, and weak mobilization—could cohere for a long period as a reinforcing and integrated system that was relatively stable.[3]

Typologies rise or fall according to their analytic usefulness to researchers. In our judgment, the existing tripartite regime classification has not only become less useful to democratic theorists and practitioners than it once was, it has also become an obstacle. Part of the case for typology change proceeds from the implications of the empirical universe we need to analyze. Very roughly, if we were looking at the world of the mid-1980s, how many countries could conceivably be called "democracies" of ten years' duration? And how many countries were very close to the totalitarian pole for that entire period? Answers have, of course, an inherently subjective dimension, particularly as regards the evaluation of the evidence used to classify countries along the different criteria used in the typology. Fortunately, however, two independently organized studies attempt to measure most of the countries in the world as to their political rights and civil liberties.[4] The criteria used in the studies are explicit, and there is a very high degree of agreement in the results. If we use these studies and the traditional tripartite regime type distinction, it turns out that more than 90 percent of modern nondemocratic regimes would have to share the same typological space—"authoritarian."[5] Obviously, with so many heterogeneous countries sharing the same

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1. Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), 291–342. Reprinted in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970), 251–83, 374–81. Page citations will refer to the 1970 volume. The definition is found on 255.

2. See, for example, the data contained in footnotes 4 and 5 in this chapter.

3. See Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organización: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936–1968," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 128–203. Also see Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 171–259.

4. One effort was by Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, who attempted to operationalize the eight "institutional guarantees" that Robert Dahl argued were required for a polyarchy. They assigned values to 137 countries on a polyarchy scale, based on their assessment of political conditions as of mid-1985. The results are available in "A Measure of Polyarchy," paper prepared for the Conference on Measuring Democracy, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, May 27–28, 1988; and their "A Scale of Polyarchy," in Raymond D. Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987–1988* (New York: Freedom House, 1990), 101–28. Robert A. Dahl's seminal discussion of the "institutional guarantees" needed for polyarchy is found in Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1–16.

The other major effort to operationalize a scale of democracy is the annual Freedom House evaluation of virtually all the countries of the world. The advisory panel has included in recent years such scholars as Seymour Martin Lipset, Giovanni Sartori, and Lucian W. Pye. The value they assigned on their scale for each year from 1978–1987 can be found in Gastil, *Freedom in the World,* 54–65.

5. We arrive at this conclusion in the following fashion. The annual survey coordinated by Raymond D. Gastil employs a 7-point scale of the political rights and civil liberties dimensions of democracy. With the help of a panel of scholars, Gastil, from 1978 to 1987, classified annually 167 countries on this scale. For our purposes if we call the universe of democracies those countries that from 1978 to 1987 never received a score of lower than 2 on the Gastil scale for political rights and 3 for civil liberty, we come up with 42 countries. This is very close to the number of countries that Coppedge and Reinicke classify as "full polyarchies" in their independent study of the year 1985. Since our interest is in how countries become democracies we will

typological "starting place," this typology of regime type cannot tell us much about the extremely significant range of variation in possible transition paths and consolidation tasks that we believe in fact exists. Our purpose in the rest of this chapter is to reformulate the tripartite paradigm of regime type so as to make it more helpful in the analysis of *transition paths* and *consolidation tasks*. We propose therefore a revised typology, consisting of "democratic," "authoritarian," "totalitarian," "post-totalitarian," and "sultanistic" regimes.

DEMOCRACY

To start with the democratic type of regime, there are of course significant variations within democracy. However, we believe that such important categories as "consociational democracy" and "majoritarian democracy" are subtypes of democracy and not different regime types.[6] Democracy as a regime type seems to us to be of sufficient value to be retained and not to need further elaboration at this point in the book.

TOTALITARIANISM

We also believe that the concept of a totalitarian regime as an ideal type, with some close historical approximations, has enduring value. If a regime has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike, then it seems to us that it still makes historical and conceptual sense to call this a regime with strong totalitarian tendencies.

If we accept the continued conceptual utility of the democratic and totalitarian regime types, the area in which further typological revision is needed concerns the regimes that are clearly neither democratic nor totalitarian. By the early

1980s, the number of countries that were clearly totalitarian or were attempting to create such regimes had in fact been declining for some time. As many Soviet-type regimes began to change after Stalin's death in 1953, they no longer conformed to the totalitarian model, as research showed. This change created conceptual confusion. Some scholars argued that the totalitarian category itself was wrong. Others wanted to call post-Stalinist regimes authoritarian. Neither of these approaches seems to us fully satisfactory. Empirically, of course, most of the Soviet-type systems in the 1980s were not totalitarian. However, the "Soviet type" regimes, with the exception of Poland (see chap. 12), could not be understood in their distinctiveness by including them in the category of an authoritarian regime.

The literature on Soviet-type regimes correctly drew attention to regime characteristics that were no longer totalitarian and opened up promising new studies of policy-making. One of these perspectives was "institutional pluralism."[7] However, in our judgment, to call these post-Stalinist polities *pluralistic* missed some extremely important features that could hardly be called pluralistic. Pluralist democratic theory, especially the "group theory" variant explored by such writers as Arthur Bentley and David Truman, starts with *individuals in civil society* who enter into numerous freely formed interest groups that are relatively autonomous and often criss-crossing. The many groups in civil society attempt to aggregate their interests and compete against each other in political society to influence state policies. However, the "institutional pluralism" that some writers discerned in the Soviet Union was radically different, in that almost all the pluralistic conflict occurred in *regime-created organizations within the party-state* itself. Conceptually, therefore, this form of competition and conflict is actually closer to what political theorists call *bureaucratic politics* than it is to *pluralistic politics*.[8]

Rather than forcing these Soviet-type regimes into the existing typology of totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic regimes, we believe we should expand that typology by explicating a distinctive regime type that we will call *post-totalitarian*.[9] Methodologically, we believe this category is justified because on each of the four dimensions of regime type—pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobi-

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exclude those 42 countries from our universe of analysis. This would leave us with 125 countries in the universe we want to explore.

If we then decide to call long-standing "totalitarian" regimes those regimes that received the lowest possible score on political rights and civil liberties on the Gastil scale for each year in the 1978–1987 period, we would have a total of nine countries that fall into the totalitarian classification. Thus, if one used the traditional typology, the Gastil scale would imply that 116 of 125 countries, or 92.8 percent of the universe under analysis, would have to be placed in the same typological space. See Gastil, *Freedom in the World,* 54–65.

6. For discussions of variations within democracy, see Arendt Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), esp. 1–36; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 75–88; and Juan J. Linz, "Change and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy* (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1992), 182–207.

7. The strongest advocate of an institutional pluralist perspective for the analysis of Soviet politics was Jerry F. Hough, especially in his *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

8. The pioneering critique of the institutional pluralist approach to Soviet politics is Archie Brown, "Pluralism, Power and the Soviet Political System: A Comparative Perspective," in Susan Gross Solomon, ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 61–107. A useful review of the literature, with attention to authors such as Gordon Skilling, Archie Brown, and Jerry Hough, is found in Gabriel Almond (with Laura Roselle), "Model-Fitting in Communism Studies," in his *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990), 157–72.

9. Juan Linz, in his "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), 3:175–411, analyzed what he called "post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes," see 336–50. Here, with our focus on the available paths to democratic transition and the tasks of democratic consolidation, it seems to both of us that it is more useful to treat post-totalitarian regimes not as a subtype of authoritarianism, but as an ideal type in its own right.

lization—there can be a post-totalitarian ideal type that is different from a totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic ideal type. Later in this chapter we will also re-articulate the argument for considering sultanism as a separate ideal-type regime.[10]

To state our argument in bold terms, we first present a schematic presentation of how the five ideal-type regimes we propose—democratic, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian, and sultanistic—differ from each other on each one of the four constituent characteristics of regime type (table 3.1). In the following chapter we make explicit what we believe are the implications of each regime type for democratic transition paths and the tasks of democratic consolidation.

POST-TOTALITARIANISM

Our task here is to explore how, on each of the four dimensions of regime type, post-totalitarianism is different from totalitarianism, as well as different from authoritarianism.[11] Where appropriate we will also call attention to some under-theorized characteristics of both totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes that produce dynamic pressures for out-of-type change. We do not subscribe to the view that either type is static.

Post-totalitarianism, as table 3.1 implies, can encompass a continuum varying from "early post-totalitarianism," to "frozen post-totalitarianism," to "mature post-totalitarianism." Early post-totalitarianism is very close to the totalitarian ideal type but differs from it on at least one key dimension, normally some constraints on the leader. There can be frozen post-totalitarianism in which, despite the persistent tolerance of some civil society critics of the regime, almost all the other control mechanisms of the party-state stay in place for a long period and do not evolve (e.g., Czechoslovakia, from 1977 to 1989). Or there can be mature post-totalitarianism in which there has been significant change in all the dimensions of the post-totalitarian regime except that politically the leading role of the official party is still sacrosanct (e.g., Hungary from 1982 to 1988, which eventually evolved by late 1988 very close to an out-of-type change).

Concerning *pluralism,* the defining characteristic of totalitarianism is that there is no political, economic, or social pluralism in the polity and that pre-

10. For Juan Linz's first discussion of sultanism, see ibid, 259–63. For a more complete discussion of sultanism, see H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, "Sultanistic Regimes," paper prepared for a conference on sultanistic regimes at Harvard University in November 1990. The results of the conference, which included papers on such countries as Iran, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Romania, will be published in a volume edited by H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz.

11. We believe that readers can readily see for themselves how post-totalitarian regimes are not democratic regimes, so we will not discuss this point separately. We want to make clear that for our analytic purposes in this book that the term *post-totalitarian* refers to a type of nondemocratic regime before the transition to democracy. In this chapter our main concern is with ideal types. However, in chapter 15, "Post-Communism's Prehistories," we provide ample empirical evidence of what a totalitarian or post-totalitarian (in contrast to an authoritarian) legacy means for each of the five arenas necessary for a consolidated democracy that we analyzed in table 1.1 in this book.

existing sources of pluralism have been uprooted or systematically repressed. In an authoritarian regime there is some limited political pluralism and often quite extensive economic and social pluralism. In an authoritarian regime, many of the manifestations of the limited political pluralism and the more extensive social and economic pluralism predate the authoritarian regime. How does pluralism in post-totalitarian regimes contrast with the near absence of pluralism in totalitarian regimes and the limited pluralism of authoritarian regimes?

In mature post-totalitarianism, there is a much more important and complex play of institutional pluralism within the state than in totalitarianism. Also, in contrast to totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism normally has a much more significant degree of social pluralism, and in mature post-totalitarian there is often discussion of a "second culture" or a "parallel culture." Evidence of this is found in such things as a robust underground *samizdat* literature with multi-issue journals of the sort not possible under totalitarianism.[12] This growing pluralism is simultaneously a dynamic source of vulnerability for the post-totalitarian regime and a dynamic source of strength for an emerging democratic opposition. For example, this "second culture" can be sufficiently powerful that, even though leaders of the second culture will frequently be imprisoned, in a mature post-totalitarian regime opposition leaders can generate substantial followings and create enduring oppositional organizations in civil society. At moments of crisis, therefore, a mature post-totalitarian regime can have a cadre of a democratic opposition based in civil society with much greater potential to form a democratic political opposition than would be available in a totalitarian regime. A mature post-totalitarian regime can also feature the coexistence of a state-planned economy with extensive partial market experiments in the state sector that can generate a "red bourgeoisie" of state sector managers and a growing but subordinate private sector, especially in agriculture, commerce and services.

However, in a post-totalitarian regime this social and economic pluralism is different in degree and kind from that found in an authoritarian regime. It is different in degree because there is normally more social and economic pluralism in an authoritarian regime (in particular there is normally a more autonomous private sector, somewhat greater religious freedom, and a greater amount of aboveground cultural production). The difference in kind is typologically even more important. In a post-totalitarian society, the historical reference both for the power holders of the regime and the opposition is the previous totalitarian regime. By definition, the existence of a previous totalitarian regime means that most of the pre-existing sources of responsible and organized pluralism have been eliminated or repressed and a totalitarian order has been established. There is therefore an active effort at "detotalitarianization" on the part of oppositional

12. For example, in mature post-totalitarian Hungary the most influential *samizdat* publication, *Beszélő,* from 1982 to 1989, was issued as a quarterly with publication runs of 20,000. Information supplied to Alfred Stepan by the publisher and editorial board member, Miklós Haraszti, Budapest, August 1994.

Table 3.1. Major Modern Regime Ideal Types and Their Defining Characteristics

Characteristic	Democracy	Authoritarianism	Totalitarianism	Post-totalitarianism	Sultanism
Pluralism	Responsible political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy in economy, society, and internal life of organizations. Legally protected pluralism consistent with "societal corporatism" but not "state corporatism."	Political system with limited, not responsible political pluralism. Often quite extensive social and economic pluralism. In authoritarian regimes most of pluralism had roots in society before the establishment of the regime. Often some space for semiopposition.	No significant economic, social, or political pluralism. Official party has *de jure* and *de facto* monopoly of power. Party has eliminated almost all pretotalitarian pluralism. No space for second economy or parallel society.	Limited, but not responsible social, economic, and institutional pluralism. Almost no political pluralism because party still formally has monopoly of power. May have "second economy," but state still the overwhelming presence. Most manifestations of pluralism in "flattened polity" grew out of tolerated state structures or dissident groups consciously formed in opposition to totalitarian regime. In mature post-totalitarianism opposition often creates "second culture" or "parallel society."	Economic and social pluralism does not disappear but is subject to unpredictable and despotic intervention. No group or individual in civil society, political society, or the state is free from sultan's exercise of despotic power. No rule of law. Low institutionalization. High fusion of private and public.
Ideology	Extensive intellectual commitment to citizenship and procedural rules of contestation. Not teleological. Respect for rights of minorities, state of law, and value of individualism.	Political system without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities.	Elaborate and guiding ideology that articulates a reachable utopia. Leaders, individuals, and groups derive most of their sense of mission, legitimation, and often specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of humanity and society.	Guiding ideology still officially exists and is part of the social reality. But weakened commitment to or faith in utopia. Shift of emphasis from ideology to programmatic consensus that presumably is based on rational decision-making and limited debate without too much reference to ideology.	Highly arbitrary manipulation of symbols. Extreme glorification of ruler. No elaborate or guiding ideology or even distinctive mentalities outside of despotic personalism. No attempt to justify major initiatives on the basis of ideology. Pseudo-ideology not believed by staff, subjects, or outside world.

Table 3.1. *(continued)*

Characteristic	Democracy	Authoritarianism	Totalitarianism	Post-totalitarianism	Sultanism
Mobilization	Participation via autonomously generated organization of civil society and competing parties of political society guaranteed by a system of law. Value is on low regime mobilization but high citizen participation. Diffuse effort by regime to induce good citizenship and patriotism. Toleration of peaceful and orderly opposition.	Political system without extensive or intensive political mobilization except at some points in their development.	Extensive mobilization into a vast array of regime-created obligatory organizations. Emphasis on activism of cadres and militants. Effort at mobilization of enthusiasm. Private life is decried.	Progressive loss of interest by leaders and nonleaders involved in organizing mobilization. Routine mobilization of population within state-sponsored organizations to achieve a minimum degree of conformity and compliance. Many "cadres" and "militants" are mere careerists and opportunists. Boredom, withdrawal, and ultimately privatization of population's values become an accepted fact.	Low but occasional manipulative mobilization of a ceremonial type by coercive or clientelistic methods without permanent organization. Periodic mobilization of parastate groups who use violence against groups targeted by sultan.
Leadership	Top leadership produced by free elections and must be exercised within constitutional limits and state of law. Leadership must be periodically subjected to and produced by free elections.	Political system in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined but actually quite predictable norms. Effort at cooptation of old elite groups. Some autonomy in state careers and in military.	Totalitarian leadership rules with undefined limits and great unpredictability for members and nonmembers. Often charismatic. Recruitment to top leadership highly dependent on success and commitment in party organization.	Growing emphasis by post-totalitarian political elite on personal security. Checks on top leadership via party structures, procedures, and "internal democracy." Top leaders are seldom charismatic. Recruitment to top leadership restricted to official party but less dependent upon building a career within party's organization. Top leaders can come from party technocrats in state apparatus.	Highly personalistic and arbitrary. No rational-legal constraints. Strong dynastic tendency. No autonomy in state careers. Leader unencumbered by ideology. Compliance to leaders based on intense fear and personal rewards. Staff of leader drawn from members of his family, friends, business associates, or men directly involved in use of violence to sustain the regime. Staff's position derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler.

currents in civil society. Much of the emotional and organizational drive of the opposition in civil society is thus consciously crafted to forge alternatives to the political, economic, and social structures created by the totalitarian regime, structures that still play a major role in the post-totalitarian society. Much of the second culture therefore is not traditional in form but is found in new movements that arise out of the totalitarian experience. There can also be a state-led detotal- itarianization in which the regime itself begins to eliminate some of the most extreme features of the monist experience. Thus, if there is growing "institutional pluralism," or a growing respect for procedure and law, or a newly tolerated private sector, it should be understood as a kind of pluralism that emerges *out of* the previous totalitarian regime.

However, it is typologically and politically important to stress that there are significant limits to pluralism in post-totalitarian societies. In contrast to an authoritarian regime, there is *no* limited and relatively autonomous pluralism in the explicitly political realm. The official party in all post-totalitarian regimes is still legally accorded the leading role in the polity. The institutional pluralism of a post-totalitarian regime should not be confused with political pluralism; rather, institutional pluralism is exercised within the party-state or within the newly tolerated second economy or parallel culture. The pluralism of the parallel culture or the second culture should be seen as a *social* pluralism that may have political implications. But we must insist that the party and the regime leaders in post-totalitarian regimes, unless they experience out-of-type change, accord *no* legitimacy or responsibility to nonofficial political pluralism.[13] Even the formal pluralism of satellite parties becomes politically relevant only in the final stages of the regime after the transition is in progress.

When we turn to the dimension of *leadership,* we also see central tendencies that distinguish totalitarian from authoritarian leadership. Totalitarian leadership is unconstrained by laws and procedures and is often charismatic. The leadership can come from the revolutionary party or movement, but members of this core are as vulnerable to the sharp policy and ideological changes enunciated by the leader (even more so in terms of the possibility of losing their lives) as the rest of the population.[14] By contrast, in the Linzian scheme, authoritarian leadership is characterized by a political system in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined but actually quite predictable norms. There are often extensive efforts to co-opt old elite groups into leadership roles, and there is some autonomy in state careers and in the military.

13. Hungary in 1988–89 represents a mature post-totalitarian regime which, by engaging in extensive detotalitarianization and by increasingly recognizing the legitimacy of other parties, had experienced significant out-of-type changes even before the Communist Party lost power. See chapter 17.

14. For example, under Stalin, of the nine members of the Politburo in 1930, five had disappeared or been shot by 1937. See George K. Schueller, *The Politburo* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 5–6.

As in a totalitarian regime, post-totalitarian leadership is still exclusively restricted to the revolutionary party or movement. However, in contrast to a totalitarian regime, post-totalitarian leaders tend to be more bureaucratic and state technocratic than charismatic. The central core of a post-totalitarian regime normally strives successfully to enhance its security and lessen its fear by reducing the range of arbitrary discretion allowed to the top leadership.

In contrast to those who say that the totalitarian regime concept is static, we believe that, when an opportunity presents itself (such as the death of the maximum leader), the top elite's desire to reduce the future leader's absolute discretion is predictably a dynamic source of pressure for out-of-type regime change from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism. The post-totalitarian leadership is thus typologically closer in this respect to authoritarian leadership, in that the leader rules within unspecified but in reality reasonably predictable limits. However, the leadership in these two regime types still differs fundamentally. Post-totalitarian leadership is exclusively recruited from party members who develop their careers in the party organization itself, the bureaucracy, or the technocratic apparatus of the state. They all are thus recruited from the structures created by the regime. In sharp contrast, in most authoritarian regimes, the norm is for the regime to co-opt much of the leadership from groups that have some power, presence, and legitimacy that does not derive directly from the regime itself. Indeed, the authoritarian regime has often been captured by powerful fragments of the pre-existing society. In some authoritarian regimes, even access to top positions can be established not by political loyalties as much as by some degree of professional and technical expertise and some degree of competition through examinations that are open to the society as a whole. In mature post-totalitarian regimes, technical competence becomes increasingly important, but we should remember that the original access to professional training was controlled by political criteria. Also, the competences that are accepted or recognized in post-totalitarian systems are technical or managerial but do not include skills developed in a broader range of fields such as the law, religious organizations, or independent business or labor.

The limited party-bureaucratic-technocratic pluralism under post-totalitarianism does not give the regime the flexibility for change within the regime that co-optation of nonregime elites can give to many authoritarian regimes. The desire to resist the personalized leadership of the First Secretary–ideologue can be a source of change from totalitarian to post-totalitarian, but it can also lead eventually to the oligarchic leadership of aging men supported by the nomenklatura. Attempts at rejuvenation at the top by including or co-opting new men and women from the outside are normally very limited. In extreme cases (i.e., the GDR and post-1968 Czechoslovakia), frozen post-totalitarianism shows geriatric tendencies. Under crisis circumstances, the inability to renovate leadership, not so paradoxically, is a potential source of dynamic change in that a frozen post-totalitarian regime, with its old and narrow leadership base, has a very limited capac-

ity to negotiate. Such a leadership structure, if it is not able to repress opponents in a crisis, is particularly vulnerable to *collapse.* One of the reasons why midlevel cadres in the once all-powerful coercive apparatus might, in time of crisis, let the regime collapse rather than fire upon the democratic opposition has to do with the role of ideology in post-totalitarianism.

The contrast between the role of *ideology* in a totalitarian system and in a post-totalitarian system is sharp, but it is more one of behavior and belief than one of official canon. In the area of ideology, the dynamic potential for change from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian regime, both on the part of the cadres and on the part of the society, is the growing empirical disjunction between official ideological claims and reality. This disjunction produces lessened ideological commitment on the part of the cadres and growing criticism of the regime by groups in civil society. In fact, many of the new critics in civil society emerge out of the ranks of former true believers, who argue that the regime does not—or, worse, cannot—advance its own goals. The pressures created by this tension between doctrine and reality often contributes to an out-of-type shift from a totalitarian regime effort to mobilize enthusiasm to a post-totalitarian effort to maintain acquiescence. In the post-totalitarian phase, the elaborate and guiding ideology created under the totalitarian regime still exists as the official state canon, but among many leaders there is a weakened commitment to and faith in utopia. Among much of the population, the official canon is seen as an obligatory ritual, and among groups in the "parallel society" or "second culture," there is constant reference to the first culture as a "living lie."[15] This is another source of weakness, of the "hollowing out" of the post-totalitarian regime's apparent strength.

The role of ideology in a post-totalitarian regime is thus diminished from its role under totalitarianism, but it is still quite different from the role of ideology in an authoritarian regime. Most authoritarian regimes have diffuse nondemocratic mentalities, but they do not have highly articulated ideologies concerning the leading role of the party, interest groups, religion, and many other aspects of civil society, political society, the economy, and the state that still exist in a regime we would call post-totalitarian. Therefore, a fundamental contrast between a post-totalitarian and authoritarian regime is that in a post-totalitarian regime there is an important ideological legacy that cannot be ignored and that cannot be questioned officially. The state-sanctioned ideology has a *social presence* in the organizational life of the post-totalitarian polity. Whether it expresses itself in the extensive array of state-sponsored organizations or in the domain of incipient but still officially controlled organizations, ideology is part of the social reality of a post-totalitarian regime to a greater degree than in most authoritarian regimes.

The relative de-ideologization of post-totalitarian regimes and the weakening of the belief in utopia as a foundation of legitimacy mean that, as in many authoritarian regimes, there is a growing effort in a post-totalitarian polity to legitimate the regime on the basis of performance criteria. The gap between the original utopian elements of the ideology and the increasing legitimation efforts on the basis of efficacy, particularly when the latter fails, is one of the sources of weakness in post-totalitarian regimes. Since democracies base their claim to obedience on the procedural foundations of democratic citizenship, as well as performance, they have a layer of insulation against weak performance not available to most post-totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. The weakening of utopian ideology that is a characteristic of post-totalitarianism thus opens up a new dynamic of regime vulnerabilities—or, from the perspective of democratic transition, new opportunities—that can be exploited by the democratic opposition. For example, the discrepancy between the constant reiteration of the importance of ideology and the ideology's growing irrelevance to policymaking or, worse, its transparent contradiction with social reality contribute to undermining the commitment and faith of the middle and lower cadres in the regime. Such a situation can help contribute to the rapid collapse of the regime if midlevel functionaries of the coercive apparatus have grave doubts about their right to shoot citizens who are protesting against the regime and its ideology, as we shall see when we discuss events in 1989 in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.[16]

The final typological difference we need to explore concerns *mobilization.* Most authoritarian regimes never develop complex, all-inclusive networks of association whose purpose is the mobilization of the population. They may have brief periods of intensive mobilization, but these are normally less intensive than in a totalitarian regime and less extensive than in a post-totalitarian regime. In totalitarian regimes, however, there is extensive and intensive mobilization of society into a vast array of regime-created organizations and activities. Because utopian goals are intrinsic to the regime, there is a great effort to mobilize enthusiasm to activate cadres, and most leaders emerge out of these cadres. In the totalitarian system, "privatized" bourgeois individuals at home with their family and friends and enjoying life in the small circle of their own choosing are decried.

In post-totalitarian regimes, the extensive array of institutions of regime-created mobilization vehicles still dominate associational life. However, they have lost their intensity. Membership is still generalized and obligatory but tends to generate more boredom than enthusiasm. State-technocratic employment is an alternative to cadre activism as a successful career path, as long as there is "correct" participation in official organizations. Instead of the mobilization of enthu-

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15. Extensive discussions and references about "parallel society," "second culture," and the "living lie" are found in our chapter on post-totalitarianism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (chap. 17).

16. Daniel V. Friedheim is conducting major research on the question of collapse in such frozen post-totalitarian regimes. See Friedheim, "Regime Collapse in the Peaceful East German Revolution: The Role of Middle-Level Officials," *German Politics* (April 1993): 97–112, and his forthcoming Yale University doctoral dissertation in which he discusses East Germany.

siasm that can be so functional in a totalitarian regime, the networks of ritualized mobilization in a post-totalitarian regime can produce a "cost" of time away from technocratic tasks for professionals and a cost of boredom and flight into private life by many other people. When there is no structural crisis and especially when there is no perception of an available alternative, such privatization is not necessarily a problem for a post-totalitarian regime. Thus, Kadar's famous saying, "Those who are not against us are for us," is a saying that is conceivable only in a post-totalitarian regime, not in a totalitarian one. However, if the performance of a post-totalitarian as opposed to a totalitarian regime is so poor that the personal rewards of private life are eroded, then privatization and apathy may contribute to a new dynamic—especially if alternatives are seen as possible—of crises of "exit," "voice," and "loyalty."[17]

Let us conclude our discussion of post-totalitarianism with a summary of its political and ideological weaknesses. We do this to help enrich the discussion of why these regimes collapsed so rapidly once they entered into prolonged stagnation and the USSR withdrew its extensive coercive support. Indeed in chapter 17, "Varieties of Post-totalitarian Regimes," we develop a theoretical and empirical argument about why frozen post-totalitarian regimes are more vulnerable to collapse than are authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

Totalitarianism, democracy, and even many authoritarian regimes begin with "genetic" legitimacy among their core supporters, given the historical circumstances that led to the establishment of these regimes. By contrast, post-totalitarianism regimes do not have such a founding genetic legitimacy because they emerge out of the routinization, decay, or elite fears of the totalitarian regime. Post-totalitarian regimes, because of coercive resources they inherit and the related weaknesses of organized opposition, can give the appearance of as much or more stability than authoritarian regimes; if external support is withdrawn, however, their inner loss of purpose and commitment make them vulnerable to collapse.

Post-totalitarian politics was a result in part of the moving away from Stalinism, but also of social changes in Communist societies. Post-totalitarian regimes did away with the worst aspects of repression but at the same time maintained most mechanisms of control. Although less bloody than under Stalinism, the presence of security services—like the Stasi in the GDR—sometimes became more pervasive. Post-totalitarianism could have led to moderate reforms in the economy, like those discussed at the time of the Prague Spring, but the Brezhnev restoration stopped dynamic adaptation in the USSR and in most other Soviet-type systems, except for Hungary and Poland.

Post-totalitarianism had probably less legitimacy for the ruling elites and above all the middle-level cadres than had a more totalitarian system. The loss of the utopian component of the ideology and the greater reliance on performance (which after some initial success did not continue) left the regimes vulnerable and ultimately made the use of massive repression less justifiable. Passive compliance and careerism opened the door to withdrawal into private life, weakening the regime so that the opposition could ultimately force it to negotiate or to collapse when it could not rely on coercion.

The weakness of post-totalitarian regimes has not yet been fully analyzed and explained but probably can be understood only by keeping in mind the enormous hopes and energies initially associated with Marxism-Leninism that in the past explained the emergence of totalitarianism and its appeal.[18] Many distinguished and influential Western intellectuals admired or excused Leninism and in the 1930s even Stalinism, but few Western intellectuals on the left could muster enthusiasm for post-totalitarianism in the USSR or even for perestroika and glasnost.

As we shall see in part 4, the emergence and evolution of post-totalitarianism can be the result of three distinct but often interconnected processes: (1) deliberate policies of the rulers to soften or reform the totalitarian system (detotalitarianism by choice), (2) the internal "hollowing out" of the totalitarian regimes' structures and an internal erosion of the cadres' ideological belief in the system (detotalitarianism by decay), and (3) the creation of social, cultural, and even economic spaces that resist or escape totalitarian control (detotalitarianism by societal conquest).

"Sultanism"

A large group of polities, such as Haiti under the Duvaliers, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo, the Central African Republic under Bokassa, the Philippines under Marcos, Iran under the Shah, Romania under Ceauşescu, and North Korea under Kim Il Sung, have had strong tendencies toward an extreme form of patrimonialism that Weber called *sultanism*. For Weber,

patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, *sultanism* tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. . . . Where domination . . . operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called *sultanism* . . . The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists only in the extreme development of the ruler's discretion. It is this which distinguishes it from every form of rational authority.[19]

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17. The reference, of course, is to Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 59. For a fascinating discussion of this dynamic in relation to the collapse of the GDR, see Hirschman, "Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay on Conceptual History," *World Politics* 41 (January 1993): 173–202. We discuss the Kadar quote in greater detail in the chapter on varieties of post-totalitarianism (chap. 17).

18. On the ideological and moral attractiveness of revolutionary Marxist-Leninism as a total system and the "vacuum" left in the wake of its collapse, see Ernest Gellner, "Homeland of the Unrevolution," *Daedalus* (Summer 1993): 141–54.

19. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1:231, 232. Italics in the original.

Weber did not intend the word *sultanism* to imply religious claims to obedience. In fact, under Ottoman rule, the ruler held two distinct offices and titles, that of sultan and that of caliph. Initially, the Ottoman ruler was a sultan, and only after the conquest of Damascus did he assume the title of caliph, which entailed religious authority. After the defeat of Turkey in World War I and the proclamation of the republic, the former ruler lost his title of sultan but retained his religious title of caliph until Atatürk eventually forced him to relinquish even that title. Our point is that the secular and religious dimensions of his authority were conceptually and historically distinguished. Furthermore, the term *sultan* should not be analytically bound to the Middle East. Just as there are mandarins in New Delhi and Paris as well as in Peking and there is a macho style of politics in the Pentagon as well as in Buenos Aires, there are sultanistic rulers in Africa and the Caribbean as well as in the Middle East. What we do want the term *sultanism* to connote is a generic style of domination and regime rulership that is, as Weber says, an extreme form of patrimonialism. In sultanism, the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency toward familial power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the ruler, there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals.

Table 3.1 gives substantial details on what a sultanistic type is in relation to pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership. In this section we attempt to highlight differences between sultanism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism because, while we believe they are distinct ideal types, in any concrete case a specific polity could have a mix of some sultanistic and some authoritarian tendencies (a combination that might open up a variety of transition options) or a mix of sultanistic and totalitarian tendencies (a combination that would tend to eliminate numerous transition options).

In his long essay, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," Juan Linz discussed the special features that make sultanism a distinctive type of nondemocratic regime.[20] Since the sultanistic regime type has not been widely accepted in the literature, we believe it will be useful for us to highlight systematically its distinctive qualities so as to make more clear the implications of this type of regime for the patterns of democratic resistance and the problems of democratic consolidation.

In sultanism, there is a high fusion by the ruler of the private and the public. The sultanistic polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan. In this domain there is no rule of law and there is low institutionalization. In sultanism there may be extensive social and economic pluralism, but almost never political pluralism, because political power is so directly related to the ruler's person. However, the essential reality in a sultanistic regime is that all individuals, groups, and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable and despotic intervention of the sultan, and thus all pluralism is precarious.

In authoritarianism there may or may not be a rule of law, space for a semi-opposition, or space for regime moderates who might establish links with opposition moderates, and there are normally extensive social and economic activities that function within a secure framework of relative autonomy. Under sultanism, however, there is no rule of law, no space for a semiopposition, no space for regime moderates who might negotiate with democratic moderates, and no sphere of the economy or civil society that is not subject to the despotic exercise of the sultan's will. As we demonstrate in the next chapter, this critical difference between pluralism in authoritarian and sultanistic regimes has immense implications for the types of transition that are *available* in an authoritarian regime but *unavailable* in a sultanistic regime.

There is also a sharp contrast in the function and consequences of ideology between totalitarian and sultanistic regimes. In a totalitarian regime not only is there an elaborate and guiding ideology, but ideology has the function of legitimating the regime, and rulers are often somewhat constrained by their own value system and ideology. They or their followers, or both, believe in that ideology as a point of reference and justification for their actions. In contrast, a sultanistic ruler characteristically has no elaborate and guiding ideology. There may be highly personalistic statements with pretensions of being an ideology, often named after the sultan, but this ideology is elaborated after the ruler has assumed power, is subject to extreme manipulation, and, most importantly, is not believed to be constraining on the ruler and is relevant only as long as he practices it. Thus, there could be questions raised as to whether Stalin's practices and statements were consistent with Marxism-Leninism, but there would be no reason for anyone to debate whether Trujillo's statements were consistent with Trujilloism. The contrast between authoritarian and sultanistic regimes is less stark over ideology; however, the distinctive mentalities that are a part of most authoritarian alliances are normally more constraining on rulers than is the sultan's idiosyncratic and personal ideology.

The extensive and intensive mobilization that is a feature of totalitarianism is seldom found in a sultanistic regime because of its low degree of institutionalization and its low commitment to an overarching ideology. The low degree of organization means that any mobilization that does occur is uneven and sporadic. Probably the biggest difference between sultanistic mobilization and authoritarian mobilization is the tendency within sultanism (most dramatic in the case of the Duvalier's Tonton Macoutes in Haiti) to use para-state groups linked to the sultan to wield violence and terror against anyone who opposes the ruler's will. These para-state groups are not modern bureaucracies with generalized norms and procedures; rather, they are direct extensions of the sultan's will. They have no significant institutional autonomy. As Weber stressed, they are purely "personal instruments of the master."

20. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," 259–63.

Finally, how does leadership differ in sultanism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism? The essence of sultanism is *unrestrained personal rulership*. This personal rulership is, as we have seen, unconstrained by ideology, rational-legal norms, or any balance of power. "Support is based not on a coincidence of interest between preexisting privileged social groups and the ruler but on interests created by his rule, rewards he offers for loyalty, and the fear of his vengeance."[21]

In one key respect leadership under sultanism and totalitarianism is similar. In both regimes the leader rules with undefined limits on his power and there is great unpredictability for elites and nonelites alike. In this respect, a Stalin and a Somoza are alike. However, there are important differences. The elaborate ideology, with its sense of nonpersonal and public mission, is meant to play an important legitimating function in totalitarian regimes. The ideological pronouncements of a totalitarian leader are taken seriously not only by his followers and cadres, but also by the society and intellectuals, including—in the cases of Leninism, Stalinism, and Marxism (and even fascism)—by intellectuals outside the state in which the leader exercises control. This places a degree of organizational, social, and ideological constraint on totalitarian leadership that is not present in sultanistic leadership. Most importantly, the intense degree to which rulership is personal in sultanism makes the *dynastic* dimension of rulership normatively acceptable and empirically common, whereas the public claims of totalitarianism make dynastic ambition, if not unprecedented, at least aberrant.

The leadership dimension shows an even stronger contrast between authoritarianism and sultanism. As Linz stated in his discussion of authoritarianism, leadership is exercised in an authoritarian regime "with formally ill-defined but actually quite predictable" norms.[22] In most authoritarian regimes some bureaucratic entities play an important part. These bureaucratic entities often retain or generate their own norms, which imply that there are procedural and normative limits on what leaders can ask them to do in their capacity as, for example, military officers, judges, tax officials, or police officers. However, a sultanistic leader simply "demands unconditional administrative compliance, for the official's loyalty to his office is not an impersonal commitment to impersonal tasks that define the extent and content of his office, but rather a servant's loyalty based on a strictly personal relationship to the ruler and an obligation that in principle permits no limitation."[23]

We have now spelled out the central tendencies of five ideal-type regimes in the modern world, four of which are nondemocratic. We are ready for the next step, which is to explore why and how the *type* of prior nondemocratic regime has an important effect on the democratic transition paths available and the tasks to be addressed before democracy can be consolidated.

21. Ibid., 260.
22. Ibid., 255.
23. Ibid., 260.

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The Implications of Prior Regime Type for Transition Paths and Consolidation Tasks

Having analyzed the necessary conditions for a consolidated democracy and then spelled out the key differences among the four ideal-typical nondemocratic regimes, it should be clear that the characteristics of the previous nondemocratic regime have profound implications for the transition *paths* available and the *tasks* different countries face when they begin their struggles to develop consolidated democracies. Within the logic of our ideal types, it is conceivable that a particular authoritarian regime in its late stages might have a robust civil society, a legal culture supportive of constitutionalism and rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy that operates within professional norms, and a reasonably well-institutionalized economic society. For such a polity, the first and only necessary item on the initial democratization agenda would relate to political society—that is, the creation of the autonomy, authority, power, and legitimacy of democratic institutions. We argue in chapter 6 that Spain, in the early 1970s, approximated this position. However, if the starting point were from a totalitarian regime of the communist subtype, democratic consolidation would entail the task of simultaneously crafting not only political society and economic society, but also every single arena of a democracy as well. The full implications of these arguments are spelled out in a more systematic and detailed manner in tables 4.2 and 4.3, but here let us first depict the argument in its most stark form, table 4.1.

The analytic utility of distinguishing between post-totalitarian and totalitarian regimes should now be clear. As table 4.1 demonstrates, it is conceivable that a post-totalitarian regime could begin a transition to democracy with a combination of low-medium or medium scores on each condition necessary for a consolidated democracy except for the autonomy of political society. Hungary in early and mid-1989 came closest to approximating this position. While the tasks facing democrats starting from a mature post-totalitarian regime are challenging, they are substantially less than those facing democrats starting from a totalitarian regime. However, it should also be clear that, precisely because post-totalitarian regimes have a prior totalitarian period, there will be *legacies* to over-

Non-Democratic Regimes

Second Edition

Paul Brooker

Introduction

Studying non-democratic regimes: why and how

Although it appeared at the beginning of the twenty-first century that the world had entered an 'age of democracy', there now seems to be a more pessimistic mood about democracy's global prospects – and about whether non-democratic rule is becoming extinct. At least the twenty-first century seems unlikely to experience sufficiently 'hard times' to trigger a new wave of 'traditional' forms of dictatorship. Military rule may be a possibility in countries that are faced with worst-case scenarios, but it is more likely that there will be (1) camouflaged or disguised dictatorships that claim to be 'democratic' and (2) an acceptance of a flawed form of democracy as being 'good enough', even if it is really no more than semidemocracy. However, semidemocracy is better studied as a flawed form of democracy than as a non-democratic regime, and it is still too early to discern why and how non-democratic rule may continue to survive and evolve in the twenty-first century.

In any case, whatever the future may hold, there are several good reasons for studying the non-democratic regimes of the past and present. One reason is simply that the global wave of democratization lost momentum in the early 1990s and left some important non-democratic regimes in place. They still govern a significant proportion of the world's population, with the Chinese communist regime alone ruling a quarter of humanity, and they are still a source of international tension or concern, such as oil-rich Iran and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, non-democratic regimes have played a very influential role in the history of government and politics. Non-democratic government, whether by elders, chiefs, monarchs, aristocrats, empires, military regimes or one-party states, has been the norm for most of human history. As late as the 1970s non-democratic government was more common than democracy, and for a large part of the twentieth

century first fascism and then communism seemed to have replaced democracy as the 'wave of the future'. Thirdly, the study of non-democratic regimes highlights the moral ambiguities and contrasts involved in government and politics. Such dictators as Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot have become notorious for the millions of deaths that they have caused, but, at the other extreme, non-democratic regimes have also produced leaders who are still regarded by large numbers of people in their countries and around the world as being morally exemplary, courageous heroes, founding fathers, patriotic statesmen, progressive politicians or tragic martyrs.

Fourthly, it is important to be aware of the differences in not only the personal behaviour of different rulers but also the structural behaviour of different types of non-democratic regime. For example, there are major behavioural differences between dictatorship by the military and by a political party. Unlike their popular image, military dictatorships have been more unstable than their civilian counterparts. Countercoups by soldiers discontented with the existing military government have been so frequent that attempted coups are actually twice as common in military regimes as in civilian regimes (Nordlinger, 1977: 140). A more important form of instability is the frequency with which the military peacefully relinquishes power to civilians and 'return[s] to the barracks' – in fact the average life of military regimes is only about five years (*ibid*.: 139). In turn, this is often because the military had quite limited and short-term political goals when it seized power and therefore had always intended to retain power for only a few years (*ibid*.: 142–3). In the many cases where the military has such limited goals, its seizure of power may have little effect upon the lives of ordinary citizens, in the sense of those who are not involved in politics and are not viewed as enemies by the new regime.

The same could not be said of the onset of some party dictatorships, such as the Nazis' takeover of Germany or the communists' takeover of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. Towards the end of that war, a group of elderly workers in Nazi Germany was heard to remark 'that they had little concern for the future: that they had had to work hard under the [monarchical] Kaiser, in the [democratic] Weimar Republic, and in the [Nazi] Third Reich, and had probably no more and no less to expect from [communist] Bolshevism than hard work and low

wages' (Kershaw, 1983: 314). But many of their fellow citizens had more reason to fear the coming of communist dictatorship. Peasant farmers and small-businessmen, as well as wealthy landowners and industrialists, were likely to lose their land or businesses through communist collectivization of agriculture and expropriation of the private sector. More importantly, the small Jewish minority of their fellow citizens had already suffered greatly from the Nazi dictatorship, with many having lost their *lives* as well as their livelihood.

Finally, the study of non-democratic regimes offers a comparative perspective on democracy. Comparisons between non-democratic and democratic regimes can be made across a wide range of areas, such as state-building, consolidation of new regimes, government policies and performance, policy-making and even style of government. Furthermore, all democracies have emerged from a background of non-democratic rule, whether by a local regime or by a foreign power, and have inherited some features from this non-democratic past. Indeed, the tendency for these non-democratic legacies and other factors to distort transitions to democracy has focused attention on the need to define or assess democracy in a way that readily distinguishes between (a) the *flawed* democracy of (transitional or more permanent) semidemocracy and (b) the distinctive absence of democracy in *non-*democratic regimes, even when they use a sophisticated disguise of multiparty democracy.

On the other hand, if the non-democratic regimes have nothing more in common than *not* being democracies (or semidemocracies), they can hardly be studied as an intellectually coherent category of regimes. If economists were asked to study 'non-market' economies, they would point out in some bewilderment or amusement that this covered (a) primitive economies that had not yet developed market mechanisms; (b) communist state-owned/planned economies that had rejected the use of market mechanisms in favour of central planning; and (c) capitalist economies that espoused market mechanisms, but in reality were characterized by monopolies, cartels and other anti-competitive practices. However, political science is a less rigorous discipline and is quite happy to throw in together (a) ruling monarchies, (b) communist party dictatorships and (c) democratically disguised dictatorships as a single area of study and expertise. It also long ago developed methods for giving coherence to a col-

lection of different types of regime, such as employing a historical perspective and utilizing the term 'modernization'.

Modernizing to survive: the three phases of modernization

It has long been the conventional wisdom that non-democratic rule has become a political anachronism. In particular, it now seems hard to believe that hereditary monarchy could have ever been accepted as a legitimate way of governing and not have provoked constant bouts of armed rebellion, such as that of the American colonists against King George III, against the very notion that political power can be inherited like a piece of family property. But the anachronistic nature of non-democratic rule does not mean that it is doomed to extinction. Political anachronisms can continue to survive through continual modernization, whether they be non-democratic rule, hereditary monarchy, or even armed rebellion.

In the case of non-democratic rule there have been three phases of modernization. The first phase began some two hundred years ago with Napoleon Bonaparte's use of plebiscites (referendums) to legitimize his military dictatorship and eventual assumption of the title of Emperor. A military commander's seizure of power was nothing new in world history. The Imperial throne of the ancient Roman Empire had often been fought over by military commanders, and the monarchical title of Emperor is derived from the Latin *imperator* (commander). But Bonaparte had put forward a new answer to the problem of how to legitimize a military seizure of power; he had hypocritically adopted the 'will of the people' principle espoused by the democratic ideology of the American and French revolutions. He had also claimed that his coup was aimed at rectifying the weaknesses of the Directory regime set up after the French revolution, and here, too, he was pioneering what would become a traditional justification for military coups. Its more authoritarian form would describe the military intervention in such terms as an 'iron surgeon' having to remove the gangrened or cancerous corruption afflicting the body politic (Ben-Ami, 1983: 58); its more liberal form would emphasize the intent to introduce democracy or a 'better' democracy. Such 'democratic' justifications were used by the many mil-

itary dictators in nineteenth-century Latin America (Rouquié, 1987: 32–3), and by the most common form of non-democratic regime in the twentieth century – rule by the military or its leader.

The second phase of modernization was similar to the first in paying homage to democracy and involving rule by an organization or its leader. But the regime included a new form of organization – a political party – and added an ideology to become the distinctively twentieth-century form of non-democratic rule, the *ideological one-party state*, which politically and militarily rivalled democracy for much of that century. First came the communist dictatorship that emerged from the October 1917 revolution in Russia (renamed the 'Soviet Union'). Its Marxist-Leninist ideology espoused not only socialism but also 'leadership' by the Communist Party over state and society. During the 1920s–30s, though, communism was overshadowed by the emergence of fascist dictatorships – Mussolini's Fascist regime and Hitler's Nazi regime – whose nationalist/racist ideology espoused personal dictatorship by the party leader over state and society.

The second-phase modernized dictatorships continued to pay homage to (their interpretation of) democracy and went through the motions of plebiscitary (one-party) elections to (powerless) parliaments. But they declared that the old, multiparty competitive form of democracy was outmoded and had been replaced by their new, communist or fascist form in which the popular will was embodied or led by the communist party or the fascist leader. Thus the regimes of this second phase of modernization had turned the tables on democracy by arguing that *it* was the anachronistic political system and that they were the wave of the future.

What is more, this open political rivalry was accompanied by a military rivalry that in the fascist case soon became open warfare – and seemed briefly to be very successful warfare. By the middle of 1940 Nazi Germany seemed set to conquer or control the whole of Europe and to lead its Axis alliance to world domination. At that time US policy makers found 'it was not too difficult to envision a future in which the United States . . . holding on to a political system that seemed ineffective and anachronistic, would find itself, at best, a single island in a hostile sea; at worst, it would battle alone against an Axis invasion of the American hemisphere' (Christman, 1992: 246).

Although the Second World War instead led to the destruction of the fascist regimes, it also led on to a huge expansion in the number of *communist* dictatorships. By the end of the 1940s they had been established throughout Eastern Europe and in China and North Korea. The only major additions to the ranks of communist regimes in the 1950s–60s were North Vietnam and Cuba, but Africa was producing many examples of a new type of ideological party dictatorship that became known as the 'African one-party state'. It is true that the 1960s–70s spread of military dictatorships through the Third World destroyed the majority of these African one-party states as well as many newly established democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America – so that the Third World came to be dominated by the military rather than party type of dictatorship. However, these military regimes were in many cases a second-phase form of military dictatorship that boasted an ideology and official party, such as Nasser's Arab Socialism and ASU in Egypt or Ne Win's Burmese Socialism and BSPP in Burma (Myanmar). In any case, the key point is that by the 1970s the countries of the Third World were predominantly under non-democratic rule and in combination with the Second World of communist dictatorships had relegated democracy to being, if not an outmoded, then a somewhat unusual form of rule.

But already in the 1970s a wave of democratization was beginning to build that would sweep away in the 1980s–90s most military and party dictatorships, including the Soviet Union superpower, only a few years after these first-phase and second-phase modernized non-democratic regimes had reached their numerical peak. However, this global wave of democratization also seems to have instigated a *third* phase of modernization, which involves abandoning ideology and one-partyism in favour of disguising dictatorship as a multiparty democracy. (In fact the liberal Mexican revolutionary dictatorship had pioneered the disguised-dictatorship approach in the early twentieth century and had lasted longer than the Soviet Union's pioneering communist ideological one-party state.) It seemed that the long-term future of non-democratic rule, including any hope of reviving its global prominence, lay in avoiding open rivalry with democracy and adopting an 'if you can't beat them, (appear) to join them' approach. And there was good reason for existing or potential dictatorships to believe that the worst of global democratization

was over and that they could make a successful adaptation to the new age of democracy.

Problems of democratization

In recent years there has been some disillusionment with the 1970s–90s wave of democratization for failing to 'finish the job'. For not only have some of the old non-democratic regimes continued to survive, but also too many of the transitions from non-democratic rule have yet to produce a true democracy – and indeed have sometimes slid back into some form of dictatorship.

The failure of the 1970s–90s wave of democratization to remove all non-democratic regimes could be readily explained by pointing to the zoological analogy of reptiles surviving into the age of mammals. Nonetheless, it is surprising that these old non-democratic regimes have continued to survive so successfully. For example, Brooker's (1997) book on dictatorships that were continuing to survive 'in a democratic age' focused on four communist regimes (China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba) and on four Middle Eastern dictatorships (Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran). Ten years later the only one of these eight dictatorships that had not continued to survive was Iraq, which had been ended by military invasion rather than by some form of democratization. Furthermore, the democratization instituted in Iraq after the invasion has been as problematic as Edelstein (2004) predicted in his scholarly analysis and assessment of over 20 historical cases of military occupation by the US or other countries in the period 1815–2003.

The seven other dictatorships in the 'sample' had not only survived but also shown that they could cope with the potentially crisis-producing problem of *succession*. North Korea had consolidated its hereditary succession from the personal rule of father Kim Il Sung to son Kim Jong Il, Syria had carried through a similar hereditary succession from Hafiz to Bashir Asad, and Cuba was preparing for a succession from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul. Similarly, the institutional rather than personal dictatorships of China, Vietnam and Iran had passed the torch of collective leadership to a new political generation. The general impression was one of remarkable regime stability in a suppos-

edly 'democratic age'; these were reptiles doing very well for themselves in the age of mammals.

This was perhaps not as disconcerting as the number of transitions to democracy that were not doing well and were producing what seemed to be evolutionary 'digressions' or 'regressions'. Too many democratizing transitions from non-democratic rule have failed to go on and produce the expected result of democracy. The transitions have too often stalled at a level of democracy that is no more than *semi*democracy or have fallen back into some form of dictatorship that is usually disguised as democracy. However, the difficulties of democratization are nothing new in history, and in fact had been noted more than 50 years earlier by Joseph Schumpeter when presenting what would become political science's most influential theory of democracy – directly and as the basis for the Downsian, rational-choice approach to democracy (Schumpeter, 1974 [1942]; Downs, 1957: 29 n. 11).

Schumpeter's conception of democracy is viewed even by its supporters as being 'minimalist', as 'just a system in which rulers are selected by competitive elections' (Przeworski, 1999: 23). But he also presented a far from minimal set of preconditions for a democracy's success, notably its success in reproducing itself and not being replaced by non-democratic rule (Schumpeter, 1974 [1942]: 290 n.5, 290–6). Among his preconditions were (1) the personnel factor of having politicians who are honest, reasonable and capable of providing inspiring leadership, (2) the institutional as well as personnel factor of having a strong and competent civil service and (3) the presence of 'democratic self-control' in the sense of (a) keeping political conflict within procedural rules, (b) keeping some issues out of the political arena and (c) being willing to compromise about any interests and ideals that politics involves. Demanding such extensive self-control, and such effective civil servants and politicians, would be asking a lot of the new democracies that began appearing after the Second World War as part of the democratic age that emerged in the 1940s – and had died out by the 1960s.

The emerging democratic age was the product of three different processes in different parts of the world. The first was the de-axisification process that took place in Europe and Northeast Asia immediately after the Second World War, which involved

democratization of the former Axis powers – Germany, Italy and Japan – and of states that had been their dependencies or allies or had been conquered by the Axis powers in the early years of the war. The de-axisification had shown how important a role external powers and intervention could play in the failure or success of democratization, as in the eastern European and northern Korean territories under the influence of the Soviet Union the democratization slid back into a communist form of dictatorship rather than developing into a democracy or semidemocracy.

The second process was the wave of decolonization in Asia and Africa that began after the Second World War but would continue on into the 1950s–60s. The dozens of ex-colonial territories that became independent states would typically start out as a democratic or semidemocratic state because the British, French or other colonial empire had staged some kind of decolonizing elections in the territory and had handed over power to the local leaders who had won these elections. But as was noted earlier, most of these new Third World states soon become military regimes or one-party states, and in the African region even created a new variant of ideological one-party state that claimed to have developed an appropriately African form of democracy and socialism.

The third process was the onset in Latin America of one of the region's cyclical periods of democracy. Latin America had experienced its wave of decolonization in the nineteenth century but had become stalled in a cyclical pattern of alternating periods of democracy and dictatorship, with each period lasting about 20 years (Seligson, 1987: 3-4). One of these periods of democracy arrived in the 1940s–50s and, about 20 years later, would be replaced by a period of military dictatorship that coincided with the 1960s–70s shift to military or one-party rule in many of the newly decolonized states.

Considering the failings of the democratic age produced by these three processes, it is perhaps surprising that political scientists were not more sceptical or pessimistic about the new democratic age that was apparently being produced by the 1970s–90s wave of democratization. It is true that in the 1980s experts on Latin America were actually *too* pessimistic about the long-term prospects of the wave of democratization that had swept their region:

most scholars expert in the region remain *sceptical* regarding the long-term significance of this change. They quickly point to previous periods in Latin American history, such as the years immediately following World War II, the 1920s and earlier periods, going all the way back to the 1820s, when democratic forms of government seemed to be taking hold. In each period, however, democracy proved ephemeral. Democratic regimes were readily replaced by authoritarian regimes which often were *more repressive* than those that had preceded them. (Seligson, 1987: 3 emphases added)

But the continuing spread of democratization in other regions of the world, especially the dramatic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, led to the more confident assessment that this was a *global* wave of democratization – and led to some justifiable confidence about the prospects of this new age of democracy.

The notion that a 'third wave' of global democratization had begun in the 1970s and extended into the 1990s is associated with Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), which compared this third wave to what he identified as two earlier waves of democratization – in 1828–1926 and 1943–62. Although Huntington was cautious about the extent and long-term prospects of the new wave, the disintegration of the partially democratized Soviet Union into 15 new states at the end of 1991 seemed to put the seal on democracy's triumph. What is more, there was good reason to feel confident about the long-term prospects of this wave of democratization compared to that of the 1940s–60s. Important historical changes, globally and regionally, had created more favourable local environments for democratization. This time there would be no external powers derailing or diverting democratization like the Soviet influence that had diverted Eastern European de-axisification into a wave of communist expansion. Nor would there be any wave of decolonization associated with one or more region's democratization; the nearest equivalent would be the way in which the five Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union became independent states while undergoing democratization. Finally, the TINA (there is no alternative) factor would be very evident globally, as the various forms of military or one-party dictatorship had already been tried and

found wanting – there was no point in returning to these failed alternatives to democracy.

Another reason for continuing optimism, even when some problems began to appear, was that these did not take the form of blatant backsliding into open military rule or into an obvious one-party state. Instead there was the stalling at semidemocracy or the slide back into a democratically disguised form of dictatorship. In recent years the democratically disguised dictatorship has been widely recognized as a serious threat to democracy, with books describing 'the rise of semi-authoritarianism' and 'electoral authoritarianism' (Ottaway, 2003; Schedler, 2006). But this wolf-in-sheep's-clothing approach had been identified as early as the mid-1990s, when a largely historical analysis of one-party states had warned that these twentieth century dictatorships' readiness to challenge democracy in ideological and political combat would soon be replaced by a different strategy – using the trappings of multiparty democracy to camouflage dictatorship. Indeed their 'resort to camouflage will produce a new and perplexing challenge for the democracies – how to prevent the twenty-first century from being the century of pseudo-democracy' (Brooker, 1995: 256).

By the mid-1990s, too, there was a growing awareness among experts on democratization that the 'third wave' might be spent and perhaps actually receding. Huntington was already seeing signs of a possible reversal of the third wave, as Diamond pointed out in the quite pessimistic diagnosis and prognosis that he presented at the end of the decade (1999: 64). He warned not only that the third wave seemed to be losing momentum but also that 'most third-wave democracies' were suffering from defects that could 'extinguish democracy altogether in many countries unless they were corrected' by a consolidation that 'encompassed a shift in *political culture*' that would strengthen the legitimacy of the democratic political system and the loyalty to the democratic regime (*ibid*.: 64–66). This emphasis on political culture is somewhat similar to Schumpeter's earlier-described precondition of 'democratic self-control' and to his argument that democratic self-control in turn requires certain 'national habits' that 'have not everywhere had the opportunity to evolve and which the democratic method itself cannot be relied on to produce' (1974: 295).

The pessimism that was evident by the end of the 1990s has itself been consolidated by experts on democratization. For

example, one has made a famous call for 'the end of the transition paradigm' because so many of the countries still referred to as 'transitional' were not in fact on the way to becoming democracies but instead had arrived at something less than democracy (Carothers, 2004 [2002]). And a very recent example of this pessimism is a textbook assessment of attempts by democratic states and non-governmental organizations to promote democracy in countries that were untouched by the third wave or whose democratization eventually produced merely semidemocracy or even a dictatorship. Apparently democracy promotion has worked best 'where it was least needed' because the conditions were favourable and events were moving in a democratic direction (Burnell, 2008: 645):

> Moreover, democracy promotion could become even more challenging in the future. The most receptive countries have now become democracies, particularly the states that have joined the European Union. Strong opposition from the ruling elites and unfavourable socio-economic conditions characterize many of the world's remaining non-democracies. There are many of them. To illustrate, Freedom House in its annual surveys reckons the number of states still 'not free' remains on average around fifty. Another fifty or so states are classified as only 'partly free'. (*Ibid*.: 648)

The persistence of non-democratic regimes

Considering the pessimistic prognosis about democratization there seems good reason to expect that non-democratic regimes will be a feature of the political landscape for decades to come. Furthermore, their persistence may well involve not merely the continuing survival of long-standing examples but also the survival of some *recent* examples and the birth of some *new* ones. For looking ahead into the future of our new century, there seem to be several negative factors that will hinder further democratization and indeed may create pressures towards a revival of non-democratic rule. These factors have been rated below as 1, 2 and 3 in terms of the present public perceptions of the dangers lying ahead in the twenty-first century, but they might well have been rated in the reverse order:

1. climate change = medium and long-term geographic/economic effects with domestic and international political implications;
   a. domestic pressure on democracies and semidemocracies;
   b. international conflicts that will have advantages for non-democratic regimes.
2. financial problems and resource shortages = short- and medium-term economic effects with domestic and international political implications;
   a. domestic pressure on financially weak or resource-needy democracies and semidemocracies;
   b. domestic and international advantages for financially strong or resource-*rich* non-democratic regimes.
3. terrorism/insurgency = short- and medium-term domestic and international political effects;
   a. international strategic-based advantages for non-democratic regimes, as in Cold War;
   b. domestic security-based pressures on democracies and semidemocracies in the medium term when apocalyptic biological and nanotechnological weapons become available to insurgents.

However, it is safer to assume that these factors are more likely to lead to populist or paranoid *semidemocracy* rather than dictatorship, even of a disguised type, and to encourage a revival of semidemocracy. After all, semidemocracy had a long history before the emergence of full democracy, even if in those days semidemocracy took the pre-modern form of a property-restricted and/or gender-restricted franchise (as New Zealand was the only country before the twentieth century to extend the franchise to the female half of the population). In contrast, the modern semidemocracies have a universal franchise or suffrage and fall short of full democracy only in terms of their representative institutions and processes.

Of course this raises the fundamental problem of distinguishing between semidemocracy and dictatorship – especially when the latter is a democratically disguised dictatorship. One answer to the problem is to go back to the classic, ancient Greek emphasis on 'who rules?' and to the original, ancient Greek meaning of democracy as the rule of the people, which created an important contrast with aristocracy as rule of the few/best and with autocracy as rule of the one individual. And when its

conception of 'the people' is updated to mean universal suffrage, defining democracy as the rule of the people creates a similarly important contrast with modern personal rule and with organizational rule by a party or military – including those that have used a democratic disguise. So it also provides a clear contrast between (a) semidemocracy as the *flawed* rule of the people and (b) democratically disguised dictatorship as the rule of some *other* entity than the people.

However, the concept of *the rule of* the people also needs to be brought up to date to deal with some long-standing objections, such as those raised by such modern classic theorists of democracy as Schumpeter and Popper. As a prelude to presenting his own, competitive-elections definition of democracy Schumpeter launched a blistering attack on 'popular will' notions of democracy, while Popper rejected any notion of translating 'democracy' into 'the rule of the people'. Although the people 'may influence the actions of their rulers by the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense' (Popper, 1962: 125–6). But as both these theorists of democracy emphasized the importance of the institutional element in democracy, they would hardly object to reframing 'the rule of the people' in terms of the *principal-agent* relationship that has been widely used in institutional economics and has also been adopted by some versions of the 'new institutionalism' in political science – which have included analyses of democratic and non-democratic rule in principal-agent terms (see Chapters 1 and 4 and Exhibit 1.1). From this perspective, the people 'rule' as a collective principal that chooses agents – through competitive elections – who rule on their behalf and may be dismissed by them at the next elections if the majority of the people prefer an alternative agent or set of agents. But if the elections are very *imperfectly* competitive, there is a *flawed*, only semidemocratic, principal-agent relationship between the people and their agents. Yet so long as the people can still use these electoral institutions to dismiss their agents it is *not* a democratically disguised *dictatorship* – ruled by an individual monarchical-like person or by an organization through its agent(s).

On the other hand, the classic question of 'who rules?' remains the best way of framing any study of non-democratic regimes because it begs two other crucial questions about these regimes – *how* do they rule and *why* do they rule? The three-dimensional

approach of who/how/why has been becoming more prominent in recent analyses of non-democratic rule (Snyder, 2006; Brooker, 2008), and it plays an important part in this book. For example, not only Chapter 1 on theoretical approaches but also Chapters 5 and 6 on *control and policies* highlight the importance of 'how they rule', notably the extreme degree of control and the extreme policies of such totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany. From this perspective the latest phase of modernization of non-democratic rule is at least not as dangerous as the previous phase, which introduced the ideological one-party states and their ideologically driven, often extreme ambitions.

In comparison, the democratically disguised dictatorship is restricted in how it rules by its supposedly democratic claim to *legitimacy*, described in Chapters 5 and 8, which is its domestic and international justification for *why* it rules. The restriction on how it rules goes beyond preventing it from eliminating all independent political parties. For, as Schumpeter pointed out, democracy's competitive elections involve and require some degree of liberalism – even if only political liberalism – in the form of considerable freedom of the press and considerable freedom of discussion for all citizens (Schumpeter, 1974: 272). So some apparent freedom of the press and of discussion will have to be preserved; the censor and the secret police cannot be too evident without damaging the credibility of the democratic disguise. Regardless of who rules such regimes, the justification for why they rule will therefore restrict how they rule to something far below the ideologically driven extremism that ended or manipulated so many lives in the twentieth century.

Chapter 1
Theoretical Approaches

The study of non-democratic regimes is blessed or cursed by a bewildering variety of different theoretical approaches. There are three basic reasons for the variety of different approaches: (1) the diverse range of regimes involved; (2) the different aspects of the regimes that different theorists have focused upon; and (3) the 'sociology of knowledge' in political science, in terms of how the discipline is organized and operates. As non-democratic regimes include such a diverse range of regimes, it is not surprising that different approaches have been used to deal with the different types, such as military rule or the personal rule of a monarch or personal dictator. Furthermore, some approaches are less concerned with the 'who rules?' question than with the question of '*how* do they rule?' – with the form rather than type of regime. This focus on form is particularly evident in the theories about the famous 'isms'; the theorists of totalitarianism and authoritarianism are concerned with the level and method of control, while theorists of communism and fascism focus on ideology and policies when identifying examples of communist or fascist regime.

As the different types and perspectives are often not mutually exclusive, the same regime may be described or labelled in several different ways. And this can be done in a cumulative fashion that combines several different approaches. For example, Hitler's Nazi Germany could be described as a (1) fascist (2) totalitarian (3) one-party state (4) ruled by a personal dictator.

In this chapter the focus will be on the three main groups of theoretical approaches that together provide a comprehensive and multifaceted insight into non-democratic regimes. The two groups concerned with types and 'who rules?' are (1) the personal-rule approaches and (2) the 'military regime' and 'one-party state' institutional approaches. The third group includes the theoretical approaches of totalitarianism and authoritarianism and also indirectly the two other 'isms', communism and fascism, as both of them are covered by theories of totalitari-

anism. Although the notion of totalitarianism usually fails to highlight their different ideologies and policies, the distinctive features of communist and fascist regimes will be described in later chapters, especially those on legitimacy and policies.

The totalitarian-authoritarian approach

The most widely recognized theoretical approaches to non-democratic regimes are theories or concepts of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. They are less interested in the traditional regime-defining question of 'who rules?' than in the wider question of '*how* do they rule?' and particularly their level and methods of control. In the case of totalitarianism, the leading textbook on the subject summed up the essence of totalitarian rule as an ever-present *total control* over the individual (Schapiro, 1972: 117). And authoritarian rule could be summed up, in almost residual terms, as non-democratic rule that does not seek such a high level of control and so does not have to use such extreme methods as totalitarianism.

Totalitarianism

The notion of totalitarian rule emerged in the 1920s–30s as part of the ideology of fascist Italy. The fascist 'totalitarian' state's aspirations were pithily described by its ruler, Mussolini, in the slogan: 'everything in the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing against the State'. But when the notion of totalitarian rule re-emerged in the 1950s as a prominent concept in Western political science, it was used to describe *communist* as well as fascist extremism and was based upon knowledge of Stalin's communist rule as well as knowledge of Hitler's fascist regime.

By then, too, a new image of total control – and of the methods used to achieve it – had emerged in Orwell's futuristic novel *1984*. Writing in 1948, Orwell had described tyrannical rule by a political party that maintained total control of *thought* as well as actions by means of 'thought police', comprehensive censorship and continuous indoctrination or propaganda that exploited the futuristic technology of two-way 'telescreens' (used for surveillance as well as broadcasting) located in the home as well as public places. The indoctrination and propaganda was

focused on the official ideology, Ingsoc, and a supposedly infallible leader, Big Brother, whose absolute power was supposedly accompanied by a big-brotherly affection for his followers. Although this 1984 form of rule went beyond the level of control that could be expected of any totalitarian regimes of Orwell's own era, he had noted in the novel that such an extreme form of rule 'had been foreshadowed by the various systems, generally called totalitarian, which had appeared earlier in the century' (1954 [1949]: 164). His imaginative portrayal of what became known as an 'Orwellian' nightmare had therefore created a standard or benchmark of what a totalitarian regime could be expected to achieve if it had sufficient resources and such technology as the telescreens.

The theories of totalitarianism presented by Western political scientists in the 1950s depicted a regime that seemed Orwellian in at least its aspirations or intent. Arendt's 1951 pioneering work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* depicted totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship that was intent on attaining 'the permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life' (1962 [1951]: 326). Such an extreme dictatorship had so far produced only two examples of totalitarian dictatorship – Hitler's Nazi regime and Stalin's rule over communist Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. She downplayed the ideological/policy differences between the rightist Nazis and leftist communists, declaring that in practice it made little difference whether totalitarians organized the masses in the name of race or of class (*ibid.*: 313*)*. Of course this difference in ideology/policy *was* of great practical importance to the massacred minority races, such as Jews or Gypsies, and the socially eliminated classes, such as farm or business owners. And indeed the lack of concern with the ideological/policy differences between the Nazi racist, sexist and militarist regime and the communist Marxist-Leninist regime is a widely recognized problem with the totalitarian approach.

However, Arendt emphasized the importance of ideology *per se* for such regimes. It is the means of psychologically, internally dominating the individual, and the ideology's desire to transform human nature provides the regime with a reason as well as a road map for the all-pervading totalitarian organization of human life (*ibid.*: 325, 363, 458). Arendt did not explore in any detail the indoctrinating methods the regime uses to instil its ide-

ology and psychological, internal domination; her emphasis was more on the coercive, external aspects of control carried out by the secret police – which she described as the elite formations and super-party of a totalitarian regime (*ibid.*: 380, 413, 420).

But even more important than the secret police is the functionally indispensable *leader* figure – the Stalin or Hitler (*ibid.*: 374–5, 387). The regime is so closely identified with the leader and his infallibility as interpreter of the ideology that any move to restrain or replace him would prove disastrous for the regime. He can count on the loyalty of his subordinates, monopolize the right to explain ideology and policy, and behave as if he were above the regime's political party and other organizations.

In comparison, Friedrich and Brzezinski's 1956 *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* provided a more detailed and widely applicable theory than Arendt's. The newer theory's examples included not only Nazi Germany and the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but also communist China and fascist Italy, even if the latter was acknowledged to be only a borderline case. However, the most distinctive and important aspect of the new theory was its analysis of how these regimes exerted their characteristically total control. The new theory claimed that the 'character' of totalitarian dictatorship was to be found in a *syndrome* of six interrelated and mutually supporting features or traits: (1) an ideology; (2) a single party, typically led by one person; (3) a terroristic police; (4) a communications monopoly; (5) a weapons monopoly; and (6) a centrally-directed economy (1961 [1956]: 9).

Friedrich and Brzezinski acknowledged that the six-feature syndrome had shown such significant variations as difference between fascist and communist types of centrally-directed economy. (The fascists had retained a private-ownership form of centrally-directed economy, while the communists had shifted to a state-*owned/collectivized* as well as centrally-planned economy.) They also acknowledged that there were other differences between fascist and communist regimes: in origins, political institutions, and proclaimed goals. And on several occasions, too, they noted that the totalitarian regime's single party played a more extensive, state-controlling role in communist than fascist regimes.

But they did not emphasize and explore the ideological differences between fascism and communism, even though they had

listed ideology as the first feature or trait in the six-point syndrome and were depicting totalitarianism as an ideologically driven form of dictatorship. The ideology is the ultimate source of the goals that the totalitarians seek to attain through a political, social, cultural and economic revolution that becomes systemized as a condition of 'permanent revolution' that extends to such prosaic matters as fulfilling economic Five-Year Plans (*ibid.*: 132, 137, 150). However, ideology is also being used to control the individual and ensure his or her psychological commitment to the ideology's revolutionary goals. This is reflected in the totalitarian commitment to the ideology's infallibility, which produces a 'violent passion for unanimity', with the regime's terroristic police 'searching everywhere' – even within the party – 'for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity' (*ibid.*).

Friedrich and Brzezinski pointed out that the totalitarian regime relies on its 'highly effective' propaganda/indoctrination system as well as terror to instil a totalitarian atmosphere in society (*ibid.*: 107, 116–17). The propaganda/indoctrination system uses not only mass communications, notably radio and newspapers, but also face-to-face communication by thousands of speakers and agitators deployed by the party and such mass-member organizations as the regime's youth and labour movements. And indeed the level of police-inflicted terror may eventually decline not only because terror is internalized into a habitual conformity but also because new generations of society are raised as fully indoctrinated supporters of the regime (*ibid.*: 138).

Yet considering the importance of indoctrination, the propaganda/indoctrination system was not explored in much detail or given much of an evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. It is true that there was coverage of the 'islands of separateness', such as the churches and universities, where a person could remain aloof from the terror-accompanied 'total demand for total identification' (*ibid.*: 231, 239). But there seemed to be little awareness of the extent to which the propaganda/indoctrination system fell short of the technological capacity – in a *pre-television*, let alone pre-telescreen, era – for Orwellian control:

> The invention of print . . . made it easier to manipulate public opinion, and the film and the radio carried the process further. With the development of television, and the technical advance [the telescreen] that made it possible to receive and

transmit simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end. Every citizen, or at least every citizen important enough to be worth watching, could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the sound of official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. The possibility of enforcing not only complete obedience to the will of the State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects, now existed for the first time. (Orwell, 1954: 165)

In fact Friedrich and Brzezinski were not envisaging an intensification of totalitarianism but rather its moderation. Having noted the changes taking place in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953 (too late for Arendt to consider in her book), they contended that the Soviet Union was passing through evolutionary phases which had never had time to emerge in the two fascist regimes thanks to their destruction in the Second World War. These later evolutionary phases or stages seemed to produce a more moderate version of totalitarianism, with not only a decline in terror but also an absence of absolutist individual rule by the leader of the regime's party (which in the post-Stalin Soviet Union had shifted to 'collective leadership' by the cabinet-like party Politburo). Friedrich and Brzezinski considered that the totalitarian leader embodied a unique form of absolutist rule that involves a pseudo-religious or pseudo-charismatic emotionalism and also reduces the regime's political party to a wholly dependent status as more the leader's following than an organization in its own right (*ibid.*: 25–6, 29). Yet their syndrome did not list the leader figure as one of the syndrome's six features; he is included merely as the leader of the party, which is 'typically' led by an individual. They and other theorists had to adjust the concept of totalitarianism to fit a reality that was moving in the opposite direction to what might have been expected. Instead of exploiting increased resources and new technology to reach higher levels of control, the communist regimes were showing an 'entropic' exhaustion of totalitarian energy.

Decline of the concept of totalitarianism

The differences between Arendt's and Friedrich and Brzezinski's theories were only a foretaste of the different interpretations and

definitions that the term 'totalitarian' soon acquired. With nearly a dozen theorists having coined their own definitions, with researchers having applied it to more than a dozen *pre*-twentieth-century regimes, and with politicians employing it in anti-communist polemics, it is not surprising that some scholars believed such a loosely used term should be avoided or abandoned (Barber, 1969; Rigby, 1972). In any case, political scientists dissatisfied with theories of totalitarianism as tools for studying communist regimes had developed a host of new concepts or models of contemporary communist rule and society: the administered society, the command society, the organizational or mono-organizational society, the ideological system, the monist system, the mobilization system and, most fruitfully, the bureaucratic system; they had also begun to apply to communist systems the factional-conflict and interest-group approaches originally developed as models of Western or democratic politics (Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 523–4; Hough, 1977: 49–51).

However, some second-generation theories of totalitarianism built on the two classic works of Arendt and Friedrich and Brzezinski while also attempting to accommodate the criticisms and changing circumstances that were undermining the standing of the classic conception of totalitarianism. Schapiro's 1972 text book *Totalitarianism* is an accomplished example of such second-generation theorizing. He contended that totalitarianism varies in intensity or totality and that the totalitarian nature of a regime is still clearly discernible even when one or more characteristic features is weak or absent (*ibid.*: 124). So he could readily include the (sometimes weak or absent) leader figure in his list of totalitarianism's five characteristic features or 'contours' and three distinctive instruments of rule or 'pillars' (see Table 1.1). His list covered similar territory to the six-point syndrome but with the significant omission of the terroristic police and the significant addition of mobilization as a characteristic feature of totalitarianism (*ibid.*: 20, 38, 45, 119).

The inclusion of *mobilization* reflected the common use of the term by political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in some theories of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. It referred to dictatorships' attempts 'to activate their peoples in support of official norms and goals', and it was used in this sense by fascist and communist regimes themselves long before the notion of mobilization entered the theoretical vocabulary of

Table 1.1   *Characteristic features of totalitarianism and authoritarianism*

Totalitarianism: classic theorists, Friedrich and Brzezinski	Totalitarianism: second generation theorist, Schapiro	Authoritarianism: classic theorist, Linz
Six-point syndrome	'Contours'	
1. Ideology	1. The leader	1. Limited political pluralism
2. Single party typically led by an individual	2. Subjugation of the legal order	2. Distinctive mentalities instead of elaborate and guiding ideology.
3. Terroristic police	3. Control over private morality	3. Absence of intensive/extensive mobilization
4. Communications monopoly	4. Continuous mobilization	4. Leader or small group of leaders exercise power within predictable limits
5. Weapons monopoly	5. Legitimacy based on mass support	
6. Centrally-directed economy		
Other features:	'Pillars'	
1. 'permanent revolution' and 'passion for unanimity'	1. Ideology	
2. Indoctrination system	2. Party	
3. Leader is absolutist and pseudo-religious/ charismatic	3. Administrative machinery of the state	

political science (Unger, 1974: 5). The minimal and most common form of mobilization is to 'activate' people to express support for the regime itself, as when the Cuban communist regime has been able to draw a crowd of over a million people to political gatherings in Revolution Square through highly organized mobilization of the public by the official labour unions and

neighbourhood Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (Aguirre, 1989: 389–90).

But even the less minimal forms of activating people do not require the psychological, internal control of thought rather than merely *actions in support of* official norms and goals. The notion of mobilization therefore offers a way of tacitly acknowledging the limits of indoctrination while also retaining a focus on control. And the limits on 'totalitarian' indoctrination were becoming evident as early as the 1960s. Some historical research into Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union was already suggesting that there had been surprisingly *weak* control, particularly in rural areas (Peterson, 1969; Fainsod, 1958). By the 1980s historians were revealing that Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union had achieved far from total control over the individual's thoughts and actions, even when that individual was one of the leader's subordinates in the party or state hierarchies (Allen, 1984; Kershaw, 1983; Broszat, 1981; Getty, 1985). For example, local Nazi leaders could compel their fellow townspeople 'to attend meetings and pretend enthusiasm, but that was largely a mutually agreed charade' (Allen, 1984: 104). The Nazi regime's control of 'hearts and minds' seemed impressive only in comparison to the self-proclaimed 'totalitarian' fascist regime in Italy. One of its southern party bosses complained that the people of his province had been given no tangible indication that they were living in a fascist era (Brooker, 1991: 289).

So despite the efforts of the second-generation theorists of totalitarianism, this concept appeared almost as far removed as Orwell's fictional *1984* from the realities of life under dictatorship. Theories of totalitarianism certainly seemed to have little or no relevance for the study of contemporary dictatorships except for such rare anomalies as Kim Il Sung's communist regime in North Korea or the early stages of Mao's Cultural Revolution in China – before it descended into such chaos that he had to call in the military to restore order. One or two of the one-party states established in Africa during the 1960s were occasionally labelled totalitarian, as in the case of Guinea and its 'mobilization of the people' (Rivière, 1977). But the dictatorships of the 1960s–80s were usually better described as *authoritarian*, especially as the leading analyst of authoritarianism had included a subtype that catered for the exceptional cases of relatively high mobilization.

Authoritarianism

While theories of totalitarianism may seem to cover too rare a form of modern non-democratic government, theories of authoritarianism face quite the opposite problem. For the notion of 'authoritarian government' is often used as virtually a synonym for 'non-democratic government', as, unlike the notion of dictatorship, it can be applied to monarchies and traditional forms of government as well as more modern forms of non-democratic regime. However, Linz's pioneering 1964 analysis of authoritarianism excluded both totalitarianism and traditional systems from his conception of authoritarianism (1970 [1964]: 269–70). And he rejected any notion that authoritarian regimes form only a residual category, such as the class of (modern) regimes that are neither democratic nor totalitarian. Instead, Linz stressed the distinctive nature of the authoritarian type of regime and presented a multifaceted coverage of authoritarianism that was comparable in breadth to the theories of totalitarianism.

The prominence that Linz gave to *military* dictatorships in his description of authoritarianism highlighted the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Both the classic works on totalitarianism had noted that the military played a relatively minor role in a totalitarian dictatorship (Arendt, 1962: 420; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1961: 273). In contrast, Linz pointed out that the military enjoys a 'privileged position' in most authoritarian regimes and that its position is likely to be further enhanced if the regime had been established by a military coup (1970: 267). But as his conception of authoritarianism also included *non*-military dictatorships, it could also be applied to the many African one-party states and to the large majority of communist regimes that, thanks to political evolution or entropic exhaustion, had become too moderate to be credibly described as totalitarian. Linz noted that totalitarian regimes might appear more like a form of authoritarianism 'if their ideological impetus is weakened, apathy and privatization replace mobilization, and bureaucracies and managers gain increasing independence from the party' (*ibid*.: 281).

Linz's definition of an authoritarian regime pointed to four distinctive elements or features (*ibid*.: 255–9), which can be listed in similar manner to totalitarian theorists' six-point syndrome or eight contours/pillars, as in Table 1.1, but require some accompanying explanation:

1. Presence of limited political pluralism. Linz viewed this *limited* political pluralism as the most distinctive feature of authoritarianism. Although the limits vary in degree, form and target from one regime to another, the crucial point is that some groups are *not controlled* by the regime and indeed have some political influence. At one extreme was General Franco's one-party state in Spain allowing independence and influence to the Catholic Church, while at the other extreme was the officially liberal-democratic PRI dictatorship in Mexico actually encouraging some political participation by a limited number of parties (which were also allowed to compete to some degree against the PRI in elections).

2. *Absence* of elaborate and guiding *ideology*. Linz acknowledged that ideology was by no means unknown among authoritarian regimes – and may be loudly proclaimed – but any such ideology is not used for guiding the regime. Usually an authoritarian regime has merely a *distinctive mentality*. Mentalities are apparently more emotional than rational and are not as future-oriented as the utopianism of ideologies.

3. *Absence* of intensive or extensive political *mobilization* throughout most of a regime's history. Although there are exceptions, these occur in the *early* stages of some authoritarian regimes, during which there may be considerable and indeed very intensive (controlled) popular participation.

4. A 'leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones' (*ibid.*: 255). Even when the regime's leader or leaders may seem to be absolutist, in practice this power is exercised within predictable limits rather than in a wholly discretionary or arbitrary fashion. Linz refers to the military junta as an example of power being exercised by a small group of leaders, and presumably another example would be the communist regime's cabinet-like party Politburo.

That all four of these features are either quite complex or have significant exceptions is an indication of the problems involved in generalizing about modern non-totalitarian non-democratic regimes. However, Linz at least created a separate subtype for the exceptions to the absence-of-mobilization feature. He described these mobilizing exceptions as *populistic* regimes, whose level of mobilization falls short of 'the pervasiveness and

intensity of the totalitarian model' but whose attempt to implement socially progressive or conservative policies requires a level of political mobilization that is quite exceptional for authoritarian regimes (*ibid.*: 260).

In contrast to this populistic or high-mobilization subtype, the more common examples of authoritarianism have sought an actual *de*politicization of society (*ibid.*: 261–4). They have also, consciously or unconsciously, encouraged a process that Linz termed *privatization* – in the sense of citizens shifting their attention from public affairs to private matters. Some might argue of course that depoliticization/privatization is actually activating people 'in support of official norms and goals' and therefore is as much a case of mobilization as what occurs in a high-mobilization authoritarian regime. And this argument can point to another aspect of Orwell's *1984* vision of control, namely that the working masses – the 'proles' – who comprised 85 per cent of the population were controlled by means that seem quite similar to privatization:

> no attempt was made to indoctrinate them with the ideology of the Party. It was not desirable that proles should have strong political feelings. All that was required of them was a primitive patriotism which could be appealed to whenever it was necessary . . . The sexual puritanism of the Party was not imposed on them. Promiscuity went unpunished, divorce was permitted. For that matter, even religious worship would have been permitted if the proles had shown any sign of needing or wanting it. They were beneath suspicion. As the Party slogan put it: 'Proles and animals are free.' (Orwell, 1954: 60–1)

Few proles had telescreens in their home and most proles had a mental horizon filled up with private concerns, not only sex and potentially religion but also work, home, children, neighbours, beer, gambling and spectator sport (*ibid.*: 60). Just as indoctrination can be improved by technology, so too can privatization be better encouraged, consciously or unconsciously, through the use of television and the home-computer-accessed internet, which even Orwell did not envisage. Such new technology is particularly useful in encouraging a concern with sex and sports and with an increasingly important private concern – *shopping* – that

Linz's (mobilization)

1 Lower mobilization   2 Higher mobilization = 'populistic'
(includes stabilized populistic)

O'Donnell's (modernization)

1 Traditional   2 Populist (activates)   3 Bureaucratic (deactivates)
Low modernization   Medium   High modernization
                       modernization

Orwell failed to mention because he did not envisage the increasing material abundance of the late twentieth century.

Depoliticizing, privatizing authoritarianism therefore seems to be a potentially very effective method of control and is clearly a difficult (or at least controversial) type to categorize in terms of mobilization. To complicate matters further, Linz noted that populistic one-party states in Africa might eventually experience a decline in the degree of political mobilization, with their parties being transformed into patronage rather than mobilizing organizations. And in fact he viewed such unintended or intended depoliticization as being characteristic of any *stabilized* authoritarian regime (1970: 259–60). So his overall typology of authoritarianism might best be described as including not only the unusual higher-mobilization subtype but also a standard lower-mobilization subtype that includes stabilized populistic regimes as well as intentionally depoliticizing regimes (see Figure 1.1).

A more influential typology of his conception of authoritarianism was provided in the early 1970s by O'Donnell's classic work, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. He viewed Linz's conception of authoritarianism as being the genus to which belonged three species of authoritarianism – the traditional, the populist and, most importantly, the bureaucratic – which were linked to levels of *modern*ization rather than mobilization (O'Donnell, 1979 [1973]: 91, 108–9). The traditional type of authoritarianism is associated with a low level of modernization and includes the traditional type of military regime but (following Linz) not monarchies or other traditional forms of government. The populist type of authoritarianism, such as

Perón's modern military regime in Argentina, is associated with medium levels of modernization and seems similar to Linz's high-mobilization subtype in attempting to politically *activate* and 'incorporate' (under tight control) segments of the 'popular sector', namely the working class and sections of the lower middle class.

But O'Donnell was primarily concerned with the high-modernization type of authoritarianism – the *bureaucratic* type or 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' (*ibid.*: 90). It is similar to Linz's depoliticizing, low-mobilization subtype in attempting to politically *deactivate* and 'exclude' the popular sector. O'Donnell specified that the presence or absence of military government was irrelevant typologically to bureaucratic authoritarianism (*ibid.*: 108). However, the military component of his bureaucratic type seems particularly strong, if only because he used the military regimes established in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s as his case studies or primary examples. The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is established by a 'coup coalition' of officers and civilians (typically dominated by technocrats) that aims to solve what they see as the country's pressing problems in what they regard as the most effective manner (*ibid.*: 74, 81–5). O'Donnell provided an impressive analysis of these economic and political-social problems and the regime's intended solutions. But the analysis was so specifically related to his two primary examples that it reduced the applicability of the bureaucratic-authoritarian 'model' to other countries (Sera, 1979; Kaufman, 1979; Schamis, 1991: 209–10).

His theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism is therefore better viewed from a narrower, solely institutional perspective – the bureaucratic features from which the subtype and concept took its name. He had borrowed the notion of a 'bureaucratic' type of non-democratic regime from a recent study of 1930s East European dictatorships, in which Janos had argued that an 'administrative-military complex' of civil service and military, together with some middle-class camp followers, had formed a dominant political class that he labelled 'bureaucratic' (1970: 205). When O'Donnell applied this label to 1960s South American cases, he made a less obviously 'who rules?' argument. He maintained that the term 'bureaucratic' suggested the typical features of high-modernization authoritarianism, such as the key role played by public bureaucracies (military and civil service)

and private bureaucracies (business corporations) and the regime's attempt to control the activities of social sectors by 'encapsulating' them into government-dependent interest groups and/or political parties (O'Donnell, 1979: 51, 91). It is these institutional features that have led to the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism being accepted as a convenient label to attach to high-modernization authoritarian regimes, as when it was used to describe South Korea in the Park era and Russia in the Putin era (Im, 1987; Shevtsova, 2004).

The institutional approach to authoritarianism was taken further, though, in Perlmutter's 1981 book *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis.* His analysis focused on the institutional-structural aspect of modern authoritarian regimes (by which he meant all modern non-democratic regimes, including the totalitarian) and on the ways in which they employ particular *institutions* or sets of institutions as *instruments of rule.* These included 'the classical instruments of rule: army, police, bureaucracy, judiciary' (Neumann, 1957: 236). But Perlmutter (1981: 9, 11, 13) added such typically modern instruments as the political party and the youth movement to his list:

1. the single party;
2. the 'bureaucratic-military complex' of civil service and the military; and
3. a set of institutions, such as the political police, paramilitary forces, and militant youth movements, that he describes as 'the parallel and auxiliary structures of domination, mobilization, and control'.

His many types or models of authoritarianism – such as the Praetorian, the Nazi and the Bolshevik Communist models – each show a characteristic preference for one of these three instruments of rule, as when a model prefers to dispense 'with the use of the single party and employ the military as the instrument of domination' (*ibid.*: 9). But here the authoritarian approach has come to overlap with an older, institutional approach that has identified two key types of non-democratic regime – namely, the military regime and the one-party state – by focusing on the military or a party as not merely instruments of rule but the actual *rulers.*

The 'military regime' and 'one-party state' approaches

These two theoretical approaches are focused on a particular *institution* – whether a military or party organization – that defines a particular type and category of non-democratic regime. And these two institutional approaches are much more concerned than the totalitarian-authoritarian approaches with the question of 'who rules' – in fact the standard definition of a military regime is that 'the military rules'. However, focusing on a particular institution has led theorists of one-party states to be more concerned about the regime *having* a party than about whether the party is the ruling institution or is merely an instrument of rule. If it is merely an instrument, then describing the regime as a one-party state is actually describing *how* it rules, and this institutional approach is overlapping with those theorists of authoritarianism, such as Perlmutter and O'Donnell, who emphasize the institutional aspect of the regime's rule and control. A perhaps less obvious but certainly more important overlapping is that such one-party states may be the instruments of the *military's* rule and therefore can be categorized as *both* a military regime and a one-party state. (In contrast, a regime is hardly likely to be categorized as being both totalitarian and authoritarian at one and the same time, and in fact the latter concept is partly defined in terms of its differences from the other, more extreme concept.) However, the military regimes, too, have their categorizing problems; like the one-party states, they face the 'who rules' problem of distinguishing institutional rule from personal rule by an individual leader – and that problem has been developed into a separate theoretical approach that will be covered in the next section of the chapter.

The military regimes

The military aspect of a 'military regime' is the state's military apparatus and particularly the army. The army is one of the classic instruments of rule, and as it is also the most physically powerful, since ancient times there has been the prospect of the servant becoming the master. Ancient Rome produced the first military *organization* by introducing a career service (including retirement benefits) for its soldiers as well as organizing them into legions and

cohorts (brigades and battalions) that could be assembled into armies, garrisons and other task forces. But it did not take long for military commanders, most famously Julius Caesar, to use their armies to gain political power and replace the Roman Republic with rule by Emperors – a new monarchical title that came from the word *imperator*, meaning (military) commander. For large parts of its history the Roman Empire was a military dictatorship that was ruled by military commanders who had become Emperor through a civil war between rival armies or through the backing of the military or a key military unit. The most famous example of the power of the military was the way in which the Praetorian Guard unit exploited their position as guardians of the Emperor and capital city to put their favoured candidates on the Imperial throne. By analogy, the term *praetorianism* has long been applied by political scientists to describe chronic military intervention in politics or the military's exercise of political power. For example, Nordlinger (1977: 3) referred to his analysis of military coups and governments as the study of praetorianism:

> Praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. This term is taken from one of the earliest and most famous instances of military intervention. The Praetorian Guards of the Roman Empire . . . ended up using their military power to overthrow emperors and to control the Roman senate's 'election' of successive emperors.

Furthermore, Nordlinger then cited Gibbon's remark that Praetorian intervention was the first cause as well as symptom of the decline of the Roman Empire, which confirms that analyses of military regimes are the oldest form of theorizing about modern non-democratic regimes (as Gibbon made this diagnosis in the eighteenth century, when writing his classic tome on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire). But the most important theory of military regimes did not emerge until Finer's 1962 *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*.

Finer's book provided the classic typology of military regimes (1976 [1962]: 149–51, 245–6). It identified no fewer than *five* different structural forms of military rule and regime: two direct, one dual and two indirect. The more standard of the two forms

of direct rule involves openly military rule by a military junta or by a military government, with leading military officers installed as the country's president and/or government ministers. The 'quasi-civilianized' form of direct military rule differs by clothing itself in (supposed) evidence of civilian support, and/or in civilian garb and institutions (*ibid.*: 163). Its civilian features may even include a supportive political party, but all the regime's civilian institutions are only 'civilian trappings, emanating from and dependent on the military' (*ibid.*: 159).

In contrast, the civilian component of the 'dual' type of military regime – a political party or some other organized civilian support – has been developed by a military dictator as reliable 'civilian forces' that can act as 'a counterpoise to the views and the influence of the army' (*ibid.*: 150, 158). As the head of both the military and this civilian organization, he can strengthen his personal position by establishing a balance of power between the dual, military and civilian bases of the regime. Although it may seem quite similar in structure to a quasi-civilianized version of direct rule, it has the very different purpose of increasing a military dictator's *personal* autonomy *from* the military – not of *disguising* the military's rule behind a façade of civilianization.

Disguising military rule can be done in other ways than quasi-civilianization, though, and Finer's typology included the other main form of disguise – the use of indirect rule (*ibid.*: 151–7). By controlling a puppet civilian government from behind the scenes the military can avoid responsibility for governing the country while still 'calling the shots'. As Finer pointed out, such indirect rule can take the form of (1) controlling all the activities of the civilian government or (2) only intermittently exerting control and to secure limited objectives – the indirect-*limited* type of military rule.

In addition to his impressively comprehensive typology, Finer made a pioneering distinction analysis of the military regime's goals. He pointed to two quite different ways in which the ruling military may conceive of its duty of custodianship of the national interest: (1) the arbitrating or vetoing of civilian political affairs that threaten the national interest; or (2) openly ruling the nation – 'rulership' – and carrying out a political programme that is required by the national interest (*ibid.*: 31).

The other pioneering attempt to distinguish between the different goals that bring a military regime to power was made by

Huntington in his 1968 theory of *praetorian* societies – those in which military intervention is only the most prominent example of a general politicization of social forces, groups and institutions (1968: 194–6). Using Latin America's long history of military interventions, he identified the different political roles that the military perform in each of the three types of praetorian society (*ibid.*: 199–223). The military plays a vital role in the shift from the oligarchical to the middle-class type of praetorian society, as a 'breakthrough' or 'reform' coup by (usually) middle-ranking officers leads to increased political participation by the middle classes. But the military plays a largely reactive, 'arbitral or stabilizing' role *within* an established middle-class praetorian society. And if there is a shift to the mass type of praetorian society, the military plays a 'guardian' role on behalf of the middle classes, employing a 'veto' coup to protect their dominant position against the now politically participating lower classes. Therefore by focusing on these different roles or goals three sub-types of the praetorian military can be distinguished: (1) the reformer type; (2) the arbitral type; and (3) the guardian/veto type (see Table 1.2).

Similar typological distinctions were made in two important 1977 books on military intervention in politics. Perlmutter's *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* distinguished between arbitrator and ruler subtypes of the 'praetorian' army and also referred to a third subtype, the party-army type, that evolves from the ruler type and is a structural form of regime somewhat similar to Finer's 'dual' type – as the praetorian military have withdrawn from politics and left the regime in the hands of a military leader who has an official party at his disposal (1977, 104–8, 145–7). Nordlinger's *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* adopted a similar approach of linking goals and structure but in a rather different way – by using the distinction between direct and indirect military rule. In addition to a 'ruler' type that combines ambitious political and/or economic goals with extensive rule, he identified a guardian type that combines limited goals with less extensive rule and a moderator type that combines limited goals with indirect rule (1977, 22–6).

In the 1980s Finer returned to the issue of categorizing military regimes and added some new features to his classic typology (1988: 255–72). Now he focused on the question of the extent to which the military 'as such' – as an institution – takes on a gov-

Table 1.2   *Typologies of military rule*

Finer (1976[1962])	Huntington (1968)	Perlmutter (1977)	Nordlinger (1977)
Structural forms	Goals	Goals and a form	Goals and forms
1. Indirect-limited	1. Reform (of oligarchic society)	1. Arbitrator	1. Moderator (limited goals, indirect rule)
2. Indirect-complete	2. Arbitral (within middle-class society)	2. Ruler	2. Guardian (limited goals, direct rule)
3. Dual	3. Guardian/Veto (against lower-classes' power)	3. Party-Army (evolved Ruler type)	3. Ruler (ambitious goals, extensive rule)
4. Direct			
5. Direct: quasi-civilianized			

erning or policy-making role in a military regime. Surveying the whole field of then-existing military regimes, he looked in each case for the presence of a military junta and/or cabinet, as he assumed that this feature was an indication of rule by the military 'as such' because at least some supreme executive power is wielded by military men 'who in some sense or other command and/or represent the armed forces' (1988: 255). He noted that such regimes could be considered as belonging to the 'direct' or the 'direct: quasi-civilianized' categories of his long-established typology.

However, he was well aware that many dictatorships lacked a military junta/cabinet but were still commonly regarded as a military regime because they were ruled by a military president. Finer considered that these were possibly cases of the military (as such) playing a merely supportive role, namely supporting *personal-presidential* government by a military man. These cases therefore seem quite similar to Finer's long-established *dual* type, especially as a number of them had an official political party. The more fundamental similarity is that the dual regime's military dictator has established the party in order to strengthen his personal autonomy from the military – 'as such' and as an institution. So by the 1980s Finer's main interest in categorizing military regimes had become the distinction between the military as a ruling institution and the military dictator governing with some personal autonomy from the military as an institution whether this is described as a 'dual' or as a 'personal-presidential' military regime.

The 'one-party state' approach

The notion of a 'one-party state' is much more recent than that of military rule, if only because the political party is a comparatively recent institution. The first-ever party organization, as distinct from a parliamentary faction, was probably the nation-wide network of local Jacobin clubs that evolved during the French Revolution. And during the nineteenth century the rise of political parties was linked to the rise of democracy rather than dictatorship. Not until the twentieth century did the political party become a key component of some dictatorships as well as all democracies. Indeed the association with democracy is still implied by the very notion of describing a non-democratic

regime as a *one*-party state rather than a *multi*party democracy. However, many post-1900 dictatorships have not had a party and therefore the 'one-party state' theoretical approach has tended to be more concerned with the question of whether a party is present than whether that party is the ruling institution or merely an instrument of rule.

The theorists of one-party states have also been more inclined than theorists of military regimes to link their analyses to the totalitarian-authoritarian approach. For example, in his pioneering 1961 paper on single-party regimes Tucker was also seeking to improve the totalitarian approach by introducing an ideologically based typology. He classified communist and fascist regimes as two different totalitarian subtypes or species and also added an authoritarian, nationalist subtype as the third species of a 'genus' that he labelled 'revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices'. The new genus or category took into account the resemblances that communism and fascism shared with a 'large and still growing number' of authoritarian regimes that he described as being revolutionary *nationalist* regimes under single-party auspices (1961: 283). Thus he was differentiating the three species or subtypes according to the obvious ideological/policy differences between communist, fascist and nationalist regimes but was defining the genus or overall category in terms of a shared institutional feature – the single party.

But he was careful to define the genus in the broad institutional terms of 'under single-party auspices' rather than the more specific 'under single-party *rule*'. This enabled him to include Kemalist Turkey and Nasser's Egypt among his nationalist examples, even though these two regimes were what Finer would later term 'dual' or 'personal-presidential' *military* regimes. Similarly, Tucker's account of how single-party regimes could undergo a 'metamorphosis' (a transformation from one species/ subtype into another) acknowledged that the fascist regime was fuehreristic (leaderistic) and that Stalin's communist regime metamorphed in the 1930s into a fascist-like leaderistic regime (*ibid*.: 289). Clearly in both the fascist and Stalin cases the leader would have been treating the single party as merely an instrument of rule.

Another example of the typological importance of the single party is that the other distinctive feature of these regimes, their

revolutionary nature, may well be only temporary. Tucker acknowledged that they may well lose their revolutionary momentum, seemingly more through entropic exhaustion than political evolution, and continue in power long after they have lost their revolutionary purpose and goals (*ibid.*: 286–7). Although a communist or fascist regime would in this case have to be re-classified as authoritarian rather than totalitarian, it would presumably still belong to the same genus as the nationalist regimes – the defining feature of the genus is the presence of a single party.

Huntington presented in 1970 a theory of *one-party systems* that paid more attention than Tucker's to the question of whether the party was the ruling institution or merely an instrument of rule. In what he termed a 'strong' one-party system the party plays a *dominant* role, with all other types of political actor playing only insignificant roles (1970: 6–7). On the other hand, in a 'weak' one-party system the party may be relegated to a *minor* role and be eclipsed by one or more of the other types of political actor. In particular, there was (1) the 'bureaucratic' type of political actor, including the military, and (2) the 'personalistic' type, including a charismatic leader. (Like Tucker, Huntington included among his examples of one-partyism some dictatorships that could have also been categorized as personalistic military regimes, such as General Franco's Spain and Kemal Ataturk's Turkey.) In less extreme cases of a weak one-party system, there may be a balance of power between the party and one or more of the other types of political actor. In these balanced cases the party may not have been relegated to being merely an instrument of rule but only in the *strong* systems is there clearly rule by the party 'as such' or as an institution.

Huntington's typology of one-party systems was similar to Tucker's in having three subtypes, but they were not based on ideology/policy distinctions, such as communist, fascist and nationalist. Instead, they were distinguished by their different goals, namely revolutionary or exclusionary, and by the third subtype's lack of any obvious social or political goals (*ibid.*: 15, 24–41). The 'revolutionary' subtype was the most familiar and was similar to Tucker's genus or category of totalitarian and authoritarian revolutionary single-party regimes. In contrast, the unfamiliar 'exclusionary' subtype was a small and dying breed of

Figure 1.2 *Typologies of single-party or one-party regimes*

Tucker's genus type (1961)	**Huntington's type (1970)**
Revolutionary mass-movement regime under single party auspices	One-party system
Subtypes (based on ideology/policy)	*Subtypes (based on nature of goals)*
1. communist	1. revolutionary
2. fascist	2. exclusionary
3. nationalist	3. established
Changes and features	*Changes and features*
1. metamorphosis, e.g. communist → fascist-like leaderistic	1. evolution, i.e. revolutionary → established
2. loses revolutionary purpose/goals	2. 'strong' system features party rule

Brooker's type (1995)
Ideological one-party state

Subtypes (based on structural forms)

party-state (ruled by the party or a party figure)	military-party (ruled by the military or a military figure)

Changes and features
1. organizational rule degenerates into personal rule
2. ideology and party features political and perhaps social and/or governing roles

one-party systems which sought to suppress or restrict the political activity of a section of society.

Finally, the 'established' subtype included the growing number of one-party systems that had *evolved* from the *revolutionary* type and were passing through evolutionary phases of transformation, consolidation and adaptation. These authoritarian regimes are suffering from goal exhaustion rather than entropic exhaustion; they have accomplished their key revolutionary goals and now have an administrative rather than revolutionary character. They experience a decline in party-mobilized popular participation and in the importance of ideology, while political leadership tends to lose its personalist, charismatic and autocratic quality and instead becomes oligarchical and bureaucratic. In fact Huntington had provided the most sophisticated analysis yet or thereafter of the evolution from totalitarian extremism to authoritarian moderation.

Over the next quarter of a century the study of one-party states made little progress, as is evident in Brooker's 1995 *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The Ideological One-Party States*. His two-species typology did not involve ideological/policy differences nor differences in goals but instead two different structural forms which were based on features that had already appeared in Tucker's and Huntington's theories. Military regimes with a party were not only included as examples of one-party states but also became an actual subtype, the military-party regime, which is ruled by the military or a military figure and relegates the party to being merely an instrument of rule. Even the other subtype, the party-state regime, includes cases in which the ruler is a party figure rather than the party 'as such' and as an institution. Within both subtypes 'there is the distinction between personal rule by a dictator, either a party or a military figure, and dictatorship by an organization, either the party or the military' (1995: 19).

However, one area in which progress was being made by the 1990s was that influence of the 'new institutionalism' was being felt. It was apparent in Brooker's analysis of 'degeneration' from *organizational* rule by party or military into *personal* rule by, respectively, a party or military figure. For he described this change in terms of a shift in the *principal-agent* relationship, which was terminology borrowed from either the new institutionalism in economics or the rational-choice form of new institutionalism in political science (Hall and Taylor, 1996, and see Exhibit 1.1):

> The regime's leadership, whether an individual or a political committee, acted as the agent of the ruling organization, whether the party or the military. But usually, and sooner rather than later, the regime was transformed from a case of party or military rule into one of personal rule by an individual who originally had been only an agent of the party or military. The original *principal-agent* relationship not only had come to an end but also may even have been reversed, with the *formerly ruling organization now becoming the agent of the personal ruler.* (Brooker, 1995: 9–10 emphases added)

The reversal in the principal-agent relationship is referring to a ruling institution being transformed into merely an instrument of

Exhibit 1.1   Principals, agents and 'shirking'

The dictionary definition of the 'principal' involved in a principal-agent relationship is: 'A chief actor or doer; the chief person engaged in some transaction or function, esp. in relation to one employed or acting for him (*deputy, agent*, etc.); the person for whom and by whose authority another acts' (OED, 2001: vol. 12, 496). The theory of principal-agent relationships became prominent in the social sciences in the 1970s–80s through economic theories of the firm that included a 'managerial theory of the firm' centred on the principal-agent relationship between owners and manager (Hart, 1995 [1989]: 155–6). The theory included the principal-agent concept of *shirking*, which assumed that a firm's manager has 'goals other than the owners' welfare, for example, on-the-job perks, an easy life, or empire-building' and that 'the manager will put some emphasis on his or her own objectives at the expense of the owners' (*ibid.*). However, a famous article by Alchian and Demsetz argued that the shareholding joint owners of a public company constitute a collective principal that not only has the voting power to change the manager but also relies on competition from *would-be* agents to prevent shirking by its existing agents: 'The *policing* of management shirking relies on across-market *competition* from new groups of would-be managers as well as competition from members within the firm who seek to displace existing management' (1996 [1972]: 207, emphases added). This argument has some striking similarities with Schumpeter's competitive-elections definition of democracy, which can readily be presented in these principal-agent terms (see Exhibit 8.2).

But a *non*-democratic regime lacks electoral or other competitive means of 'policing' those who hold key public offices and powers. The nearest equivalent is when such a powerful agent is removed by a collective principal – a ruling military or party – as a remedy for unacceptable shirking, as when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union removed Khrushchev from power in 1964 (see Exhibit 4.2). However, many non-democratic regimes are examples of *one-person rule* and analogous to a firm that is owned by *the manager* – who therefore cannot be removed by shareholders' voting power or other institutional means. For example, in his later years a famous owner-manager 'survived as the managerial leader of his company only because it was *his* company'; he had become 'stubborn, single-minded and without managerial flexibility' but his 'lieutenants' were 'helpless as they watched the decline of the company' (Demsetz, 1996 [1983]: 352).

rule – and specifically of personal rule. It provides a way of dealing with a problem or concern of earlier institutional approaches, such as Finer's concern with rule by the military 'as such' and as distinct from a personal-presidential military regime. While the former involves a military junta/cabinet acting as the agent of the ruling military organization, the latter involves a military president *not* acting as the agent of the military and perhaps even converting the military into an instrument of his *personal* rule.

The personal-rule approach

The notion of personal rule can be quite surprisingly ambiguous because it involves two rather different theoretical approaches. However, both are only supplementary approaches that are focused on either a particular subset of non-democratic regimes or a particular aspect of those regimes. The first is focused on the traditional 'who rules' question and in this case the answer is not an institution but an individual person – what might be termed 'one-person rule'. The other approach to personal rule goes beyond this notion of one-person rule and also or instead asks 'how do they rule'. And in this case the answer is through personal relationships and through personal self-interest, notably greed and fear.

The 'one-person rule' approach is focused on a particular individual whose primacy is formalized by a traditional title, such as King, by a public office, such as President, or by a position in an organization, such as the military's Commander in Chief or a communist party's General Secretary. The holder of this title, office or position is *not* merely acting as the *agent* of a ruling institution when he is exercising power, whether absolutist or power limited by rules and by other political actors. (Perhaps the most important example of this approach was actually the totalitarian theorists' analysis of the absolutist personal rule of the totalitarian dictator, the Hitler or Stalin, which is still a useful analysis or reminder of the extreme and ideological cases of one-person rule.) However, the one-person-rule approach will be covered in the next chapter, along with the concepts of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism that are derived from Weber's sociological analysis of monarchy and other traditional forms of personal rule.

The most prominent example of the other approach to personal rule dates back to at least the 1960s and to Roth's concept of 'personal rulership'. He described personal rulership as being based on personal loyalties 'linked to material incentives and rewards' and as being prevalent in some new states in the Third World that 'may not be states at all but merely private governments of those powerful enough to rule' (1968: 195–6, 198). Several years later a typology of this concept was developed by Linz to categorize some non-democratic regimes that were neither totalitarian nor authoritarian and were based on personal loyalty linked to material rewards (1975: 253, 259–64). Linz identified four different systems of personal rule: (1) oligarchic democracy; (2) *caciquismo* (rule by local political bosses); (3) *caudillismo* (rule by military chieftains); and (4) modern sultanism (absolutist one-person rule), which was the most centralized and most arbitrary or discretionary form of personal rule.

The notion of 'modern sultanism' has been more applicable than his three other types of personal rule, which belong to an earlier, almost nineteenth century period of non-democratic regime. However, Linz considered even the modern sultanist system to be relatively rare and most likely to be found in a small country with a largely agricultural economy and few urban centres, such as Duvalier's Haiti, Trujillo's Dominican Republic and other Central American countries (*ibid.*: 253, 259–62). The regime's private use of public power is exemplified by the prevalence of corruption as well as the personal nature of the ruler's staff – which tends to include his family, friends, cronies and even business associates.

Sultanist personal rule is based not only on personal loyalty linked to material rewards but also on the extensive use of *fear*. The army and the police 'play a prominent role' in the sultanist regime, and 'men directly involved in the use of violence to sustain the regime' are members of the ruler's personal staff (*ibid.*: 260). But, unlike in totalitarian regimes, the use of terror is *not ideologically* motivated or justified, and the lack of any ideological commitment is also evident in the lack of a mass party, the absence of mass mobilization, and even the ruler's tendency to enrich himself, his family and other members of the ruling group (*ibid.*: 217, 260, 189, 262).

In recent times the concept of sultanist personal rule has been extended to a wider range of cases by viewing sultanism as a ten-

dency that appears in different varieties of regime, to varying degrees, and in different stages of the dictator's career (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). However, the concept still lacks the flexibility and applicability of the one-person-rule approach, which can be applied to a totalitarian, sultanist or any other variety of non-democratic regime in which the monarch, president, party General Secretary or military supreme commander is the ruler and is not the agent of a ruling institution. Furthermore, that one-person-rule regime might not be ruling through personal relationships and personal self-interest but instead through institutional and/or ideological relationships and interests.

A mixed approach

Any approach to the study of non-democratic regimes has to adopt a 'mixed' theoretical approach simply in order to deal with the diversity of these regimes. But it is also important not to create unnecessary complexity and to ensure that the concepts being used are as unambiguous as possible. The chapters that follow therefore focus on theories of *types* rather than forms of rule and uses the 'who rules', personal-rule and institutional approaches. And this includes sharpening or narrowing the focus of the 'one-party state' approach by viewing it as a party rule/dictatorship type that includes only those cases where the party is a *ruling* institution, not merely an instrument of rule for a military regime.

However, there is still room for the '*how* do they rule' perspectives – in a different format and not as theoretical approaches. The ideological/policy perspective still appears as the means of identifying the communist and fascist regimes and distinguishing them from what are commonly called African or Third World one-party states. And the totalitarian-authoritarian concern with the level and method of control appears in the chapter dealing with control and, like the ideological/policy perspective, also appears in the chapter on policies and policy making.

Another feature of the mixed approach is that it also includes the question of '*why* do they rule' in the sense of the regime's justification of its rule – its legitimacy and right to rule. This includes self-justification as well as justifying itself to the ruled and to the international community. The question of 'why do

they rule' is covered not only in the chapter on legitimacy but also in a later chapter on democratically disguised dictatorships or 'semi-dictatorships' and on the problem of distinguishing them from semidemocracies, which are flawed democracies that still involve some sort of principal-agent rule by the people rather than by a personal dictator or a ruling institution. A democratically disguised dictatorship may involve rule by a person or a military or party organization, just like the other dictatorships, but it seeks to legitimate itself with the democratic disguise of semi-competitive elections and therefore is well adapted to survive in an age of 'rule by the people'.

РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК

ИНСТИГУТ МИРОВОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ
И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

АВТОРИТАРИЗМ
И ДЕМОКРАТИЯ
В РАЗВИВАЮЩИХСЯ
СТРАНАХ

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ
В ПОСТТРАДИЦИОННЫХ ОБЩЕСТВАХ

Понятие модернизации. Категория модернизации – перехода от традиционного общества к современному – многомерна, обладает комплексным характером, определяется и толкуется по-разному. Мы будем исходить из трех ее признаков, являющихся, с нашей точки зрения, необходимыми и достаточными.

Это, во-первых, смена преобладающей формы общественного труда (аграрного – индустриальным). Во-вторых, дифференциация ранее слабо расчлененного общества на отдельные сферы (экономическую, политическую, правовую, культурную), обладающие собственной, относительно автономной логикой существования и развития, в том числе по отношению к государству (становление так называемого гражданского общества). Наконец, атрибутом модернизации является формирование автономно-суверенного индивида, личности как основного (первичного) субъекта общества. Правда, в различных регионах и цивилизациях формирование последнего признака протекает по-разному. В наиболее развитом виде он представлен в обществах Запада. На Востоке личность складывается в рамках того или иного типа корпорации (община, землячество, каста, расширенная семья и пр.).

Модернизация охватывает длительный исторический период примерно от XVI в. по настоящее время (для большинства стран он еще не завершен). По своему значению модернизационный переход сопоставим с эпохой неолитических революций, сменой собирательства и пастушества земледелием.

Традиционное общество было основано на простом воспроизводстве, ремесленных технологиях, общинно-корпоративистских ценностях, почтения к авторитету и возрасту, ориентации на прошлое и его повторение. Оно являло собой как бы "самоподдерживающуюся неизменность". Конечно, и в нем имели место изменения, но они происходили по большей части спонтанно, не проистекая из субъективного целеполагания индивидов и групп. Современное, индустриальное общество, наоборот, можно определить как "самоподдерживающуюся изменяемость". Человек в нем не только готов воспринимать постоянные сдвиги в технологии, стандартах потребления, правовых нормах и ценностных ориентациях, но способен инициировать их. Возникает качественно иной тип общества, развитие которого несет с собой вместе с тем и новые проблемы.

Модернизация – это комплексный процесс. Она захватывает все сферы общественной жизни – экономическую, социальную, политико-

правовую и культурную. Изменения в этих сферах тесно связаны между собой и коррелируют друг с другом.

Экономическая модернизация означает существенное повышение производительности труда в сельском хозяйстве, индустриализацию, развитие транспорта и коммуникаций, создание национального вос-производственного хозяйственного комплекса, расширяющееся участие в мировом хозяйстве. Основными векторами в этом развитии служат реализация принципов и структур рыночной экономики, а также научно-технический прогресс, нарастающее приложение достижений науки к практике в форме технологии.

В социальной сфере модернизация несет с собой беспрецедентный по сравнению с обществами традиционного типа рост социальной мобильности, дифференциацию социальных групп, в том числе на профессиональной основе. Урбанизация приводит к значительному сокращению доли крестьянства и сельского населения, росту "третьего сословия", буржуазии, промышленного пролетариата, средних слоев. На определенном этапе модернизации (индустриального, капиталистического развития) возникает тенденция к сравнительному сближению доходов различных групп (при росте их потребления), что в системе рыночного хозяйства становится ведущим стимулом прогресса производства. Социальная модернизация включает также развертывание системы массового образования, медицинского обслуживания и социального обеспечения.

В социокультурном плане происходит существенная трансформация традиционных ценностей. Появляется Личность, "прорастающая" внутри традиционных общинно-корпоративных структур или освобождающаяся от них. Доминантами ее поведения становятся установка на персональные достижения, высокая оценка личных заслуг, готовность к переменам. Автономизация человека в обществе тесно связана с секуляризацией, ограничением мировоззренческих и иных функций религии и ее учреждений.

В пору своей зрелости модернизированное общество обладает рядом количественных параметров, принципиально отличающих его от традиционного. В десятки раз повышается показатель ВНП на душу населения; доля индустриального сектора в народном хозяйстве достигает 70% и более (против 5–8% в традиционном обществе); налоги формируют от 1/4 до 1/2 ВНП (5%); на инвестиции расходуется от 1/6 до 1/4 ВНП (1–2%). Разница в доходах высших и низших групп не превышает 5–6:1, в то время как в традиционных обществах она составляет 15–20:1. Продолжительность жизни достигает 70–75 лет (против 25–50). Аналогичны другие показатели – охват населения средним (80–100%) и высшим (более 30%) образованием, медицинским обслуживанием, средствами массовой коммуникации и т.п., – которые несоизмеримы с соответствующими показателями доиндустриальных обществ[1]. Приведенные сопоставления характеризовали уровень модернизации развитых стран в 50–60-е годы. С тех пор эти нормы стали еще выше – тем более по мере вступления обществ Запада (и Японии) в постиндустриальную фазу.

Процесс модернизации предполагает определенные механизмы ее осуществления (стихийная и направляемая модернизация), характер модернизации (органическая или неорганическая – в первую очередь в зависимости от способности того или иного общества к саморазвитию), тип социальной организации модернизирующегося общества (капитализм, формы, ему сопутствующие, а также альтернативные).

Стихийная модернизация была в наибольшей мере характерна для стран Запада в периоды позднего средневековья и постсредневековья. Она проходила через постепенное, самопроизвольное накопление предпосылок в тех или иных сферах общественной жизни, соединение (или несовместимость) которых приводили к качественным сдвигам. Вместе с тем и на Западе, и – в качественно большей мере – на ближней и дальней периферии процесс модернизации все чаще становился результатом сознательных усилий отдельных групп, элит и прежде всего – государства.

В обоих случаях успешность модернизации во многом зависела от того, насколько процесс изменений протекал органично, т.е. вырастал из предшествующих структур, охватывал все сферы общественной жизни, воспринимался большинством общества (или хотя бы значительной его частью) как естественный, поддерживался ими и соответственно принимал характер саморазвития.

В экономическом плане модернизация осуществлялась, как правило, через реализацию оптимальной для данного общества линии развития, "разматывающей цепочки факторов", когда сдвиг в одном хозяйственном секторе влечет за собой прогресс в другом (аграрная революция – индустриализация – экспортная экспансия и т.п.). Последовательность этих сдвигов или фаз и их направление зависели от конкретных условий той или иной страны – стартового потенциала, наличия ресурсов, качества рабочей силы, социальных структур, степени интегрированности в мировой рынок.

В институциональном плане модернизация означала как адаптацию традиционных социальных институтов (семья, община, церковь, каста и пр.) к современным функциям, так и изменение функций этих институтов, приводившее в конце концов к трансформации самих институтов (эволюция средневекового парламента, появление ассоциаций нового типа на месте прежних общин и землячеств и т.п.).

С цивилизационной точки зрения для модернизации (особенно – органической) характерны как симбиоз, так и синтез традиционных и современных ценностей, который состоит в использовании или переинтерпретации одних ценностей традиционной культуры при нейтрализации других, а также в создании или восприятии новых, современных ценностей и "прививке" их к древу национальных культурных традиций. Здесь многое определяет уровень развития традиционной культуры модернизирующегося общества, ее содержательный потенциал, степень открытости контактам извне и, наконец, прочность связи (или, наоборот, глубина разрыва) между культурной элитой и широкими слоями населения, наличие более или менее значительного посреднического слоя между ними.

Далее – проблема разнообразия форм социальной организации модернизирующихся обществ и, в частности, форм, отличных от капитализма.

Капитализм, став в XIX–XX вв. адекватной формой модернизации (по всем ее трем параметрам), тем не менее оставался – вплоть до последних десятилетий – локализованным в одном цивилизационном ареале (Запад). В других ареалах, даже там, где капитализм более или менее укоренился и сложился как способ производства (ряд стран Латинской Америки и Арабского Востока), он не "организовал" общества на собственных принципах. Только на Западе капитализм был тождествен модернизации, как и модернизация – капитализму: "к Востоку от Суэца" (и к Югу) образовались явные ножницы между модернизацией и капиталистической формой организации обществ.

Это обстоятельство определило возникновение иных (новых) видов или форм социальной организации.

В XX в. сложилось несколько основных их разновидностей. Первая – генерированная естественным развитием самого капитализма на Западе – реализовалась под эгидой государства в виде "неприбыльного" госсектора и разветвленной "социальной инфраструктуры" (так называемое государство благосостояния).

Вторая – неотрадиционалистская – возникла на основе специфических незападных традиций и в значительной мере в порядке реакции на экспансию капитализма; здесь основной социальной единицей был не суверенно-автономный индивид, но та или иная коллективная общность – от племени/рода/ или общины до корпорации, включая такой институт, как государство (Саудовская Аравия, Марокко и др.).

Третья – социалистическая – рождается с Октября 1917 г., расширяясь в середине XX в. на Восточную Европу, а в 50–70-е годы на "третий мир"; она имеет основанием полное тождество государства и общества (так называемый реальный социализм).

Процесс модернизации проходит различные фазы. Обычно различают такие стадии, как осознание цели, консолидация модернизаторски настроенной элиты, период трансформации и, наконец, интеграция общества на новой основе (С. Блэк). Иногда это разграничение проще: период ограниченной модернизации и затем ее омассовление, распространение на все общество (Ш. Эйзенштадт). Выделяют также раннеиндустриальную, позднеиндустриальную и, наконец, постиндустриальную фазу. Последняя фактически выходит за рамки модернизации, поскольку в постиндустриальном обществе начинают формироваться качественно новые черты: информационная революция, индивидуализация потребления, примат духовных стимулов над материальными, рост творческих функций в сфере труда. Нынешние развитые страны находятся в начале этой фазы.

Основная периодизация модернизации связана с неравномерностью ее протекания в мировом пространстве и историческом времени. Инициатором модернизации и ее первым эшелоном стал регион Запада. Внутри него, конечно, можно выделить разновидности и модели, отражающие особенности конкретной страны или группы стран, а также отличающиеся сроками развертывания модернизации (Англия, континентальная Западная Европа, США, переселенческие колонии типа Австралии или Канады). Но все они были связаны геополитическим и историко-культурным единством, что привело примерно к одному и тому же типу индустриального общества.

Определяющие черты первого эшелона – органический в целом характер модернизации, ее длительность и постепенность (с XVI в., если не раньше); относительная синхронность вызревания различных предпосылок и элементов буржуазной формации.

В остальных странах и регионах – основная часть планеты – модернизация приняла характер, во многом отличный от западной. Дело не только в сдвинутых (иногда на столетия) сроках ее развертывания, но и в значительно меньшей степени ее органичности. В первую очередь это связано с тем, что главный импульс модернизации исходил здесь извне – из стран первого эшелона, ушедшего вперед Центра складывающейся мирообщности. Историческое время, "отпущенное" на модернизацию, по сравнению с Западом, значительно сокращено. Правда, общество, где совершается запоздалая модернизация, может использовать уже имеющиеся достижения более развитых стран. Проблема, однако, заключается в том, чтобы приспособить аборигенные традиционные структуры и ценности к использованию "чужих" достижений в короткий исторический отрезок времени, занимающий жизнь трех–четырех, а иногда даже одного–двух поколений.

Среди обществ запоздалой модернизации можно выделить второй эшелон (Россия, некоторые южно- и восточно-европейские государства, а также Япония, осуществлявшие модернизацию на независимой национальной основе). В терминах миросистемной теории И. Валлерстайна они образуют Полупериферию, а одна из этих стран (Япония) в конце концов сумела войти в ядро Центра.

Третий эшелон – это страны Латинской Америки, Африки и подавляющее большинство стран Азии. Это – мировая Периферия, которая изначально интегрировалась в общемировой процесс модернизации через систему колониализма и зависимости, в качестве сырьевого придатка к Центру. Разделяя со вторым эшелоном ряд общих черт позднего развития, модернизация стран "третьего мира" вместе с тем изначально обладала значительной спецификой.

Дело в том, что исходным пунктом для "третичной модернизации" послужили не просто докапиталистические, но патриархальные, общинно-племенные, государственно-общинные ("азиатские") структуры. Их культура и цивилизации, существенно отличные от европейских, явились объектами модернизации. Внутренние предпосылки модернизирующих процессов (и в структурах, и в общественном сознании) были здесь еще слабее, нежели в странах второго эшелона, и процесс модернизации не просто испытывал воздействие извне, но был неукорененным, неорганичным в своем исходном виде.

Поэтому третичная модернизация характеризовалась очаговостью, инверсией стадий, фрагментарностью и обилием переходных и тупиковых структур, аморфностью сознания и деятельности социальных

субъектов. Отсюда – вероятностный и, более того, периодически обратимый характер процесса модернизации в этом эшелоне.

Наконец, важной особенностью третьего эшелона стало то обстоятельство, что модернизация в регионах мирового Юга осуществляется в эпоху выявления и быстрого обострения глобальных проблем. Демографический, экологический и продовольственный кризисы становятся для молодых государств объективными ограничителями развития. Одновременно вхождение стран Центра в постиндустриальную фазу еще более усложняет задачи модернизационного рывка в отстающих обществах, хотя, как показывает опыт некоторых "новых индустриальных стран" Азии, не превращает их в невыполнимые.

Сегодня в третьем эшелоне модернизации можно выделить различные группы. Одна из них – страны Восточной и Юго-Восточной Азии, вписавшиеся в новейший поворот мировой экономики (70–80-е годы), которые вырвались из Периферии в Полупериферию и по некоторым параметрам даже начинают приближаться к Центру. Другая – вчерашние лидеры индустриальной модернизации в "третьем мире", забуксовавшие на определенном этапе (крупные страны Латинской Америки). Еще одна группа – типичные страны "третьего мира" с характерными для них структурными дисбалансами и секторами отсталости (Индия, ряд арабских и латиноамериканских стран). Наконец, группа наименее развитых – стагнирующих и даже деградирующих стран (преимущественно африканских), где трудно говорить о каких-либо заметных достижениях в процессе модернизации.

В странах запоздалого развития особенно наглядно проявляется, что модернизация – это не только исторический прогресс, но и проблематичное, рискованное предприятие, стимулирующее острые общественные противоречия, напряжения и конфликты.

На пути модернизации встают различные барьеры и опасности. Наиболее типичными из них являются анклавность современного сектора в обществе; элитарный или верхушечный характер модернизации; раскол между модернизирующимися и традиционалистски настроенными слоями населения; диспропорции между развитием города и деревни и др. Элитарная, ограниченная модернизация, ориентированная не на все национальное общественное пространство, а лишь на его отдельные привилегированные секторы, являются непрочной и ущербной, сколь ни значительны были бы ее успехи на каких-то направлениях. Такое диспропорциональное развитие неизбежно порождает общественные конфликты, которые способны затормозить процесс, направить его по зигзагообразным или тупиковым путям и даже повернуть вспять. История модернизации (особенно в странах запоздалого старта) знает периодические срывы (например, в России в начале XX в., в Японии 30–40-х годов нынешнего века, в Иране в конце 70-х – начале 80-х годов и т.д.), периоды застоя и преобладания попятных тенденций.

Все сказанное имеет непосредственное отношение к социалистической модели развития и ее спутникам (некапразвитие, соцориентация). Насколько они эффективны как средство модернизации? Является ли социалистический антикапитализм вариантом модернизации или, так сказать, ее "псевдоморфозом", своего рода историческим подобием или даже тупиком? Известно, что в СССР и других социалистических странах форсированная индустриализация и курс на "полную экономическую самодостаточность" привели к серьезным диспропорциям, воспрепятствовавшим созданию общества массового потребления. В результате эти страны переживают сейчас острейший системный кризис, оказались неспособными к постиндустриальным формам развития, а для завершения индустриальной его фазы вынуждены перейти к реформам либерального типа. Был ли социализм для этих стран неизбежным поворотом, этапом в процессе модернизации или уклонением от нее? Этот вопрос сегодня требует осмысления.

Политическая модернизация. Это – особое специфическое направление модернизации и в то же время обеспечение процесса в целом в сфере властных отношений.

В традиционном обществе властные структуры, доминируя над обществом, в то же время непосредственно выполняли достаточно ограниченный круг функций: военное дело, поддержание порядка, организация общественных работ, сбор налогов. В модернизированном или модернизирующемся обществе достижение последним большей свободы от государства и самообособление сферы политики сопровождается значительным расширением задач, решаемых в этой сфере. В круг последних включается осуществление определенной экономической стратегии, проведение целенаправленной политики развития и перераспределения ресурсов, развертывание системы массового образования, медицинского обслуживания, социального обеспечения, многочисленных информационых служб. Конечно, методы управления и общий объем деятельности политико-государственной власти варьируются в каждом конкретном случае.

Политическая модернизация означает вместе с тем глубокое реформирование традиционной политической культуры и прежней политической структуры насильственным или мирным путем. Политические лидеры начинают признаваться таковыми не на основе их иерархического статуса и авторитета, но оцениваются по их собственным заслугам – реальным или приписываемым. Происходит разделение властей на законодательную, исполнительную и судебную, относительно автономные по отношению друг к другу. Рационально разграничиваются функции центральной и местной власти, последняя в значительной мере начинает действовать на началах самоуправления. Важнейшим (хотя и не единственным) вектором политической модернизации становится процесс демократизации. Этот процесс по общему правилу протекает противоречиво, неравномерно, прерываясь не только эпизодами, но и длительными периодами господства противостоящей, авторитарной тенденции. Однако, в целом, в глобальном масштабе демократизация выступает как поступательный процесс.

Политическая демократия – это не просто определенная субординация властных структур, система сдержек и противовесов, плюрализм политических партий, рационализация бюрократических институтов и соответствующие правила политического поведения. Это еще – спе-

цифический договор, "contrat social" между государством и обществом. Принимается законодательство, которое не только закрепляет демократические процедуры публичной власти, но и гарантирует права человека, его собственность, предпринимательскую деятельность и т.д. против любого государства, в том числе самого демократического. Как необходимый коррелят и база политической демократии вырастает гражданское общество – широкий комплекс общественно-политических самодеятельных ассоциаций граждан (профсоюзы, творческие объединения, конфессиональные общины, семья и пр.), через которые широкие массы населения выражают свои интересы, формируют общественное мнение, влияют на политические структуры, защищают свои права.

Политическая модернизация обычно начинается с расщепления традиционной политической элиты, кристаллизации в ней модернистски настроенных деятелей, а также с отпочкования от традиционного управленческого слоя оппозиционных групп, аутсайдеров. Во взаимодействии этих групп рождается новая, модернизаторская политическая элита, которая ищет опоры в тех или иных массовых секторах населения и в конце концов оказывается у руля власти.

Как и модернизация в целом, политическая модернизация – это процесс, занимающий длительный исторический период. В Англии, например, только на борьбу королевской власти с парламентом ушло пять веков, а окончательное завершение политической модернизации произошло лишь к середине нынешнего века. Основной долгосрочной тенденцией политической модернизации для стран первого эшелона было поступательное формирование демократических структур, постепенное вырастание их из добуржуазных политических и правовых институтов. При этом модернизация в политической сфере была тесно состыкована со сдвигами в других областях (экономической, социальной и культурной) и зачастую являлась естественным порождением этих сдвигов.

В странах запоздалой модернизации роль политического фактора выступает более весомой, порой определяющей. И это естественно. Стартовая ситуация в этих обществах была крайне неблагоприятной для "стихийной" модернизации (более низкий, нежели в странах "первого эшелона уровень социальной дифференциации и социальной самодеятельности; сравнительно слабое развитие городов или иной их характер по сравнению с европейскими аналогами; менее выраженное национальное единство; консерватизм культурных традиций; наследие колониализма и пр.). Процесс развития не обладал здесь органическим, поступательным характером. Отсюда повышенная роль политической власти, государства как "толкача" и организатора модернизации – роль тем значительная, чем позже то или иное общество начинает нелегкое восхождение к структурам индустриальной цивилизации. С этим связано появление такого феномена, как "авторитаризм развития (или модернизации)".

Авторитарные политические тенденции были свойственны и ряду стран первого эшелона, особенно на начальных этапах индустриали-

зации. Н.А. Симония указывает в этой связи на феномен бонапартизма в европейских обществах[2]. Во втором эшелоне "авторитаризм модернизации" проявился с гораздо большей силой и практически повсеместно (Россия до 1917 г., Япония эпохи Мейдзи, кемалистская Турция и др.). В истории же стран "третьего эшелона" – вплоть до 80-х годов XX в. – авторитаризм предстает как норма политической эволюции, отклонением от которой выступают отдельные национальные случаи (Индия, Малайзия, Коста-Рика). Однако при этом в одних случаях авторитаризм оказывается совместимым с модернизацией или способствующим ей (Мексика, "драконы" Восточной Азии), в других – ведет к консервации традиционных или неотрадиционных структур (большинство африканских режимов, ряд латиноамериканских стран, особенно в первой половине XX в.).

Политическая модернизация также наталкивается на свои препятствия и ловушки. Наиболее распространенными из них выступают националистическая политика, приводящая к автаркии; крайности технократизма, игнорирующего социальные нужды общества, и популизма, приносящего в жертву социальной политике эффективность экономического развития; неспособность или нежелание политической власти распространить импульс модернизации (и плоды ее) с элитарного на массовый уровень; неглубокое, механическое восприятие современных политических ценностей и норм при фактическом доминировании традиционной политической культуры. Многие из этих опасностей проявляются в практике функционирования политического авторитаризма, наиболее распространенного в эшелонах запоздалой модернизации. Но и демократия может приводить общество к острейшим социальным конфликтам и неэффективности проводимой политики.

Быть может, самой опасной ловушкой политической модернизации в XX в. стал тоталитаризм. Он явился порождением "недозрелой" индустриальной цивилизации, индустриализации "угля и стали", массового стандартизированного производства, когда возник соблазн использования невиданных ранее технических средств для всеохватывающего контроля над обществом. На почве массификации социальных процессов и выросли монополизм в экономике и империализм в политике, что привело к мировым войнам, революциям и появлению тоталитарных режимов, как "черных", так и "красных". Эти опасные тенденции преодолевались как "самоходом" (смягчение монополистических и империалистических тенденций в западном мире, самоисчерпание тоталитарных структур в социалистических странах), так и насильственным уничтожением тоталитарных режимов.

Основные категории анализа. В соответствии с темой исследования анализ будет вестись преимущественно в политологическом плане. Но учитывая комплексный характер процесса модернизации, рассмотрение политических аспектов должно неизбежно дополняться другими срезами – экономическими, социальными и культурологическими.

Изучение опыта политической модернизации в данной работе будет базироваться в основном на материалах развивающихся стран, треть-

его эшелона мировой модернизации. Здесь предметом исследования прежде всего выступает политический авторитаризм.

Авторитаризм как тип политической власти независимо от способа ее организации (теократия, традиционная автократия, личная или корпоративная диктатура, олигархия и др.) имеет в этих странах глубокие исторические корни, опосредованные позже, уже в ходе модернизации устойчивыми элементами традиционной политической культуры. При этом нас будет особо интересовать та разновидность авторитарной политической организации, которую мы уже обозначили как "авторитаризм развития" или "авторитаризм модернизации". Другие разновидности авторитаризма будут рассматриваться в основном под углом зрения несоответствия задачам и процессам модернизации.

В отличие от политической демократии авторитаризм определяется следующими чертами:
доминирование власти (государства) над обществом;
примат исполнительной власти над другими ее секторами;
ограничение (в той или иной форме) легальной оппозиции.

Эти черты свойственны и "авторитаризму развития". Но на определенном этапе развития данные характеристики эволюционируют, принимая относительно смягченную, рационализированную форму. Ибо политический авторитаризм, действительно стремящийся к модернизации, не может не быть озабочен поисками социальной опоры вне традиционных правящих групп, расширением своей массовой базы. Отсюда потребность в том, чтобы "выслушать" соответствующие социальные группы, наладить механизм обратной связи и т.д. В принципе "авторитаризм модернизации" совместим с какими-то элементами политического либерализма – существованием политических партий (пусть верхушечных и контролируемых), правовыми нормами и даже сравнительно "вольной" прессой. Степень постепенного "смягчения" авторитарного режима, его демократизации (иногда – добровольной, иногда – вынужденной) является важным показателем того, насколько он вписывается в процесс модернизации.

Другими показателями функциональности авторитарной политической системы на этапе модернизации развивающегося общества являются проведение эффективной экономической стратегии, нацеленной на преодоление периферийности, национальная интеграция, обеспечение политического суверенитета. Эти задачи решаются сочетанием различных методов, в том числе репрессивных.

Существует разнообразный набор характеристик и оценок механизма функционирования политической власти и ее взаимодействия с обществом. В интересующем нас случае развивающихся стран основными такими критериями (и параметрами исследования) представляются следующие:
стартовая ситуация, которая вытекает как из предшествующей истории, так и из конкретных обстоятельств возникновения данной политической власти (экономический кризис, вооруженный конфликт, национальное движение и т.п.), что в значительной мере определяет характер и дальнейшую эволюцию соответствующего политического режима;
роль внешних воздействий, взаимодействия геополитических сил, а также степени вписанности той или иной страны в мировое хозяйство;
состав политической элиты, уровень ее гомогенности, ее непосредственная социальная опора;
тип отношений элиты и масс (патернализм, вертикальная мобильность, элементы самоуправления), что определяет возможности политической мобилизации и вовлечения в процесс развития различных групп населения;
основные структуры и институты власти, их способность к установлению обратных связей, включая взаимоотношения центральной и местной администрации;
роль национального лидера и его ближайшего окружения в выработке и проведении в жизнь эффективной экономической и социальной стратегии;
использование в процессе развития, политической и социальной мобилизации масс национальных культурных традиций, без чего практически невозможна "идеология развития";
степень, характер и механизмы достижения консенсуса в обществе.

Последний критерий представляется особенно важным, ибо без консенсуса, более или менее широкого или хотя бы частичного, осуществление модернизации невозможно. При этом имеется в виду как консенсус внутри правящей элиты, так и между элитой и массами, достаточно значительными массовыми слоями.

Говоря о консенсусе, мы имеем в виду анализ таких его параметров, как предмет (по поводу чего), участники, способ выработки и, конечно, виды консенсуса (консенсус интересов и ценностей).

Консенсус может быть выражен различными способами: через голосование, опросы общественного мнения, массовые признаки одобрения или, наоборот, отсутствие явного массового неодобрения (но не по принципу "народ безмолвствует"). Иногда консенсус возникает как аванс провозглашаемому политическому курсу, иногда – как результат деятельности политической власти. Но в любом случае консенсус означает принятие тех изменений, которые несет с собой процесс модернизации или по крайней мере не "отбрасывание" этих изменений массовым сознанием и поведением. Напротив, отсутствие минимального единства в обществе, наличие серьезных противоречий и конфликтов, неотрадиционалистских сил может заблокировать модернизацию или существенно деформировать ее.

Понятие консенсуса, тесно связанное с проблемой легитимности власти (ее источниками), позволяет анализировать политические отношения и структуры в обществе, где нет четко выраженных сил и ситуаций социальной гегемонии. В странах "третьего мира" механизмы консенсуса или легитимности представляются более сложными и менее определенными, нежели, скажем, в Европе XIX – первой половины XX в. с характерными для нее более четкой социально-классовой

стратификацией и более артикулированными интересами тех или иных групп.

Критерий консенсуса используется авторами для классификации основных разновидностей политического авторитаризма в "третьем мире". Здесь выделяются:

авторитаризм при отсутствии консенсуса или в условиях псевдоконсенсуса. Речь идет о ситуациях, когда политика авторитарного режима либо, по сути, далека от модернизации, хотя и прикрывается декларациями о "единстве нации во имя развития" и т.п., либо не принимается подавляющим большинством населения страны и(или) не способная объединить вокруг провозглашенных целей и реальных институтов власти большую часть правящих групп;

авторитаризм на базе ограниченного консенсуса. В обществе существует лишь частичное согласие – как внутри правящей элиты, так и между нею и остальным населением. Эта ситуация создает для модернизаторского сектора ситуацию риска, которая может привести к срыву модернизации или ее замедлению. Однако возможен и иной исход, когда успехи модернизаторской политики приводят к расширению общественного согласия и дальнейшему продвижению вперед проводимых преобразований;

авторитаризм на базе широкого консенсуса, который возникает, как правило, при особых ситуационных обстоятельствах, способствующих сплочению общества, и благодаря наличию национальных социокультурных традиций, благоприятных для восприятия ценностей развития.

Пик преобладания авторитаризма в политической жизни развивающихся стран приходится на конец 60-х – 70-е годы. Однако на стыке 70-х и 80-х годов обозначилась тенденция перехода от авторитарных форм правления к либеральным и демократическим. Происшедший сдвиг объясняется рядом причин, как внутренних, так и внешних. Любой авторитаризм, даже "просвещенный", содержит в себе неустранимые внутренние изъяны с точки зрения возможности адекватного отражения интересов общества большинства и автономии индивидуума. Что же касается "авторитаризма развития", то именно в том случае, когда он успешно решает экономические и социальные задачи модернизации, он вольно или невольно подрывает почву собственного существования. Добровольно или вынужденно в данном случае совершается переход к демократическим формам правления – это вопрос обстоятельств.

Эрозия политического авторитаризма в странах "третьего мира" связана с общемировыми процессами. Речь идет не только о сознательном воздействии извне (включая феномен "цепной реакции" демократизации). По-видимому, еще большее значение имеет вступление стран Центра в постиндустриальную фазу развития и, следовательно, необходимость для "догоняющих" обществ совмещать на данном этапе модернизации индустриальные и постиндустриальные тенденции. Можно предположить, что такое совмещение превышает возможности авторитарной власти и наряду с сопутствующим кризисом социалисти-

ческого этатизма инициирует переход к демократии или поиски такового.

Задача исследования здесь заключается в том, чтобы определить, насколько эта тенденция является устойчивой или, наоборот, обратимой, соответствуют ли процессы демократизации в модернизирующихся обществах созревшей объективной реальности или опережают ее.

В этой связи новое значение и звучание приобретает проблема институционализированной политической демократии в "третьем мире". Речь идет о тех сравнительно немногих развивающихся странах (прежде всего Индии), где политическая демократия утвердилась достаточно прочно и давно, практически с начала независимого существования. Исследовательская задача состоит, во-первых, в том, чтобы выяснить причины такой удачной "пересадки" западогенных политических форм на незападную почву, во-вторых, выявить специфику политической демократии в условиях мировой "периферии". На наш взгляд, здесь важно понять не только механизм действия соответствующих политических институтов, но и особенно формирования гражданского общества незападного типа.

Наконец, отдельный блок изучения образуют политические модели антикапиталистического, социалистического типа (Китай, страны соцориентации и др.). Данные режимы обладают громадной, качественной спецификой в связи с наличием элементов тоталитаризма. Излишне говорить, насколько важна эта тема для понимания политических процессов, происходящих на территории бывшего Советского Союза.

[1]*Black C.E.* The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History. N.Y., Evanston a.l., 1966. P. 9–22.

[2]Эволюция восточных обществ: синтез традиционного и современного. М., 1984. С. 196 и далее.