Internationale Politik und Sicherheit | 66

Krumm | Medvedev | Schröder (eds.)

Constructing Identities in Europe

German and Russian Perspectives

Nomos

SWP

Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

herausgegeben von der
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Band 66

Reinhard Krumm | Sergei Medvedev |
Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.)

Constructing Identities in Europe

German and Russian Perspectives

Nomos

SWP

This publication was made possible with the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

ISBN 978-3-8329-7221-9

1. Edition 2012

Table of Contents

Preface

In Russian history and culture, there is a category of questions known as *vechnye voprosy*, "eternal questions". One such question, which has haunted Russian society for over three centuries, is the issue of belonging: Is Russia part of Europe?

Now, more than 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this question is being asked once again, and it is more pressing than ever. Early hopes that post-Soviet Russia could easily integrate into Europe were soon dashed, as Russia embarked upon a difficult transition in the 1990s, then reverted to Great Power politics in the 2000s. Russia's relations with the European Union today are beset with political bickering, bureaucratic squabbling and wordy documents of little practical use. Bilateral relations with key European capitals are also fraught with difficulties, as the West voices ever stronger concerns over internal political developments in Russia.

Against this background, the present book was conceived in response to the need to understand the origins of the current crisis in Russian-European relations and the reasons for the failure to integrate Russia into Europe. It is obvious that one needs to look beyond the day-to-day politics, energy issues, visa and neighborhood concerns and matters of political leadership – to the underlying questions of belonging, community and identity. In order to understand *why* Russia and Europe cannot overcome their mutual alienation, one needs to make sense of *who* they are – or rather, who they *think* they are. And here, the question of identity is key.

Indeed, the issue of identity emerges as a central theme both in the study of international relations and in foreign policy analysis. Challenged by the forces of globalization, integration and fragmentation, nations and groups across the globe respond with identity projects. The question of identity today is almost as politically relevant as the perennial questions of security and sovereignty; indeed, identity *is* security. What security is for the state, identity is for the society: a means of survival.

As the key concept of the project, identity is vital for understanding German-Russian relations, as well as Russia's relations, and identification, with Europe as a whole. The present volume examines the evolution of identity politics in Russia and Germany, their perceptions of each other and of Europe, and the effects on policy as identity patterns change. The book seeks to answer the following questions:

- What is Russia's perception of Europe? Has Russia become more or less "European" in its identity in the past decade? Is Europe/the EU still regarded as a desirable model for Russia's future development?

- What is Russia's perception of Germany – as a nation-state, as a partner in Europe and as a possible model? To what extent does Russia pursue a bilateral policy with Germany to the detriment of multilateral approaches?
- What is Germany's perception of Russia – as a European nation, as a subject to be Europeanized/Westernized, or as an ultimate Other? To what extent is Germany's Russia policy national and to what extent is it European?
- What is the future of German-Russian relations? What is the balance between bilateralism and multilateralism in Russia's relations with Europe?
- What is the future of EU-Russian relations? How could a different Europe be constructed, avoiding the real or imagined civilizational divides?

This volume is a study in political sociology and international relations. In order to answer the questions above, the book proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it presents a methodological basis, introducing identity-related theoretical frameworks in Part 1. Secondly, it provides a historical and sociological analysis of identity structures and mutual perceptions in Russia and Germany (press and elite surveys in Part 2). And finally, in Part 3 it delivers policy analysis and recommendations.

The work is a product of German-Russian cooperation, a joint effort by two German institutions, the *Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung* and *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, and a Russian University, the Moscow-based *Higher School of Economics*. An international group of 20 researchers was involved in the project, which spanned two years, 2008–2010, and included academic seminars in Moscow in April 2008 and in Berlin in June 2009. In addition, extensive elite and media surveys were conducted in Germany and Russia in 2009, engaging 25 experts in Germany and 120 experts in Russia. The results of these surveys are analyzed in Chapters 8–10 of this volume.

We hope that this book will contribute to a better understanding of the mutual perceptions, images, myths and stereotypes in Russia and Germany and thus will lay the groundwork for an informed dialogue and enlightened partnership, not only between these two counties but within Europe as a whole.

Reinhard Krumm
Moscow Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Moscow

Sergei Medvedev
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Hans-Henning Schröder
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

1. Introduction: Identity Issues in EU-Russian Relations

Sergei Medvedev and Iver Neumann

The EU-Russian zastoi

More than twenty years ago, when the Soviet Union still existed and the European Union did not, Mikhail Gorbachev came forward with a vision of a "Common European House", seeking to unite the divided continent.[1] Today, after two decades of turbulent relations, Russia and Europe remain divided, while the "Common House" has been constructed without its suspicious neighbor, Russia.[2]

Rather than with Gorbachevian idealism, EU-Russian relations can be better characterized with a term from the late Brezhnev era: *zastoi*. Literally, this means stagnation, or muddling through. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the crisis in the ailing USSR was masked by high oil prices and the inflow of petrodollars, as well as by the immense propaganda economy of the Soviet system: pompous Party congresses and May Day parades, exaggerated five-year plans and triumphant reports. By the same token, the current state of EU-Russia relations is disguised by vast East-West hydrocarbon flows and by massive symbolic activity, including heady summits, strategies, roadmaps, and a ritual invocation of the "strategic partnership".

The oil and gas flows, and the symbolic diplomacy, conceal a hugely problematic relationship. Increasingly, there is mistrust, frustration and permanent bureaucratic squabbling over technical issues, from steel export quotas to payments for European carriers' flights over Siberia. As Alexander Rahr grimly observed, "The basis for the EU-Russia partnership is as narrow as it has ever been."[3]

The institutional paralysis and political deadlock in relations between Russia and the European Union is all the more striking when one considers that both sides are vitally interdependent in their external and domestic security, as well as joint neighborhood and humanitarian issues, not to mention the fact that the EU accounts for over 50 percent of Russia's external trade and for most of the FDI in Russia. In

1 Sergei Medvedev, "Diskursy otchuzhdenia: Suverenitet i evropeizatsiya v otnosheniyakh Rossii i ES," *Mirovaya Ekonomka i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya* 12 (2009).

2 *Evropa bez Rossii. Dogovor, uchrezhdayushchii Konstitutsiyu dlya Evropy on 20 oktaybrya 2004 goda* [Europe without Russia. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 20 October 2004] (Moscow: Evropa Publishers, 2005).

3 Alexander Rahr, "With Each Passing Day the EU and Russia Need Each Other More and More," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 26 October 2004, 13.

defiance of all neo-liberal theories of interdependence, the closer the EU and Russia come to one another, territorially or economically, the more problematic their relationship, such that interdependence and contiguity become a source of permanent frustration.

Moreover, the increasing EU demand for Russian oil and gas has become a source of permanent tension, with the EU looking for guarantees of supply (e.g. by securing safe and cheap energy transit through Russian territory and enforcing the European Energy Charter), and Russia looking for guarantees of demand (e.g. by trying to buy a stake in European distribution chains, the "last mile" to the European customer). Nord Stream and South Stream, Russia's mega-projects of gas supplies to the EU via pipelines on the seabed in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, have become some of the most divisive issues in European politics.

Broadly speaking, the entire first decade of the year 2000 was a period of disillusionment in EU-Russia relations. With Putin's accession to power, and with the rise of a quasi-authoritarian bureaucratic state in Russia, the EU has became increasingly disappointed about any prospects for the "Europeanization" of Russia. For Russia, too, the EU looks much less attractive than in the 1990s: "An over-bureaucratized formation, pursuing socialist economic policies that stifle economic growth", as Dmitri Trenin succinctly put it.[4]

Another paradox is that on paper, the relationship looks just fine. There has never been a shortage of framework documents in EU-Russia relations, from the aforementioned Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to the various strategies (EU "Common Strategy on Russia" adopted in 1999 and Russia's reciprocal "Mid-term Strategy for Relations with the EU").[5] However, the proclaimed "strategic partnership" has not been supported by clear mechanisms of implementation, timelines, benchmarks and criteria such as those which, in contrast, characterize the relations of the EU with European applicant countries. Without the prospect of Russia's joining the Union, the entire ream of EU-Russia paperwork remains mostly a declaration of intent, an instrument of policy avoidance rather than clear policy guidance.

The same is largely true of another addition to the EU-Russia body of texts, the four Roadmaps, corresponding to the four Common Spaces: the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security, and the Common Space of Research, Education and Culture. Adopted at the EU-Russia summit in May 2005, the Roadmaps present some 400

4 Dmitri Trenin, *Integratsiya i identichnost': Rossiya kak "noviy Zapad"* (Moscow: Evropa Publishers, 2006), 370–71.

5 For the analysis of the CSR, see Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev (eds.), *The EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP* (Helsinki: UPI, 2001).

bulleted action points, mostly phrased in the language of "cooperation" and "dialogue" but vague on mechanisms for implementation. Lacking strategic guidance, policy instruments, or even precise definitions, Michael Emerson has called the Common Spaces "the proliferation of the fuzzy" in EU-Russia relations.[6]

Finally and most importantly, there is the lack of strategic perspective on the future of EU-Russia relations in both Brussels and Moscow. Neither side can articulate the long-term goals of their relationship, the common values, norms and interests that underlie the "strategic partnership". Most notably, by the mid-2000s, the official Russian policy line regarding the EU had boiled down to the statement that "Russia does not seek membership in the European Union"; clearly, such a negativist pronouncement cannot inform a strategic agenda.

The fundamental problem for Russia is that it has not quite figured out how to deal with a new sort of political animal, the European Union. The EU is a difficult counterpart, described alternately as a "unique, not to say strange, political actor, with divided and clashing institutions, unclear sovereignty, a weak sense of common interest and few institutions in the political arena yet able to achieve its declared ends"[7] and as "a bureaucratic body almost without political leadership".[8] From this perspective, it is not clear to Russia where political power in Europe actually resides: Is it in the national capitals, the Council or the Commission? Russian decision-makers sometimes find themselves repeating the frustrated question that Henry Kissinger used to ask back in the 1970s: "If Europe has a foreign policy, I wish someone would tell me its phone number!" Quite often, Russia resorts to tried and tested bilateralism, only to find that bilateral agreements (e.g. Gazprom's deals with European governments) clash with European Union regulations, leaving Russia to face a decidedly less sympathetic EU Commission.

The EU, too, lacks a long-term strategic vision for its relations with Russia. The basic structural impediment is that, for EU policy planners, Russia has no "vocation for membership",[9] and they cannot quite figure out what to do with their enormous

6 Michael Emerson, EU-Russia, "Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy," *CEPS Policy Brief* 71 (May 2005): 3. To this effect, Emerson quotes a French philosopher Paul Thibaud writing on the EU Constitutional Treaty on the eve of the French referendum: "The constitutional treaty … turns its back on a history, which it seems, was just a painful experience, and remains indefinitely extensible for its geography and its competences. The proliferation of the fuzzy is a manner of being for the European Union, and something which the Constitution … did not want to end." (Paul Thibaud, "Qui sont et où sont les bons européens?," *Le Monde*, 11 May 2005.

7 Dov Lynch, "Russia Faces Europe," *EU-ISS Brief*, May 2003.

8 Andrei Makarychev, "Russia's Discursive Construction of Europe and Herself: Towards New Spatial Imagery," *Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Working Paper Series* 1–2: 5.

9 See: Sergei Medvedev, "Catholic Europe, Marginal Russia and Post-Modern North," *Northern Dimensions* 1 (January 1998).

non-acceding neighbor. After half a century of successful integration and adaptation to the outside world, the EU remains essentially an integration machine. At its core is a set of bureaucratic rules, procedures and institutions aimed at transforming nations and spaces to a universal standard. However, once a nation proves impossible to integrate, the technocratic integrationist mentality fails to produce a strategic outlook or a coherent policy. In this way, the EU operational mode is technocratic and bureaucratic, not political and strategic.

At times it appears that the two sides speak different languages: Russia's language of sovereignty and inter-state relations versus the EU language of norms, regulations, and conditionality. And here, we come to the issue of *identity* as an apparent key driver of the discursive and political incompatibility of the EU and Russia. Both sides act and speak as a reflection of who they are, or rather, who they perceive themselves to be, as well as who they perceive the other side to be. Identity construction is an intersubjective practice: the identity of the Self is defined by the image of the Other and vice versa. EU-Russian relations thus become an interdependent game of identity and mutual perception.

The value of constructivism

It is precisely this concept that informs this volume. In attempting to explain the reasons for the ongoing crisis (or *zastoi*) in EU-Russian relations, it looks not so much into the political and economic factors and interests of both sides, but rather into the deep grammar of political discourses and identity structures in Europe (especially in EU institutions) and in Russia. It is here that the images of Self and Other are nurtured and tested, and that the idea of "Europe" and its borders is defined. In this sense, this book is a variation on the perennial theme "Russia and Europe". It seeks to answer the "eternal question" *(vechnyi vopros)* of Russian political philosophy: What are the limits of Europe, defined not only as an historic, economic and political entity but also as a social and normative community, a community of values – and does Russia belong in it?

In order to understand *why* Russia and the EU have abandoned the idea of association and even integration that they had entertained in the early 1990s, and why they are spiraling down to policies of mutual alienation, damage limitation and occasional confrontation, it is important to understand *who* and *how* shapes the idea of Europe, and the conditions for belonging there. In other words, the book examines the social identities and discourses that underlie the current crisis and shape the institutional framework of EU-Russian relations, including the possibility of association and integration.

The analysis takes part on two levels. First, there is the meta-level of EU-Russian relations and discourses at which Russia imagines a kind of a pan-European identity, rooted partly in Russia's historical constructions of Europe, but mostly in current EU discourses and policies. Secondly, as this book is a Russian-German project, there is the national-level analysis, a study of mutual perceptions, images and discourses in Russia and Germany. In a sense, the Russian-German identity story is one of the key narratives between Russia and Europe: for Russians, the word for a German is *nemets* (meaning *nemoi*, dumb – i.e. not speaking Russian), thus rendering the German the quintessential Other, a shorthand for any foreigner. By the same token, Russia for Germany is one of the key figures of the Other in its construction of its European and Western identity.[10]

Methodologically, the research is rooted in the Constructivist methodology, which is not yet widespread in Russian political thought, and in research on international relations and foreign policy. Most current Russian research on EU-Russian relations is based either on traditional geopolitical thinking (theories of Realism and neo-Realism), or on the various guises of neo-Liberalism (institutionalism, regime theory, theories of modernization and transition). Much attention is devoted to diplomacy, summitry, strategies and institutions of cooperation, as well as to trade and investment. On the other hand, there exists a wide body of literature in the field of literary and cultural studies, art criticism and cultural anthropology that explores in depth the historic and cultural interaction between Russia and Europe, the mutual perceptions and the mutual influence of cultural practices. Finally, there is a breadth of sociological data, both in Russia and in Europe, concerning values, identities and mutual perceptions of Russia and Europe. These political, cultural and sociological studies are often detached from one another, and there is no unifying connection in the study of EU-Russian relations that would link institutions and political relations with identity structures and mutual perceptions.

The theory of Constructivism provides the missing link, bridging political practices with social identities. In particular, it helps us understand how the relations of power (including EU-Russian relations and institutions) are constructed in the process of social interaction between groups and individuals with regard to basic values, norms and identities. In a Schmittean way, the Constructivists explain how, in trying to understand who We are – and what differentiates Us from the Other – groups take political actions and draw political borders.

Of the various theories explaining European integration and EU-Russian relations (functionalism, intergovernmentalism, classical economic theory, interest group

10 For a key text on the issue, see: Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

politics, neoinstitutionalist regime theory, etc.)[11] Constructivism probably comes closest in explaining the limits of EU-Russia integration, and the reasons behind the current crisis in EU-Russia relations. Constructivism, either in its mainstream or more post-structuralist forms,[12] focuses on the necessity of shared informal and implicit values, norms and rules – i.e. identities – as a precondition for successful cooperation and integration

As a matter of fact, these preconditions for successful integration are where constructivism begins. Moreover, constructivism carries on the tradition of one of the so-called classic integration theories of the 1950s and '60s, later known as the *transactionalist* or *communications* school of thought. This approach[13] was not explicitly concerned with European integration and in fact did not presuppose any concrete territorial and institutional organization but rather the flow of communication between relevant actors. Its essence was that mutual transactions or communications (travel, trade, telecommunication, etc.) combined with mutual responsiveness might generate a sense of community in certain conditions. This type of responsive community would be the result of a slow and complex learning process, which would increasingly involve the sharing of symbols, identities, habits, memories, values and norms.

Similarly, some constructivists put a great emphasis on the societal level (the level of citizens and civil society) as the basis from which state identity grows. At this level, the preconditions for "Russia joining Europe" were laid long before the collapse of the Communist economic and political system. Although the population of the Soviet Union was cut off from spontaneous transnational connections, this did not stop youth movements and dissidents from appropriating ideas from the West, nor the elite and masses alike from yearning for Western lifestyles and consumer goods. According to some sociologists this phenomenon especially took hold in the 1970s, which was "a period of major social and socio-psychological shifts" with far-

11 For a comprehensive analysis of various integration theories applied to EU-Russia relations, see Christer Pursiainen, "Theories of Integration and the Limits of EU-Russian Relations," in Ted Hopf (ed.), *Russia's European Choice* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

12 Constructivism is associated with scholars such as Peter Katzenstein, Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, among many others. See, for instance, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decision. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (New York [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Nicholas Onuf et al., *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

13 This approach is most notably expressed in the work of Karl Deutsch. See, for instance, Karl Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Management* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1954); Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1966).

reaching consequences in terms of the overall modernization of society. The essence of these changes was that "an industrial society was definitely formed" in the country such that "the process of urbanization was completed and a new generation grew up, shaped by the conditions of Europeanized city life."[14]

Currently this Europeanization in different fields of society of standards, values, norms, behavioral cultures and so on proceeds in Russia through several "informal" means of transnational communication (tourism, media, the Internet, etc.). In terms of formal processes, however, similar development occurs, for instance, through the pan-European higher education integration process (the Bologna process), which will ultimately harmonize or at least render comparable the higher education systems of Russia and the EU, consequently furthering academic mobility and the convergence of the academic labor market.[15] Nevertheless, there are also negative feedback effects from this Europeanization. From the societal integrationist point of view, one of the main paradoxes is that in spite of their geographic proximity, natural transnational communication between the people of the EU and Russia is still regulated by a rather complicated and expensive visa regime, which not only complicates cooperation in various fields but also contributes to the isolation and alienation of Russia from Europe.[16]

For some Constructivists, in turn, a shared state identity is often seen as constructed in everyday practices and contacts between individual decision-makers (politicians, officials). This point has undoubted relevance to EU-Russian relations. Indeed, one hears often, especially from the EU side, that most significant problems arise not from the inefficiency of the formal institutions between the EU and Russia, but from their different behavioral cultures. From the EU point of view, for instance, the Russian approach to the practice of international negotiations differs in many ways from that of the European Union countries. The Russian style of negotiations is seen as very confrontational. From the European perspective there is a "natural Russian tendency" to think about international negotiations and international cooperation as a zero-sum game: If you win, I lose. The Russians, according to many commentators on the EU, do not usually envision that both the EU and Russia can win in the longer term. Instead, Russia's focus is on relative and not absolute gains (the latter of which imply focusing on long-term reciprocity in a win-win situation). This notion implies that the worldview of Russian and EU leaders differs in many

14 Boris Kagarlitsky, *The Dialectics of Change* (London and New York: Verso, 1990), 284.

15 Christer Pursiainen and Sergei A. Medvedev (eds.), *The Bologna Process and Its Implications for Russia. The European Integration of Higher Education* (Moscow: RECEP, 2005).

16 For a comprehensive treatment of the issue, see Minna-Mari Salminen and Arkady Moshes, "Practise What You Preach: The Prospects for Visa Freedom in Russia-EU Relations," *FIIA Report* 18 (Helsinki, 2009), http://www.upi-fiia.fi/assets/events/FIIA_Report_18_2009.pdf.

respects: Russian leaders have adopted a clear realistic self-help worldview, while the EU's policy is shaped on the idea of the importance of international institutions and interdependence.

Thus, one can conclude that both the EU and Russia should pay particular attention to both the practice and the basic philosophy of their relations. It is important to consider whether the behavioral culture in cooperative practices is based on or produced by the shared implicit values, norms and rules which, in the longer run, bring identities closer together. Currently one could argue that the idea of shared values is only superficially added to any EU-Russian documents (such as the Common Space Road Maps) but not taken seriously at the level of practice. The present book tries to fill the conceptual gap, looking for the common ground, and for points of divergence, in the field of identity.

Identity research and international relations

In his dialogue "The Statesman", Plato is interested in that which is specific to the work of the statesman, and by implication, to politics. His answer is that politics is the overarching – or perhaps rather the underlying – art of regulating the relationship between the one and the many. The polis, Plato suggests, is like a woven fabric; the calling of the statesman is to perfect this weave. The resulting cloth should be a perfect mix of the bold and the prudent, with all members of the society included in the fabric. Such a weave, such a political community, Plato concludes, would be the most glorious one of them all.[17]

To Plato, then, politics concerns tying together the threads of personal fates into a fabric where they are all complementary, woven together in a community of practices and of fate. This is collective identity formation as seen from above. As seen from below, it is all about belonging and acting in accordance with preexisting scripts. We find this theme all over the political theory canon. To the contract theorists, for example, people alienate their natural state in order to forge a community. Underlying all the questions of everyday politics, of what kind of constitution a community should have, how resources should be allocated etc. is the basic question of who we are. Groups are an essential part of human life. The larger a group, the more imperative to its cohesion that there exists some kind of glue, some marker of commonality, some integration.

Why is that? Because it is impossible to act collectively without some kind of preconceived scheme of who is acting. This problem grows with the size of the

17 Plato, "The Statesman," in John M. Cooper (ed.), *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 357–58 [311b–c].

group. Think of any workplace, where the idea and practices of commonality are reiterated, over and over. With what aim? So that the employees feel happier? This is indeed part of the answer, for it is the nature of being human that a sense of commonality is one of the factors that increases personal happiness. But the key is that this feeling of commonality rests on a repertoire of knowledge about when and how to act together – and it is this repertoire of knowledge which underlies the productive power of a group. Thus a collective that knows itself to be a "we" is simply more productive, with a larger capacity for action than one with a weaker sense of group identity. As people have been pointing out since Plato, we-feeling is a good thing all around.

There are problems, however. Humans are not bees or ants. We have no group mind that can orchestrate the behavior of each and every individual. Given the diversity of human beings, every group is necessarily heterogeneous to some degree. This means that much of a sense of commonality is imagined, not actually experienced. On closer inspection, culture is never truly shared. Even when we imagine that we share it, there are differences. Russian identity, like any collective identity, is furthered by the existence of common practices, but these practices are common in the sense that they are believed to be the same, not that they are the same. Collective identity is imagined, although it is no less real for that.

Collective identities are also patchy. They are what social scientists call fuzzy sets or, following Ludwig Wittgenstein, family resemblances. There is no one physical or cultural trait that guarantees cultural similarity. Being a member of a group is a case of "know it when you see it". It follows that collective identities are also relational.[18] Where some groups are concerned, being a member of that group is compatible with being a member of another group, with no questions asked. This has important consequences. If it is the group's relations with other groups that sustain the group itself, then these groups constitute the We – the outside of the We is constitutive of the inside of the We, as it were. This is an old insight,[19] which stresses the way in which what we now call identity increases a group's capacity for action, especially regarding defense and warfare. However, in the decades following World War II, it was elaborated upon in ways which made it into the very cornerstone of social analysis of collective identity. Philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Derrida and – previously and with rather different political and analytical cadences, Carl Schmitt[20] – provided the theoretical ground-

18 For a seminal discussion of relationalism, see: Mustafa Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (February 1997): 281–317.

19 Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, ed. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

20 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976).

work. In terms of method, however, the breakthrough came within the social science that has specialized in identity since its inception, namely social anthropology. In Bergen, in 1969, Fredrik Barth and associates published the book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, which argued that ethnic groups could be studied by examining their borders and could be characterized in terms of which differences the groups themselves held to constitute them.[21] Social anthropology never looked back, and over the last thirty years, the other social sciences have followed suit.

It should now be quite clear why identity is a key precondition for foreign policy. Maintaining boundaries (territorial as well as social) is a question of identity maintenance, as well as a question of security. The delineation of a "We" is inherent to any identity formation, and since this question goes to the core of who We are, it may at any time become a political or even security question. Identity – understood as the question of who We are, who our Others are and what kind of relations exist between Us and Them – is a key precondition for foreign policy.

Questions about identity began to be asked within the discipline of International Relations once again by people like Richard Ashley and Rob Walker in the late 1980s.[22] At the same time, work by Simon Dalby[23] on American representations of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was followed by others in the emerging field of critical geopolitics, suggesting that the impetus to study these questions came from changes in foreign policy discourse itself, and not from developments internal to any one academic discipline. In a theoretical contribution, William Connolly argued that identity requires difference in order to exist, and that if threatened, identity may respond by turning that difference into otherness.[24] The identity debate in IR has focused on whether and under what conditions this hypothesis holds water. David Campbell has argued in a book-length study about the US that its history was one of constant othering, which raised the question of whether difference stood much of a chance in a post Cold War world.[25] Campbell wrote this as an indictment of the US. He was soon joined by Samuel Huntington, however, who happily essentialized and embraced the othering processes in question.[26] Political implications aside, this move effectively slams the door in the face of empirical research: if we

21 Frederik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1969).
22 See, for example, reworked material in R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*: *International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
23 Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: Discourse of Politics* (London: Pinter, 1990).
24 William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of the Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
25 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States' Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
26 Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) available at http://history.club.fatih.edu.tr/103%20Huntington%20Clash%20of%20Civilizations%20full%20text.html.

already know what identity is and how it is distributed, there is no reason why we should research these questions. Ole Wæver added that it does not follow that otherness need be spatial.[27] To Wæver, the Other may also be a former incarnation of the self. This is a nice supplementary insight, but it hardly does away with the existence of territorial others.

Alexander Wendt denied that difference was analytically necessary for identity to exist; identity could be self-organizing.[28] He has been answered by, amongst others, Bahar Rumelili, who retorted that "Wendt conflates two distinct processes here. The constitution of identity in relation to difference does not mean that the constitution of identity necessarily involves the agency and discourse of outsiders, but that it presupposes the existence of alternative identities. And no process can be self-organizing if it entails boundary-drawing because boundaries are by definition drawn between a self and an other – even though the other may not be actively participating in the boundary-drawing process."[29]

Most extant studies concern how polities have othered others to remain secure. The obvious cases to study are those where othering in its extreme form – as dehumanization – is programmatic. Soviet communism is a key modern case in point. These cases are characterized by substantial use of dehumanizing metaphors: humans are not humans but dogs, rats, insects (roaches seem to be particularly popular), etc. Perhaps because of their obviousness, these cases have been little studied within IR, but there are voluminous literatures in adjacent disciplines.[30] Neumann's *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation* was an Edward Said-inspired book on how Europe's "East" was a necessary other to "the West."[31] Anssi Paasi contributed with a book on Finland's boundaries, where delineation vis-à-vis the Russian empire and things Russian played a key role.[32]

---

27 Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community," in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 69–118.

28 Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88 (February 1994).

29 Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia* (London: Palgrave, 2007), 25.

30 Cf. Richard A. Koenigsberg, *Hitler's Ideology. A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology* (New York, NY: Library of Social Sciences, 1975); Erik Van Ree, "Stalin's Organic Theory of the Party," *Russian Review* 52 (January 1993): 43–57 and refs. therein.

31 Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1999); comp. Christopher Browning, "The Internal/ External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: The Case of Kaliningrad," *Alternatives* 28 (May 2003): 545–81.

32 Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (Chichester: Wiley, 1996).

A recent study by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson of how West Germany was integrated into the West in the wake of the Second World War set a new standard by focusing on the importance of identity not only as a precondition for action, but also as action itself (in this case, the joining of NATO). The study drew extensively on archival research, making it an exemplar in terms of data collection as well.[33]

From the perspective of Russian foreign policy, one would have thought that NATO identity would have been an obvious thing to study, but attempts to theorize NATO in general are almost non-existent.[34] Behnke starts with the puzzle of why NATO survived the Cold War, given that political realism predicted its demise. The realist prediction rested on the dictum that, once the threat against which an alliance was gone or the gain that it was supposed to realize was gained or no longer in sight – that is, once the alliance's original raison d'être had disappeared, then the alliance would also disappear. Behnke's answer is that NATO survived the disappearance of the Soviet threat because NATO was so intertwined with the representation of "the West" that it was able to survive and expand simply on the strength of being the West's politico-military arm.[35] This answer is similar to one that had already been given earlier by constructivists.[36] Behnke's important critique is that constructivists treat this sequence simply as a case of socialization, with little attention to power. Behnke draws on Carl Schmitt in order to demonstrate how NATO overcame all expectations.

The identity literature on the EU identity is vast, and some studies are of particular relevance to Russian foreign policy. Prozorov's *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU* is a study in mutually exclusive altercasting between the EU and Russia.[37] Hopf's *Russia's European Choice* offers a set of essays that tries to specify the room for maneuver remaining once Russian identity has carved out no-go areas in its European policy.[38] Mälksoo delivers an intense description of tugs-of-war over

33 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the West: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

34 But see: Ola Tunander, "Post-Cold War Europe: A Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure and a Hierarchical Cosmos-Chaos Structure?," in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Einagel (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity* (London: Sage, 1997); Michael C. Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007).

35 Andreas Behnke, "Re-Presenting the West. NATO's Security Discourse after the End of the Cold War," *Stockholm Studies in Politics* 120 (2007).

36 See contributors to the seminal volume Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), particularly Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in ibid., 271–316.

37 Sergey Prozorov, *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).

38 Ted Hopf (ed.), *Russia's European Choices* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2008).

what kind of role Poland and the Baltics have and should have in the framing of EU policy. The study is an exercise in the provincialization of Western Europe and provides a reading of Orientalism and responses to Orientalism in "Old Europe's" readings of "New Europe".[39] In a key work which should be highly suggestive for those looking for a new possible direction in Russian foreign policy, Rumelili discusses how Turkey challenged the EU's narrative of it and of why it could not join the Union by forging counter-narratives of the European self as an identity possibly exclusive of a Muslim state such as Turkey. In order to salvage an identity inclusive of Turkey, the EU had to open the way for Turkish EU membership. Turkey played up its difference. There followed an internal EU debate on whether this should be construed as a threat to European identity, in which case the appropriate response would have been to other Turkey, or whether Turkish difference could be accommodated by altering European identity.[40]

The most ambitious study of how identity may inform foreign policy action remains Ringmar's 1996 book. Ringmar posits a difference between constitutive stories about who We are – stories about action and identity – on the one hand, and stories about actions and interests on the other. Whereas the latter stories may be treated in rational terms, the former stories cannot be treated in this way. Ringmar also introduces a setting to the stories, that is, other story-telling entities. These Others are key audiences of the stories, and as such they participate actively in the formation both of identity and interests, rendering both these concepts relational: "In order to find out whether a particular constitutive story is a valid description of us, it must first be tested in interaction with others."[41] Confirmation cannot be provided by just anyone, but only by those others whom the self recognizes and respects as being of a kind to itself. These sets of others are referred to as "circles of recognition". An instance which is worthy of particular theoretical attention is of course the case where others deny recognition to the self's constitutive stories. In this situation, the storied self has three options: to accept stories told about it by others, to abandon the stories which are not recognized in favor of others, or to stand by the original story and to try to convince the audiences that it in fact does apply. The need to obtain recognition for constitutive stories, Ringmar insists, will be greater at so-called formative moments, times when new emblems, flags, dress, codes, songs, fêtes and rituals are being continuously invented. It will also be greater for social upstarts,

39 Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European: A Genealogy of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2009).

40 Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia* (London: Palgrave, 2007).

41 Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80.

such as Sweden in the 1630s. Ringmar concludes that Sweden entered the Thirty Years' War at this time in order to force other states to accept the story Sweden told about itself. To Ringmar, then, Hegel's story of how the slave must kill the master in order to get his recognition has been sublimated into the story of why certain states go to war at certain times. In a 2002 article, Ringmar also applied this framework to the case of Russian foreign policy.[42]

To sum up thus far, the importance of identity to politics has long been evident to theorists working in different cultural settings. Recent research has succeeded in rekindling interest. Most extant work has focused on identity as a precondition for action. The key to rendering identity scholarship more directly relevant to foreign policy is to make the link from preconditions for action to foreign policy actions themselves. An analysis of foreign policy is not complete until there is an analysis both of how the identities of the involved parties preconditioned and informed the policy followed, and also of how the followed policy affected those identities.

Outline of the book

The book is divided into three parts. Part One explores the theoretical frameworks for the analysis of EU-Russian identity relations. Chapter 2, by Viatcheslav Morozov, *Russia in/and Europe: Identities and Boundaries*, seeks to describe the logic of identity construction in Europe and Russia. It highlights the interaction of identities and the active role of the Other in the formation of temporal and spatial aspects of identity. In accordance with the poststructuralist theory of international relations, identity and foreign policy are mutually constitutive in the process of states' social and political interaction based on hegemony and subordination. Russia and Europe represent two opposite types of struggle for hegemony; their identities are interdependent, but quiet different. Europe's (the EU's) identity is based on social and political norms of democracy and liberal economy, the so-called "normative power Europe", while today's Russia is seen to be a marginalized form of the Other. These identities are the result of different identity construction strategies and the power of states to establish them as a norm. Before the 1990s, EU identity was centered on the dimension of time ("othering the past", an escape from Europe's disruptive history), but the transformations of the 1990s have gradually made Russia the significant Other for the EU's normative power, thus lending the European identity the definite dimension of space. Today EU identity is based on the EU's hegemonic position within Europe and its opportunity to set political and economic norms. Russia has no

42 Erik Ringmar, "The Recognition Game. Soviet Russia against the West," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37/2 (2002): 115–136.

choice but to offer its own alternative interpretations of the universal, or to try and attract the most pragmatic EU actors. In the final analysis, these strategies do not change Russia's role in European identity politics – it remains an outsider, because it only imitates the neoliberal language and practices of the West.

Chapter 3, by Andrey Makarychev, *Communication and Dislocations: Normative Disagreements between Russia and the EU*, continues the analysis of interaction between the identities of Russia and Europe. Identities are treated as inter-subjective positions that are immanently fluid, mobile and flexible. This occurs in the process of communication and their mutual references to one another's experiences and practices. Today, communication between Russia and Europe is accompanied by various inter-subjective conflicts, brought about by the disconnections of normative discourse. This results in different discursive strategies of the EU and Russia in appealing to/constructing each other. For example, Russia treats norms as empty signifiers that have specific content in each specific situation, while the EU perceives norms as established credos that cannot be changed. Such disconnection brings to life "the political effect of norms" that alienates Russia from the EU and vice versa. Firstly, European and Russian decision-makers often infuse the same normative vocabulary with different meanings. Secondly, discursive spheres exist where Russia and Europe disagree even in normative terms. Overall, such normative debates between Russia and Europe create new inter-subjective positions that construct their identities. In its European discourse Russia attempts to form a Europe that is easy to deal and to communicate with, and, at the same time, it seeks acceptance as a legitimate and constitutive member of the international community, equal to the West. The normative discourse tends to play a significant role in this process of identity dislocation.

The theoretical analysis of the interaction of collective identities in Russia and Europe is concluded by Chapter 4 by Olga Malinova, *Russia and "The West" in the Twentieth Century: A Binary Model of Russian Culture and Transformations of the Discourse on Collective Identity*. It examines the historic routes that have made Europe a significant reference point for the self-identification of Russia. The analysis is based on Yuri Lotman's concept of the binary structure of Russian culture applied to the discourse on collective self-identification. According to this theoretical basis, two pairs of ideal-type models have existed in Russia since the middle of the 19th century. The first one included the dichotomy of liberal progress and conservative tradition, while the second pair was based on relations toward Europe and included the models of "Westernism" (pro-Western) and "Nativism" (anti-Western). Using various examples from Russia's pre-Soviet and Soviet history, the author claims that these mutually exclusive models were not the same at different periods of time but that they developed a common framework of reference vis-à-vis

Europe as Russia's constitutive Other. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought in a new dichotomy of opposed ideal-type models of collective identification – "new Westernism" and "new Nativism". As a result, at the end of the 20th century Russia again confronted the binary opposition of different (and highly ideologized) models of collective identity toward its significant Other (Europe). Still, the author presumes that Russia is not forever stuck with the binary opposition of mutually exclusive concepts – the vicious circle of binarity can eventually be marginalized and substituted by a ternary model of self-identification.

Part Two of the book deals with the evolution of identity structures in Europe and in Russia and the dynamics of mutual perception in the past two decades. From the early attempts at positive identification of the Other (especially in Russia), both sides have gradually reverted to the traditional political notion of the Other as an opponent (in the spirit of Carl Schmitt) and to the centuries-old image of Russia as Europe's "constitutive Other". Chapter 5 by Vladislav Belov, *Historical Perceptions of Germany in Russia*, opens a series of comparative studies of Russian and German identities and their past and present interaction. It is mainly devoted to the problems of historical perceptions of Germany in Russia. The author states that significant historic events related to common history provide the strongest sources for shaping the image of the country, forming different archetypes and stereotypes. He identifies the facts that determine the Russians' current attitude to Germany and to the Germans at the levels of individual and collective consciousness. Among positive historic markers are the economic ties of the Novgorod Republic and the Hanseatic League, the German-influenced reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, the unique Russian-German dynasty ties, and a vast German diaspora in Russia. In the 19th century, the Russian image of the Germans became more complex, with the opposition between high German culture and the militarism and expansionism of the newly-formed German Empire. In the 20th century, with its two German-Russian wars, the external factors of Germany, above all its domestic and foreign policies, dominated the formation of Germany's image in Russia, while everyday factors remained at the background of collective perception. Nevertheless, the Soviet victory in World War II and the emergence of a friendly German state (the GDR) played a great role in shaping Russia's national identity and in the simultaneous improvement of Germany's image in Russia. Today Russia and Germany are developing a strategic partnership, thus strengthening the positive image of Germany at the level of historical consciousness among the Russians.

Chapter 6, by Hans-Henning Schröder, *Portraying the "Strangest Country": Evolution of the German Image of Russia*, provides a counterpoint to Belov's text, analyzing the evolving German perception of Russia through various historical epochs, starting from the 16th century. From early times on, a dichotomy formed in

German public discourse. On the one hand, in the acrimonious spirit of Marquis de Custine, Russia was portrayed as a barbaric country devoid of its own culture. On the other hand, following early German travelers such as August von Haxthausen, Russia was presented as a well-ordered, patriarchal state with a lively community life based on the village. The ideas of barbaric tyranny and that of the patriarchal monarchy survived well through the 19th century, although later, especially after Bismarck, the images of Russia served a political purpose, reinforcing the feeling of the "Russian threat". In the 20th century, the idea of clear and present danger was developed further, transforming into a "Bolshevik threat". Despite the leftist portrayals of the USSR as a promised land of modernization, the image of threat persisted through the Nazi years and well after 1945 in the West, where the concept of Soviet totalitarianism became the interpretive model. Summing up, Schröder observes a distinct pattern of stereotypes, both negative and positive, which repeatedly emerge over one and a half centuries and, depending on the political situation and the political beliefs of the speaker, can be combined to form an interlocking positive or negative construct, thereby stressing the underlying constructivist argument of this volume.

Chapter 7 by Reinhard Krumm, *The Rise of Realism*, continues where Schröder's text leaves off, analyzing *Germany's Perception of Russia from Gorbachev to Medvedev*. This is an exercise in political discourse analysis: The perception of Russia's government and people in Germany over the past quarter century is described through the prism of three landmark events – Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika speech (1987), Boris Yeltsin's bombing of the White House (1993), and Vladimir Putin's Munich Speech (2007). In each case special attention is paid to the German perception of Russian foreign and domestic policy. Gorbachev's speech on the democratization of the USSR in 1987 set off an avalanche of events, the most important for Germany being of course German reunification. From that perspective, the German elite and people very positively evaluated the image of perestroika, especially its foreign policy. Yeltsin's storming of the parliament in 1993 raised doubts in Germany, with Russian domestic policies becoming a dominant element in Germany's perception of this country. Putin's Munich speech in 2007 put Russian foreign policy to the forefront of Germany's perception once again, because it symbolized the unpredictability of Russia as a global player and the return of the Other. In sum, today Russian foreign and domestic policies are key markers for German perceptions of Russia, although since the election of Dmitry Medvedev the trend has been towards a more positive image of Russia.

In Chapters 8, 9 and 10, the mutual perceptions of Russia and Germany are examined through sociological instruments, which analyze the views of the elites and opinions of the press. Chapter 8 by Valeria Kasamara and Anton Sobolev presents

an analysis of the image of Germany and the EU through the eyes of the Russian media and Russian political elite. Their analysis consists of three parts: a content-analysis of six Russian periodicals, an opinion survey of 100 Russian respondents (members of the political elite), and the interpretation of this information by 30 Russian political analysts. The content-analysis reveals Germany's leading position as the EU member-state most frequently mentioned in the Russian press. Germany's quantitative domination over other EU states in the Russian press, and the qualitative descriptions of the most important events in bilateral relations confirms the hypothesis about Germany's special place in Russia's media and mass consciousness. Russian political analysts have identified four blocks of factors that contribute to Germany's special image in the Russian mass consciousness: historical, social, economic, and political. The statistical analysis of the Russian press confirms the hypothesis that Russia's mass consciousness looks to Germany as the key EU player, because the reference dynamics for Germany in the press approximate most closely those for the EU. At the same time, the survey of the political elite shows that members of the elite disagree on key issues regarding the EU, finding significant problems and possible tensions in the EU-Russia relationship. Overall, the analysis of the perceptions of Germany and the EU shows that Germany is viewed as a political heavyweight and an important Russian ally in Europe despite some problems in Russia-EU relations.

Chapter 9 by Annabelle Ahrens and Hans-Jürgen Weiss addresses the question of the image of Russia in the German media by examining political editorials about Russia in two German quality newspapers between 2001 and 2008 in terms of thematic reference, interpretative frames, and editorial evaluations. The empirical base of the study is a content analysis of 665 editorials dealing with Russia published during that period in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The results underscore the need to differentiate between the foreign policy and domestic policy images of Russia in the German press; two-thirds of all editorials refer to Russian foreign policy, especially to relations between Russia and the West. Evaluations of Russian foreign policy change substantially over time – from an initial, strongly positive image of a Russia ready for international cooperation toward a later, negative image of a world power bent on confrontation. By contrast, internal Russian conditions, especially the deterioration of Russia's democracy, are evaluated negatively throughout the analyzed editorials. Moreover, the German editorials from the period remained narrowly focused on a small number of topics and actors – the Russian government, on the one hand, and the conflict in Chechnya, on the other.

As in the Russian case, this media analysis is augmented by an elite opinion survey. In Chapter 10, Felix Oldewage examines a survey of top German experts on

foreign affairs who were questioned on various aspects of Russian-German relations. While the experts seem indecisive in evaluating the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, they tend to regard it as a positive change. There was a division between political and economic issues: The experts supported the intensification of economic exchange and cooperation while at the same time doubting whether Russia is a reliable political partner in terms of energy security; in particular, they were critical of the management of natural resources by the Russian government. Finally, the survey presents a very negative picture of Russian democracy, the political system and the rule of law in Russia.

The analyses of mutual perceptions of Russia and Germany through the prism of the media and the elites suggests policy implications for both countries. In Part Three, the present volume problematizes political discourses that define strategies in Russia, Germany, and the EU.

Chapter 11 by Susan Stewart, *Coherence in EU Policy toward Russia: Identities and Interests*, deals with the problem of developing a coherent EU policy towards Russia. The basic thesis states that EU policy will become more coherent and consistent if there is a greater degree of convergence within the EU toward a common position on Russia. Four EU countries (Germany, Poland, Finland, and Bulgaria) were chosen to investigate the existence of coherent factors in their policy towards Russia. The analysis of these countries concentrates on how political elites view questions of national identity (priorities in history, culture and values) and how these views have translated into the pursuit of certain interests (economic, security and geographical interests). The results of the four case studies demonstrate that identity-related characteristics are less salient for shaping relationships with Russia than are interest-based factors. Only the historical factor, especially in the case of Poland, seems to play a major role in setting the agenda in relations with Russia. In sum, the potential for convergence is arguably greater on the level of interests, because of the primarily interest-based policy of all four countries vis-à-vis Russia in the spheres of economy, security and neighborhood. The experience of the four countries in pursuing interest-based relations with Russia indicates that a coherent policy of the entire Union towards Russia is likely to emerge, and will be established primarily on the basis of interests rather than identities.

Chapter 12 by Fedor Lukyanov, *Russia and the European Union: Identities in the Context of Geopolitics*, for its part, examines the implications of the geopolitical roles and identities of Russia and the EU in the rapidly changing global environment. The basic thesis states that in the next 10 to 15 years Russia and the European Union should work toward a common geopolitical identity in confronting the challenges of the multipolar world. The author analyzes the geopolitical evolution of the Russian Federation and the EU. Russia is seen as a country that is striving to restore

its Great Power status while simultaneously seeking integration into the European political space. The EU is understood as a Western role model that launched its eastward expansion in reply to Russia's imperial nostalgia, establishing the geopolitical dimensions of Europe. On the whole, the development of the two rival identities – the EU's identity as a Western role model and Russia's post-imperial identity – has led to cooperation based on the technocratic approach. Today this approach is changing, because both a weakened Russia and a stronger Europe are facing marginalization in the emerging multipolar world order. A common geopolitical identity should be developed by Russian and European policymakers in order to salvage their influence in the world. The author recommends that the Russian political elite choose a paradigm that combines "European choice" with Great Power status and equality of sovereignties.

Finally, Chapter 13 by Hans-Joachim Spanger and Andrei Zagorsky, *Constructing a Different Europe: The Peculiarities of the German-Russian Partnership*, analyzes the patterns of the strong German-Russian relationship. The observed trend in their relations since 2000 is the following: Every change of government in Germany was to a greater or lesser extent accompanied by an initial cooling of relations with Russia, but each time Russia regained its position as a strategic partner of Germany. The authors study three theoretical concepts of international relations – Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism – in order to explain this pattern. The result of their analysis shows that the tension between interests and values is a recurrent feature in the Russia policy of the West and that it therefore cannot be fully incorporated into Realist and Constructivist assumptions. Thus, the Liberal concept is chosen as the most appropriate one for discussing German-Russian relations and interaction. In this context, whereas German economic and security interests call for cooperation with Russia, Germany's democratic values prove to be a stumbling block, since Russia's statist consolidation and the rise of its economic prowess are accompanied by a visible decline in its internal democracy. The study of Germany's and Russia's views on their mutual relations demonstrates that two basic obstacles for further partnership are the domestic evolution in Russia, and Germany's resistance to the development of a more pluralistic multi-polar world. Generally speaking, the results of this analysis correspond with other studies in the book in concluding that the growing gap between the political identities on both sides is potentially the most divisive issue in German-Russian and EU-Russian relations.

***

This brings us back to the starting point of this volume, the issue of identity, and the extent to which it defines foreign policy. It is clear that one of the key contradictions

between Russia and the EU, and Russia and Germany, is the basic rift in political discourse, the different readings of sovereignty in Moscow and in Europe. The Kremlin is bent on the "Westphalian" interpretation of the state, using strict control over the political and economic sphere and the strategy of bureaucratic centralization, both of which alienate Moscow from the West. On the other hand, European discourses, including the German ones, are rooted in notions of post-sovereignty and democracy that find little traction in Russian political circles. Equally important, Moscow has a very different vision of Europe from either Berlin or Brussels. Moscow pictures a Westphalian Europe of the past, a Europe of nation-states, whereas Berlin and Brussels imagine the Europe of the future as a normative community of values.

To sum up, the evidence presented in this volume provides proof for the Constructivist tenet that identity structures and the deep grammar of political discourse have a bearing on strategic documents, institutes of partnership and the quality of relations between the EU and Russia. The weakening of documents and institutions, and the current crisis in EU-Russian relations, are explained by relations of identity concerning the limits and the contents of the idea of "Europe". This also proves another key point of Constructivism: the intersubjective, relational nature of any identity. There is no "pure" German, Russian or European identity; they are permanently negotiated and re-defined within the political discourse of Wider Europe. No man is an island, no identity is immune to change, and this also gives hope for a future in which shifting Russian and European identities may converge, paving the way for policies and institutions of rapprochement and integration.