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DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND ATTITUDES TO AMERICA: COUNTRY-LEVEL PREDICTORS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

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The present study examines survey data from 45 countries by the means of factor and regression analyses in order to understand the nature and causes of anti-Americanism. Empirical results reveal a clear distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism. The former involves negative attitudes towards American culture and its global spread, whereas the latter is specifically focused on disapproval of the U.S. foreign policies. The two forms of anti-Americanism also differ in their relationship to socioeconomic development. Cultural anti-Americanism is most widespread in countries with average levels of Human Development Index, whereas political anti-Americanism is stronger in the most developed societies. This study finds that Muslim societies are characterized by higher levels of both cultural and political anti-Americanism. On the whole, these findings indicate that anti-Americanism follows consistent country-level patterns and likely has universal roots which should be studied within a comparative framework.

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There is a general consensus among scholars and policy analysts that global anti-American sentiment has been on the rise in the first decades of the 21st century (Ceaser, 2004; Chiozza, 2009; Lacorne & Judt, 2005; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Krastev, 2007; Singh, 2006; Zakaria, 2004). The phenomenon of anti-Americanism, however, has a history of more than 200 years. A historical account by O'Connor (2006) shows that, among European intellectuals in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, there was a tendency of "cultural criticism of the lack of taste, grace and civility in American habits and everyday life" (p. 13). Signs of similar anti-American sentiments can be found in Europe till the present time (Markovits, 2007), but the nature of anti-Americanism changed dramatically throughout the 20th century, parallel to the increase of the U.S. role in the international politics. Criticism of America became global and its focus shifted to economics and politics, or—more precisely—to those economic and political practices associated with the U.S. and Americans.

There is a debate in the literature regarding the exact meaning of the term "anti-Americanism." There are contributions that employ a relatively narrow definition of anti-Americanism as an "obsession" based on the demonization of the U.S. and Americans (Berman, 2004; Hollander, 1995, 2009; O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006). Throughout the present paper, the term "anti-Americanism" is used in its most general sense in order to denote the general phenomenon of "opposition or hostility to the people or the government policies of the United States" (*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 2003, p. 54).

Popular anti-Americanism can be an important factor in international politics for at least two reasons. First, the spread of anti-American sentiments can create a social climate favourable to anti-American violence and activities of extremist organizations (Hollander, 2009). Moghaddam (2005) argues that hostility to Americans based on unquestioned attribution of responsibility for all the negative processes in world politics to the U.S. represents an important stage in the "staircase to terrorism." Second, growth of popular anti-Americanism threatens American "soft power," a term coined by Nye (1990) in order to describe America's ability to convince rather than to coerce and its attractiveness to the populations of other countries. Thus, anti-Americanism can jeopardize both the legitimacy of U.S. leadership and the efficiency of its foreign policy by hindering international cooperation (Chiozza, 2009; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Naim, 2003). Zakaria (2004) suggests that such a situation would be dangerous for the whole international community, as American efforts still constitute a cornerstone of contemporary global security.

This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical debate on the nature of anti-Americanism and its causes in three major ways. First, most existing research on anti-

Americanism is represented by either case-studies or theoretical contributions, whereas comparative (Yeo, 2010) and quantitative works (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012; Chiozza, 2009) are relatively scarce. This study will use quantitative methods, namely factor and regression analysis, and country-level data collected by research centres and international organizations in order to address the phenomenon of anti-Americanism from a comparative perspective. Most importantly, it is shown that anti-Americanism on the national level is significantly related to both socioeconomic development and cultural heritage. This finding supports the idea that anti-Americanism in various regions of the world is partially caused by the common factors which should be studied using the means of comparative analysis. Second, although contributions on anti-Americanism often suggest that general hostility to America should be distinguished from issue-specific criticisms of the U.S. (Kane, 2006; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Singh, 2006), this distinction was not sufficiently explored. This paper's findings indicate that—at least on the national level—there is clear empirical distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism. Third, anti-Americanism in the Middle East and wider Muslim world draws attention of scholars (Abdallah, 2003; Chiddick, 2006; Lynch, 2007; Makdisi, 2002), but the premise that Islamic societies are on average more anti-American has never been explicitly tested. The analysis reveals that anti-Americanism is indeed more widespread in Muslim societies than in non-Muslim ones, but further research is necessary in order to understand nature of this phenomenon.

Universal Roots of Anti-Americanism

Before speaking about possible driving forces behind anti-American sentiments it is necessary to make a fundamental distinction between country-specific and more global ones. The former are usually researched in the format of case-studies devoted to particular countries and/or regions. There are contributions on the origins and development of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East (Lynch, 2007), Latin America (McPherson, 2007), Europe (Berman, 2004), and even in the U.S. itself (Hollander, 1995). This approach is based on the assumption that anti-Americanism is mostly fuelled by factors which cannot be separated from the historical and political context of a particular society.

The present study employs the opposite assumption, namely that anti-American sentiments in different parts of the world have important commonalities. More specifically, I suggest that anti-Americanism can be seen as a manifestation of a relatively old phenomenon related to resentment against modernity. Such an approach can be found in theoretical and historical contributions on anti-Americanism. Ceaser (2004) states that anti-Americanism appeared in Europe as a reaction towards the Enlightenment and other developments related

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to the modern era, such as industrialization and the growth of individualism. Rubin and Rubin (2004) argue that, since the 19th century, in the eyes of European intellectuals America began to symbolize all the negative features of modernity, such as industrial deformation of living space, rootless cosmopolitanism, and absence of elitism. Contemporary anti-Americanism, according to Berman (2004), is a form of critique directed against the processes of globalization, which promotes a neoliberal economic model and cultural unification. Ajami (2003) provided possibly the best formulation of this thesis: "To come bearing modernism to those who want it but who rail against it at the same time, to represent and embody so much of what the world yearns for and fears—that is the American burden" (p. 58).

The same view on anti-American and wider anti-Western sentiments, though on the higher level of abstraction, is developed in the contribution by Buruma and Margalit (2005). They view anti-Westernism—or "Occidentalism" as they call it—as a universal resentment against modern civilization which is defined through "the dehumanizing picture of the West painted by its enemies" (p. 5). This image is based on stereotypization and denigration: Within an Occidentalist myth the West is depicted it as a mechanistic civilization which lacks spiritual culture, inspiration, and heroism. It is interesting that specific targets of Occidentalist abhorrence—cosmopolitan cities, selfish bourgeoisie, and immoral science—correspond quite well to the crucial processes of social transformation such as urbanization, industrialization, and secularization (see Inglehart, 1997). The relationship between Occidentalism and anti-Americanism is not straightforward, as the former can be directed against other groups - for example, Jews have a long history of being an object of similar hatred. At the same time existence of remarkable similarities between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism (see Markovits, 2007) indirectly supports the idea that mass anti-American sentiments involve deeper psychological mechanisms than simple disagreement with the U.S. government. Accordingly, the analysis by Buruma and Margalit suggests that anti-Americanism should be understood as a contemporary vessel for old venom brewed of intolerance and inability to accept modernity.

Variety of Anti-American Sentiments

The assumption that anti-Americanism is related to rejection of modernity by no means refers to any possible disagreements with the U.S. foreign policy or distastes of certain aspects of American society, since they can often be justified (Hollander, 1995, 2009; Markovits, 2007; O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006). Therefore, a general distinction can be made between issue-oriented criticism of the U.S., which involves opposition to certain policies

and/or practices, and general hostility towards Americans (Lacorne & Judt, 2005). This separation was employed, for instance, in the empirical study by Chiozza (2009) in order to construct issue-specific indices of anti-Americanism. However, the assumption that rational and irrational motives of anti-American sentiments can be grouped into two coherent measures was not explicitly tested. So, the first hypothesis of the present study is that *there is an empirical distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism on the national level* (H1). If this assumption holds, then only the former can be interpreted as a psychological reaction to modernization, while the latter should be treated as a political position.

Anti-Americanism and Socioeconomic Development

If anti-Americanism in different parts of the world represents manifestation of the same psychological reaction to the processes of modernization, it is reasonable to suggest that level of anti-Americanism in a society should be related to its socioeconomic development. There are, however, different predictions regarding the direction of such relationship. A first type of logic linking anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development can be derived from the revised version of modernization theory proposed by Inglehart (1997). The theory is built on the assumption that technological progress and economic development create a social climate of "existential security" which includes guaranteed physical survival and increased control over one's own life. Existential security, in turn, leads to a number of predictable changes in both values and institutions, and the most important of them is spread of tolerance and, as a result, emergence of stable liberal democracies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Modernization theory does not directly address the phenomenon of anti-Americanism but—if the latter is fuelled by intolerance and anti-modernist resentment—existential security is expected to undermine the psychological basis for anti-Americanism. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the *spread of cultural anti-Americanism is negatively related to socioeconomic development on the national level* (H2), whereas this is not necessarily true for political anti-Americanism.

An alternative mechanism which connects anti-Americanism and modernization can be found in a historical analysis by Greenfeld (1992). She uses French word *ressentiment* in order to refer to a specific form of nationalism which emerges in the countries having undergone a processes of deep social transformation. Using examples of Russia and Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries, Greenfeld shows that most projects of "catch-up modernization" have two important similarities. First, they are oriented towards some model, usually a leading country of the time, which is widely perceived as an ideal modern society—in the narrative by Greenfeld, this role is played by France and Britain. Second, admiration

for the model is easily replaced with envy and hatred—the constituent feelings of *ressentiment*—if modernization does not go as successfully as initially anticipated. This logic explains why nowadays America has become a target of such intense hatred: The U.S. is admired and loathed because, being a global leader, it is often seen as the perfect embodiment of Western modernity. Greenfeld's theory was never designed for an empirical testing but it clearly suggests that the relationship between modernization and *ressentiment* is nonlinear. If anti-Americanism can be compared to a "virus," then the least developed countries are not yet infected with it, the most developed ones already recovered, while societies in the middle of modernization process are at highest risk. Therefore, it is possible to formulate an alternative hypothesis that there is a quadratic relationship between anti-American sentiments and socioeconomic development on the national level, so that *countries with average levels of socioeconomic development are characterized by the highest levels of anti-Americanism* (H2a). As well as for the previous hypothesis, this effect is expected only for cultural anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism in Muslim Societies

It is not surprising that the prominence of anti-American sentiments in many Muslim countries, often noticed by both media and academia, draws attention of scholars. Even though most authors agree that the level of anti-Americanism in Muslim regions, and especially in the Middle East, is rather high, various explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed (see Lynch, 2007). Many of them can be attributed to one of the two major frameworks which view anti-Americanism as respectively either a manifestation of the "clash of civilizations", or a response to American policy towards Muslims. The first approach is usually attributed to Huntington (1996), but Bernard Lewis proposed one of its earliest formulations in the classic essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage". According to Lewis (1990/2001), anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism among Muslims "goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such" (p. 18). An alternative logic links anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world to anger at the U.S. policies, including alliance with Israel, military actions against Muslim countries, and hypocrisy in support for the democratic principles (Abdallah, 2003; Chiddick, 2006; Makdisi, 2002).

The present study seeks to escape this debate and to test instead whether the level of anti-Americanism in Muslim societies can be attributed to certain social and political institutions. One such argument is put forward by modernization theory: Inglehart and Norris (2002) claim that the key gap between Muslim and Western societies concerns not politics but

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social values, most importantly gender equality and sexual morals. From a social psychological perspective, the spread of Western cultural models is driven by the processes of globalization, which threatens Islamic identity and thus provokes resentment among the Muslim populations (Moghaddam, 2008). This anger is transferred to the U.S. which - due to its unrivalled position in world politics - is seen as the source of perceived cultural expansion. In other words, anti-Americanism in Muslim societies basically represents a form of fundamentalist resistance to cultural globalization described by Giddens (2002), while prevalence of conservative social values in Islamic societies makes Muslims especially vulnerable to it. The hypotheses derived from modernization theory can be formulated as follows. First, there is a *positive relationship between the level of both cultural and political anti-Americanism on the one hand and the share of the Muslim population in a country on the other hand* (H3, H4). Second, *for cultural anti-Americanism this effect is mediated by the degree of cultural modernization in a society* (H5), while political anti-Americanism reflects dissatisfaction with American policies and thus does not follow this logic.

Another possible factor of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, which is nevertheless often neglected, concerns internal political processes in Muslim societies (see Blaydes & Linzer, 2012). Analyzing political history of the Middle East after the breakdown of Western colonial rule, Lewis (2004) finds that instead of improving the quality of administration, political modernization strengthened authoritarian governments in the region, as the latter borrowed Western technologies of oppression and propaganda in order to secure their power. Influence over media can be very important, as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) show that exposure to certain broadcasters is significantly related to the levels of anti-Americanism. Using state-controlled media and modern forms of indoctrination, authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries channel the frustration of their populations towards external targets, such as the U.S. and Israel (Moghaddam, 2005). Krastev (2007) notices that anti-Americanism is a very convenient weapon in this regard as it represents an "empty bottle" and different political actors can fill it with sometimes opposite meanings. So, another source of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and Muslim countries in general can be seen in the deliberate efforts of authoritarian elites, which, despite the recent events of the Arab Spring, are still influential in the region. Therefore, *the relationship between Muslim population and cultural anti-Americanism can be mediated by the type of political regime* (H6).

Data

      The data used for this study came from surveys collected by the Pew Research Center in year 2007 as a part of their ongoing Global Attitudes Project.[2] The 47-nation dataset covers the maximum number of societies and includes a series of questions related to various aspects of anti-American sentiments. It was collected using telephone and face-to-face interviews according to nationally representative samples with a margin of error between 3% and 6% in different countries. Due to the nature of the research question, two societies were excluded from the sample, namely the U.S. (for obvious reasons) and Palestinian territories as some international development indicators have not been calculated for the latter. As a result, my dataset comprises of 42,405 respondents in 45 countries. See Table 1 for the full list of countries included in the analysis.

< Table 1 about here >

      These data are used to construct national-level indicators of various anti-American sentiments. In the construction of country-level values, two basic steps were taken. First, individual-level survey items were recoded into dichotomous variables so that 1 meant an anti-American position and 0 pro-American. See Table 2 for the full list of questions on anti-Americanism used in the analysis as well as their values before and after recoding. Second, country-level values of anti-American sentiments were calculated as weighted means of respective dichotomous variables. Final numbers effectively represent the percentages of respondents who express certain anti-American views in a given society (i.e. ones who scored 1 for a certain variable in the national sample).

< Table 2 about here >

      Following this, national-level data were pooled with figures on socioeconomic development, economy structure, Muslim population, gender relations, and political regime. Socioeconomic development of a country was assessed by the Human Development Index (HDI), computed and published in the reports by the United Nations Development Program.[3] HDI was preferred to other indicators, most importantly to GDP per capita, due to its wider coverage of various aspects of social and economic development. To check whether the

relationship between anti-Americanism and HDI should be attributed to socioeconomic development or economic structure, controls related to the composition of economy in a given country were added. First, we included a measure of postindustrialization, computed as difference between share of services and share of industry in GDP (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Data on GDP composition were taken from the 2008 CIA World Factbook (accessed through the University of Missouri at St. Louis).[4] Second, we used a measure of a country's dependency on oil and gas rent measured as the share of fuel in exports (see Ross, 2001). These data were taken from the World Bank website.[5]

Percentages of Muslim population in each country were taken from a report on global Muslim population prepared by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.[6] This report employs figures from censuses and—if they are not available—from large-scale nationally representative polls thus representing one of the best publicly accessible sources on Muslim populations in the world. The degree of gender inequality was measured by the Global Gender Gap Index published in yearly reports as a part of the project run by the World Economic Forum.[7] This index is calculated on the basis of national statistics on women's economic participation, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health protection (see Inglehart & Norris, 2003). We used values from 2010 because that was the first report in which values for the Ivory Coast and Lebanon were provided. It is necessary to note that higher values of this index denote higher degrees of gender equality. Political regimes were rated according to the mean of scores on political rights and civil liberties published in a "Freedom in the World" report by Freedom House.[8] The index takes values from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic) thus making a natural measure of authoritarianism.

Results

Factor analysis

An exploratory factor model was run as a first step of the empirical analysis in order to understand the patterns of distribution of different anti-American opinions on the national level; the results are represented in Table 3. The findings give strong support for my first hypotheses as they show that there is a clear distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism (H1 corroborated).   The first one, which I refer to as "cultural anti-Americanism", consists of negative attitudes to American culture and its global spread. The

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[4] http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2008/fields/2012.html
[5] http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx
[6] http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population23/
[7] http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR11/GGGR11_Rankings-Scores.pdf
[8] http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2008

second type, "political anti-Americanism," includes negative evaluations of some aspects of the U.S. foreign policy, namely hypocrisy in promotion of democracy, unilateralism, and indifference to global economic inequality.

< Table 3 about here >

Using the results of factor analysis, two new country-level variables were constructed, namely synthetic indices of cultural and political anti-Americanism computed as averages of indicator variables' values. The distribution of the two forms of anti-Americanism on the national level reveals the existence of two consistent clusters. The first one consists mostly of sub-Saharan African countries, characterized by very low levels of both cultural and political anti-Americanism (see Figure 1). The second cluster includes primarily Muslim-majority societies, which score high on the two forms of anti-Americanism. These findings lend some indirect support for the assumptions that the relationship between anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development is nonlinear and that Islamic countries tend to be more anti-American than non-Islamic ones. The next step consists of a regression analysis in order to test these hypotheses directly.

< Figure 1 about here >

Regression Analysis

In this part of the empirical analysis, two independent series of regressions are estimated with respectively cultural and political anti-Americanism as dependent variables. The sequence of steps is as follows: estimate the relationship between anti-Americanism and HDI, linear and nonlinear, with controls and then add the percentage of Muslim populations to the model also looking for possible mediating effects. See Table 4 for the descriptive statistics of all variables in the analysis, including constructed indices and their components.

< Table 4 about here >

Cultural anti-Americanism. Initial regression model reveals that there is no linear dependency between cultural anti-Americanism and HDI (see Model 1.1 in Table 5) thus leading to a rejection of a hypothesis based on modernization theory that anti-American sentiments gradually diminish parallel to socioeconomic development (H2 refuted).

However, a second-order term for HDI shows significant results. This means that cultural anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development are actually connected, but the relationship between them is nonlinear or, more precisely, quadratic. The direction of the coefficient suggests that the effect takes the shape of an "inverted U," so that both the poorest and the richest countries show low levels of cultural anti-Americanism, while societies with middle levels of HDI are more hostile to American culture. Furthermore, the quadratic effect of the HDI explains 39% of cross-national variance in cultural anti-Americanism thus indicating that socioeconomic development represents a major factor in the emergence of anti-American sentiments. This finding fully confirms the alternative hypotheses formulated on the basis of the theory by Greenfeld (H2a corroborated) and makes it possible to suggest that cultural anti-Americanism follows the logic of *ressentiment* and, therefore, likely represents a psychological reaction, arising in the middle stages of modernization. Furthermore, the results of the regression analysis indicate that even after the inclusion of measures of economic structure (index of post-industrialization and fuel exports), the quadratic effect of HDI on cultural anti-Americanism remains statistically significant and does not decrease in magnitude. This finding suggests that the roots of hostility towards American culture in societies with middle levels of socioeconomic development should be attributed not to their social and/or economic structure but rather to a psychological reaction associated with ongoing modernization.

< Table 5 about here >

Then, testing the next set of hypothesis concerning the roots of anti-American sentiments in Muslim societies, the percentage of Muslim population were added as an explanatory variable to the regression model. The results reveal strong and significant positive relationship between cultural anti-Americanism and a share of Muslims in a society (see Model 1.2 in Table 5). Therefore, they empirically support a widely held belief that Muslim societies are on average more culturally anti-American than non-Muslim ones (H3 corroborated). It is also important that this effect exists additionally to HDI, i.e. the spread of anti-American sentiments in Muslim societies cannot be attributed to their levels of socioeconomic development. At the same time this analysis shows that the persistence of cultural anti-Americanism in Muslim countries cannot be explained with their social values and/or political structure. Regression results indicate that the Global Gender Gap Index and the Freedom House authoritarianism score, being added to the model, remain statistically

insignificant. Therefore, hostility to the U.S. in Muslim societies cannot be attributed to a gap in values, as modernization theory suggests, or to authoritarian political regimes (H5 and H6 refuted).

Then the final model was estimated with only statistically significant predictors, namely HDI and share of Muslim population. In terms of predictive power, this model explains 57% of cross-national variance in cultural anti-Americanism (see Model 1.3 in Table 5).

Political anti-Americanism. Political anti-Americanism shows a different pattern of relationship to socioeconomic development. There is a strong and significant negative effect of HDI on the level of political anti-Americanism (see Model 2.1 in Table 6). The second order term, by contrast, appears to be statistically insignificant. Thus, the relationship between political anti-Americanism and HDI is linear: People in developed countries tend to be more critical towards the U.S. foreign policy. It is important to note that variables related to economic structure are statistically insignificant. Accordingly, political anti-Americanism is linked to human development in general, not to a specific structure of economy. A positive relationship between political anti-Americanism and HDI indicates that disapproval of American foreign policies tends to develop within the most developed societies with emancipative social values. Therefore, it is unlikely that issue-oriented criticism of the U.S. represents a form of prejudice; instead it should be seen as a political position. At the same time this finding supports the general idea that global anti-Americanism, political as well as cultural, follows predictable patterns on the national level. The model also performs well in terms of predictive power, explaining 35% of cross-national variance in political anti-Americanism.

< Table 6 about here >

As for the relationship between political anti-Americanism and the percentage of the Muslim population, it appears that Muslim societies score significantly higher than non-Muslim ones on political anti-Americanism (H4 corroborated; see Model 2.2 in Table 6). This finding is not surprising since conventional wisdom suggests that such factors as American support for Israel and military actions against Islamic nations are likely to cause discontent among Muslims. This result can also indicate that dissatisfaction related to the U.S. policies in Muslim societies can take the form of cultural as well as political anti-

Americanism. Variables related to social and political modernization, according to my results, do not affect political anti-Americanism.

A final model with only statistically significant predictors of political anti-Americanism, HDI (both linear and quadratic terms) and share of Muslim population, was then estimated. In terms of predictive power, it explains 45% of cross-national variance in political anti-Americanism (see Model 2.3 in Table 6).

Discussion

The Two Forms of Anti-Americanism

The results of the empirical analysis have several important theoretical implications, which are discussed below. First and foremost, both factor and regression analyses indicate the existence of two distinct forms of anti-Americanism on the national level. The first form is referred to as cultural anti-Americanism since it embodies negative attitudes to American culture and its global spread. This type of anti-Americanism is close to the conceptualizations of various authors who developed the framework of anti-American sentiments as a form of intolerance and a psychological reaction to modernization. The second form is referred to as political anti-Americanism, and it includes disapproval of certain aspects of the U.S. foreign policy such as hypocrisy in spread of democracy, unilateralism, and promotion of an economic model that increases global inequality.

The findings presented in the paper indicate that the two forms of anti-Americanism are different not only in content but also in roots. The key difference between cultural and political anti-Americanism, according to this analysis, is their relationship to the level of socioeconomic development. Country-level regression analysis reveals a quadratic relationship between cultural anti-Americanism and HDI: The highest levels of hostility to America are found in the societies characterized by medium social and economic development. Political anti-Americanism, on the contrary, has positive linear relationship to HDI: Criticism of U.S. foreign policy is more often encountered in the most developed societies such as Sweden, France, and Canada. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism has both internal and external validity. These findings suggest that the debate between the two major approaches to anti-Americanism can be solved by recognition of existence of both culturally and politically motivated anti-American sentiments.

Anti-Americanism and Socioeconomic Development

An important empirical result of the present study reveals the existence of quadratic relationship between cultural anti-Americanism and HDI. Countries characterized by negative attitudes to American culture are ones with the moderate levels of socioeconomic development. This finding indirectly supports the idea that cultural anti-Americanism is more widespread in the societies undergoing the middle stages of modernization compared to countries in which modernization has not begun (the least developed ones) or is already complete (the most developed). This relationship should be interpreted in terms of the *ressentiment* theory by Greenfeld (1992). The most important strength of her analysis is the ability to explain paradoxical "love-hate" attitudes to America in many developing countries noticed, for instance, by Ajami (2003) and Moghaddam (2008). According to Greenfeld, admiration for the U.S. as a model society exists in the early stages of modernization. Later— as the gap between the country and the model becomes evident—this feeling turns into envy and hatred, thus provoking anti-American sentiments, often perceived as irrational. However, if modernization efforts finally turn successful, the psychological basis for *ressentiment* disappears. People in developed countries perceive Americans as peers and thus do not tend to either worship or abhor them. As a result, radical anti-American ideologies in such societies are usually expressed by marginalized political movements.

Political anti-Americanism, in turn, is positively related to HDI; it means that people in countries with high levels of socioeconomic development are on average more critical of U.S. foreign policy. This finding seems to contradict modernization theory, but in reality it fits rather well with the notion of postmaterialist values as suggested by Inglehart (1997). He assumes that the majority of populations in the most developed countries consist of people with high existential security and value orientations towards tolerance and self-expression. Such people are also interested in world politics, see current problems of global development, and thus tend to blame the U.S. as the leading economic and military power for its inability to deal with these problems. At the same time postmaterialists are not prejudiced, as their negative attitudes concern U.S. policies, not American culture or society. This suggestion, however, cannot be shown within the framework of country-level analysis as individual-level data is needed in order to directly estimate the link between postmaterialist values and attitudes to U.S. foreign policy. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the difference between effects of HDI on cultural and political anti-Americanism.

< Figure 2 about here >

Another important inference from these results concerns the debate regarding which factors, country-specific or universal, represent the primary drivers of anti-American sentiments. The regression analysis here revealed the existence of stable empirical relationships on the national level between the two forms anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development, which explain nearly 60% of variance for cultural anti-Americanism and more than 30% for political anti-Americanism. It means that the phenomenon of anti-Americanism cannot be fully understood if only domestic factors are taken into account. Consequently, if anti-American sentiments do follow global patterns, they can—and should—be studied using quantitative methods and large-scale comparative design.

Anti-Americanism in Muslim Societies

Unfortunately, the present study did not shed much light on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Muslim societies. On the one hand, the country-level regression analysis confirmed that Muslim countries are characterized by more pronounced anti-Americanism, both cultural and political, than non-Muslim countries, even if socioeconomic development is also taken into account. On the other hand, this effect is not mediated by either degree of gender equality or level of political liberties in Muslim societies. This finding suggests that the hostility to America from Muslim countries cannot be attributed to their social values or political institutions.

Certainly there is a temptation to interpret these results as evidence of a civilization clash between Muslims and the West in a definition proposed by Huntington (1996). However, there are still alternative explanations contributing to the understanding of anti-Americanism among Muslims and were not directly tested in the present study. First, neoliberal political and economic practices ardently promoted by the U.S. government in the international arena tend to weaken states in developing regions, increase global inequality, and thus provoke anger within disaffected nations (Griffiths, 2006). Second, anti-Americanism can also be a response to the sense of exceptionalism which is widespread among the American public and contributes to the worldwide image of the U.S. as an arrogant nation (Judt, 2005; Kohut & Stokes, 2006; Stam & Shohat, 2007). Third, U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush has been characterized by some authors as open global domination (O'Neil, 2006), and the perceived American intention to dominate over the rest of the world can represent an important predictor of anti-Americanism (Glick et al., 2006). Muslims, due to their history and geopolitical position, are simply more sensitive to these issues than people

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in other regions (Moghaddam, 2008). There are also studies which link the emergence of anti-Americanism in Muslim societies to the rise of the Islamist ideology: For instance, Mazarr (2007) sees Islamism as the most recent reincarnation of the old Occidentalist hatred for the West. However, only an individual-level analysis, which directly contrasts, for instance, personal religiosity and perceptions of American policies, can provide an adequate test of these hypotheses.

Conclusion

The present study addressed different forms of anti-Americanism and patterns of their distribution on the national level using empirical evidence from the 45 societies. The key findings contributing to the ongoing debate on the nature and causes of ant-American sentiments are accounted for below. First, an exploratory factor analysis revealed the existence of the two distinct forms of anti-Americanism - cultural and political, respectively. The former is based on negative attitudes to American culture and its global spread, whereas the latter involves opposition to certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the forceful spread of democracy, unilateralism, and promotion of the neoliberal economic model. This finding indicates that the two popular approaches to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, which emphasize respectively irrational hostility to America and criticism the U.S. policies, can be reconciled as far as they focus on the different types of anti-American sentiments.

Second, a regression analysis showed that cultural and political anti-Americanism are differently related to socioeconomic development, measured by HDI. Specifically, cultural anti-Americanism is characterized by a quadratic relationship to HDI, so that the highest level of anti-American sentiments are observed in medium-developed societies. This was interpreted using the notion of *ressentiment* proposed by Greenfeld (1992); according to it, cultural anti-Americanism can be seen as a psychological reaction related to modernization and characterized by the emergence of envy and hatred for the U.S. as the model of a modern society. Political anti-Americanism, on the contrary, is positively associated with socioeconomic modernization. It was suggested that this relationship be understood within the framework of postmaterialist values developed by Inglehart (1997): People who live in the environment of high existential security are more likely to follow the news related to world politics and criticize the U.S. as a leading global power for the problems of international development. On the whole, these findings suggest that the phenomenon of anti-Americanism is not fully dependent on the country-specific context. Instead, anti-American sentiments follow universal patterns and thus can be investigated by the means of quantitative analysis on both individual and national level.

Finally, the present study did not succeed in explaining the persistence of anti-American sentiments in Muslim societies. Despite it being confirmed that—even if socioeconomic development is taken into account—Muslim countries are characterized by higher levels of anti-Americanism, the roots of this phenomenon remain unclear. According to the regression results, neither conservative social values, such as gender inequality, nor authoritarian political institutions contribute to anti-Americanism in Muslim societies. A more complicated analysis with individual-level data is necessary in order to understand which major factors, a clash of civilizations or a response to U.S. policies, is a more important driver of anti-American sentiments among Muslims.

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Table 1

Countries Included in the Analysis

Argentina	Germany	Lebanon	South Africa
Bangladesh	Ghana	Malaysia	South Korea
Bolivia	Great Britain	Mali	Spain
Brazil	India	Mexico	Sweden
Bulgaria	Indonesia	Morocco	Tanzania
Canada	Israel	Nigeria	Turkey
Chile	Italy	Pakistan	Uganda
China	Ivory Coast	Peru	Ukraine
Czech Republic	Japan	Poland	Venezuela
Egypt	Jordan	Russia	
Ethiopia	Kenya	Senegal	
France	Kuwait	Slovakia	

Note. Total of 45 countries

Table 2

Questions on Anti-Americanism

Response	Dataset	Analysis
Negative attitude to Americans: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans?" (Question No.: Q16b)		
Very favorable	1	0
Somewhat favorable	2	0
Somewhat unfavorable	3	1
Very unfavorable	4	1
View of the U.S. foreign policy as unilateralist: "In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?" (Question No.: Q25)		
Great deal	1	0
Fair amount	2	0
Not too much	3	1
Not at all	4	1
Perception that the U.S. policies increase global inequality: "In your opinion, do United States policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?" (Question No.: Q26)		
Increase gap between rich and poor	1	1
Lessen gap between rich and poor	2	0
No effect	3	0
Opposition to spread of American ideas and customs: "Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here" (Question No.: Q27)		
It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here	1	0
It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here	2	1
Dislike American popular culture: "Which is closer to describing your view—I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television" (Question No.: Q30)		
I like American music, movies and television	1	0
I dislike American music, movies and television	2	1
View of the U.S. promotion of democracy as hypocritical: "And which comes closer to describing your view? The United States promotes democracy wherever it can, OR the United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests?" (Question No.: Q34)		
The United States promotes democracy wherever it can	1	0
The United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests	2	1

Note. Responses "Don't know" (dataset code 8) and "Refused" (dataset code 9) were treated as missing values

Table 3

Factor Analysis of Anti-Americanism

Item	Factor 1 (Cultural)	Factor 2 (Political)
Opposition to spread of American ideas and customs	**0.831**	-0.044
Dislike of American popular culture	**0.808**	-0.108
Negative attitude to Americans	**0.782**	0.198
View of the U.S. promotion of democracy as hypocritical	-0.122	**0.909**
Perception that the U.S. policies increase global inequality	0.166	**0.814**
View of the U.S. foreign policy as unilateralist	0.028	**0.782**

Note. $N = 45$. $\chi^2 = 1.66$, *df* =4, *p* = 0.80. Method of analysis is maximum likelihood. Promax rotation

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics

| Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Index of cultural anti-Americanism	0.460	0.156	0.139	0.852
Opposition to spread of American ideas and customs	0.575	0.182	0.203	0.856
Dislike of American popular culture	0.424	0.176	0.144	0.952
Negative attitude to Americans	0.380	0.175	0.070	0.849
Index of political anti-Americanism	0.670	0.141	0.367	0.870
View of the U.S. promotion of democracy as hypocritical	0.788	0.121	0.490	0.969
Perception that the U.S. policies increase global inequality	0.610	0.143	0.274	0.842
View of the U.S. foreign policy as unilateralist	0.613	0.207	0.240	0.941
Index of postindustrialization	0.269	0.194	-0.229	0.759
Share of industry in GDP	0.307	0.101	0.103	0.526
Share of services in GDP	0.576	0.127	0.297	0.862
Human Development Index	0.687	0.174	0.328	0.909
Share of fuel in exports	0.162	0.253	0.000	0.963
Share of Muslim population	0.270	0.383	0.001	0.990
Gender Gap Index	0.667	0.057	0.547	0.802
Authoritarianism	2.8	1.6	1.0	6.5

Note. $N = 45$

Figure 1. Plot of cultural (X axis) vs. political (Y axis) anti-Americanism by country

Table 5

Predictors of Cultural Anti-Americanism

Predictor	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3
Human Development Index			
Linear term	-0.151 (0.129)	0.076 (0.146)	0.058 (0.120)
Square term	-0.590 (0.128)***	-0.507 (0.117)***	-0.508 (0.107)***
Index of postindustrialization	-0.112 (0.145)		
Share of fuel in exports	-0.148 (0.141)		
Share of Muslim population		0.454 (0.152)**	0.487 (0.121)***
Gender gap index		-0.062 (0.165)	
Authoritarianism		-0.002 (0.156)	
R^2	.39	.55	.55

Note. $N = 45$. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Table 6

Predictors of Political Anti-Americanism

Predictor	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3
Human Development Index			
Linear term	0.580 (0.133)***	0.782 (0.156)***	0.767 (0.130)***
Square term	-0.004 (0.132)	0.1117 (0.125)	0.086 (0.116)
Index of postindustrialization	-0.044 (0.149)		
Share of fuel in exports	-0.151 (0.145)		
Share of Muslim population		0.455 (0.163)**	0.399 (0.121)**
Gender gap index		0.161 (0.176)	
Authoritarianism		0.132 (0.167)	
R^2	.35	.47	.45

Note. $N = 45$. All variables are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Figure 2. Graphical representation of relationship between cultural (left) and political (right) anti-Americanism (Y axis) and Human Development Index (X axis)

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