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Заседание научного семинара, посвященного вычислительной теории коллективного выбора.

Мероприятие завершено

Приглашаем вас на научный семинар по вычислительной теории коллективного выбора ВШЭ.

HSEComputationalSocialChoiceSeminar

Заседание состоится 29 января, четверг, 15:00 – 16:00 в гибридном формате

Докладчик: Дмитрий Сафронов

 

“Extensions of preferences onto sets which enable Nash implementability of manipulable social choice rules”

Maskin showed that a social choice rule can be implemented by Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative voting game only if the rule satisfies the Maskin monotonicity condition, a necessary condition which is also almost sufficient. The Maskin monotonicity is a rather tight constraint. Many well-known and popular choice rules do not satisfy it. In particular, no majority preference-based tournament solution is Maskin monotonic. However, subsequent theoretical research has shown that some of these rules can nevertheless be implemented in Nash equilibrium if voters are assumed to have preferences not only over individual alternatives but also over sets of alternatives — such preferences are called extended preferences.

 

The study reports the results of testing various extended preference models for compliance with the conditions of implementability via an equivalent hyperfunction. The positive result is the identification of models that permit implementation through this framework. The  extension of the obtained results onto preferences admitting indifferences was considered. In conclusion, although the stated condition is sufficient but not necessary, it will be shown that for the presented extended preference models violating it, there exists no implementable equivalent hyperfunction based on them. This result elevates the condition to a necessary one for the considered class of models.

 

Рабочий язык семинара: английский/русский

Онлайн: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/83756218781?pwd=prbATQVTP1yWLhZuwi6eDnel6yFFa4.1

Оффлайн: аудитория S1024

Идентификатор конференции: 837 5621 8781
Код доступа: 384596 

 

Если Вы хотите прийти на заседание очно и Вам нужен пропуск в ВШЭ, а также для включения в список рассылки семинара, напишите письмо с указанием ФИО по адресу comsoc.hse@gmail.com

 

С уважением,

Веселова Ю.А., Карпов А.В.