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Basic Values of Russians and Other Europeans

(According to the Materials of Surveys in 2008)

The authors use mainly data from the European Social Survey carried out in 2008 to compare Russian basic values and the values of the thirty-one other European countries as measured by the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire.

In public discussions regarding Russia's future, the question of its European (Western) or non-European identity is actively debated, along with the question of whether it has a special development path or shares the one followed by other European countries. Because of this, the study of similarities and differences in the basic values of Russians and residents

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of other European countries is closely connected with the broader controversy regarding Russia's development path.

We suggest that the results of the study set forth below confirm the general thesis advanced by the American scholars Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman in their well-known article, "A Normal Country."[1] The essence of their thesis is that, despite all the peculiarities of our country, on the whole the processes occurring in present-day Russia follow the general patterns typical of countries with similar levels of economic and political development. In regard to Europe, based on this thesis, one could expect that Russia will prove to be comparatively close in its values to other postsocialist countries, with which it is united by similar recent historical experience and to which it has a similar level of economic development. One could also expect that of the old capitalist countries of Europe Russia will turn out to be more like those that differ less from it in their level of economic development, in particular, countries of Southern, rather than Western or Northern, Europe.

Basic Russian values have been the object of comparative cross-country analysis in a number of studies,[2] but in most of them Russia was not a special object of analysis separate from other countries. Moreover, almost all of the conclusions in previous studies were based on aggregated data, with the whole country being depicted in the form of a point corresponding to the average views of its population on one or more value parameters.

The purpose of this article is to analyze similarities and differences in values between Russians and other Europeans. In doing so, we plan to compare Russia with other countries in terms of average values indexes; to investigate in detail precisely what subgroups within the country, from perspective of the values they share, make up the Russian population (we assume that this analysis will show similarities and differences between the residents of various countries in greater detail than a comparison of averages); to reveal, using multiple regression analysis, the role of various determinants that influence values; and to determine the correlation between the influence of individuals' country and their sociodemographic characteristics.

Rich possibilities for substantiated comparisons of the subjective culture of Russia and other European countries appeared thanks to the inclusion of our country, in 2006, as one of the participants in the European Social Survey (ESS).[3] For the first time, this made it possible to draw a values portrait of Russia's population in comparison with the

greater part of the European population. It is important that both "old" capitalist countries and former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are participating in the ESS, including, besides Russia, three other countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Data on thirty-two countries are analyzed in our study.

We use a division of European countries into four groups that has been widely adopted in comparative studies:[4] postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (twelve in our grouping), Mediterranean countries (Greece, Israel, Spain, Cyprus, Turkey,[5] and Portugal), Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland), and West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland).

This article is based on data from the fourth round of the ESS (the surveys were conducted in 2008 and the beginning of 2009), plus data on several countries from previous rounds of the ESS (on Austria and Ireland from the third round, and on Iceland and Luxembourg from the second). The calculations cited in the article partially repeat those done in our previous publications based on materials from the third round of the ESS (carried out in 2006 and the beginning of 2007).[6] The purpose of this repetition is to check the previously drawn conclusions and confirm their reliability. At the same time, in this analysis we actively use the grouping of European countries in four categories, which was not done previously. This enables us to characterize more clearly Russia's comparative position on the values map of Europe.

In this article, values are defined as a person's convictions of the significance (or importance) for him or her personally of some object or phenomenon; and basic values are a person's ultimate, purposeful values based on which the whole set of instrumental (practical, current) values guiding his or her daily life is formed.

In the ESS, a modification of Shalom Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire is used to measure values.[7] Like his other procedures, the questionnaire is composed based on the classification of values constructed by Schwartz, in which ten values indexes are distinguished.[8] In the ESS, some of the values cannot be differentiated from each other in the measurement, and therefore it is more reliable to create not ten, but only seven values indexes based on this questionnaire.[9]

The importance of "first-level" underlying values was established based on the respondent's answers to the survey questions. Each of the total of twenty-one indexes—the number of questions in the questionnaire—was

rated on a scale of one to six (the higher the number of points, the greater the importance). These indexes were used by themselves, but also for computing seven values indexes ("second-level" integral values). These derivative indexes are the average of the relevant first-level indexes.[10]

Schwartz's previous studies had shown that the seven second-level, aggregated values can be combined into four larger categories of values ("third-level" values). Pairs of these values are related by inverse correlations: with a rise in the importance of one category of values, the importance of the other declines.

The category Conservation includes the values Security and Conformity–Tradition, while the category opposite in meaning, Openness to Change, includes the values Risk–Novelty, Self-Direction, and Hedonism. These two categories form the first values axis, Openness to Change–Conservation (which belongs to the "fourth-level" values, along with the second axis). The second axis, Self-Transcendence—Self-Enhancement, reflects the opposition of the value categories of Self-Enhancement (the importance of power, wealth, and personal success) and Self-Transcendence (the importance of social equality, concern for the welfare of others, and also for the environment).

We construct the seven second-level values indexes according to the algorithm that Schwartz suggested and use factor analysis, which differs from the procedure recommended by Schwartz, to determine the structure of the values axes (fourth-level indexes).[11] Factor analysis of the twenty-one first-level values indexes gives the factor values axes Openness to Change–Conservation and Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement that were already mentioned above.[12] To be able to compare Russians and residents of other countries with respect to these integral parameters, we assign individual ratings to each respondent according to the relevant factors.

Comparison of the average Russian with "average" representatives of other countries

We start by comparing Russia with European countries with respect to average values of the seven second-level values indexes listed above. Figures 1–3 show the average ratings of the values indexes in each of the thirty-two countries included in the ESS. The countries are ranked in order of diminishing importance of the respective value: the sample size varies from 533 (Iceland) to 2,740 (Germany).[13] The figures show

Figure 1. **Average Ratings of the Values Indexes Security and Conformity–Tradition in Thirty-Two European Countries**

Figure 2. **Average Ratings of the Values Indexes Self-Direction, Risk–Novelty, and Hedonism in Thirty-Two European Countries**

Figure 3. **Average Ratings of the Values Indexes Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement in Thirty-Two European Countries**

□ No statistically significant difference from Russia

that the majority of Russia's differences from other European countries in the values indexes are statistically significant. Consequently, for the average Russian these values indexes differ from the values of "average" representatives of other countries more often than they coincide with them.

For six of the seven values indexes, Russia occupies an extreme or close to extreme position. True, we should keep in mind that Russia generally shares its position with other countries, and these are most often postsocialist or Mediterranean countries.

With respect to values belonging to the category Conservation, Russia surpasses most of the countries in prominence of the value of Security but occupies a moderately high position in prominence of the values of Tradition–Conformity (see Figure 1). On the other hand, in prominence of the values of Self-Direction, Hedonism, and Risk–Novelty, which are in the category Openness to Change, Russia is behind most European countries (see Figure 2).[14]

In the average prominence of values in the categories Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement (see Figure 3), Russia occupies extreme or close to extreme positions. The value of Self-Enhancement is more strongly expressed among Russians than among the residents of most of the other countries in the survey, while the value of Self-Transcendence, on the other hand, was less strongly expressed.[15] The conclusion that the Self-Enhancement index, which includes, in particular, the value of wealth, has a high value is in agreement with the fact that throughout the 1990s Russia was consistently among the world leaders in the materialism parameter and similar values indicators developed by Ronald Inglehart.[16] This conclusion also agrees with the conclusion that the materialist labor motivation of Russians became even stronger in the 2000s.[17]

We now move on to comparisons of more enlarged indexes based on factor analysis. The factor values axes are at the highest (fourth) level of integration of the values characteristics, and use of them makes it possible to give a more integral characterization of the average Russian.

Figure 4 shows the position of Russia and thirty-one European countries in the space of two values factors. Moving along the horizontal axis, the average indexes of countries with respect to the factor Openness to Change–Conservation changes: the farther to the right a country is on the graph, the more important the values of conservation are for its population, and the less important values of Openness to Change are. Moving along the vertical axis, the indexes on the factor Self-Transcendence–

Figure 4. **Average Ratings of the Values Factors Openness to Change–Conservation and Self-Transcendence– Self-Enhancement in Thirty-Two European Countries**

Self-Enhancement change: the higher a country is on the graph, the more important values of Self-Enhancement are for its population, and the less important values of Self-Transcendence are. On the whole, the spread between European countries on the Openness–Conservation axis is smaller than on the Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement axis. As we see, Russia occupies almost the extreme upper position vertically and a middle one horizontally. In other words, the population of Russia (if it is compared with the population of other countries based on average values) is characterized by a middle position on the values axis Openness to Change–Conservation and one of the highest orientations to the values of Self-Enhancement (at the expense of values of Self-Transcendence).

At the same time, regarding the prominence of the parameter Openness to Change–Conservation, the average Russian resembles the representatives of a large number of other countries: the Russian average on this values axis does not show statistically significant differences from the average ratings for thirteen other European countries! As for the values of Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement, the average Russian is much more unusual: Russia has no statistically significant difference only with the residents of Ukraine, Slovakia, and Turkey.

At first glance, it seems unexpected that Russia occupies a middle position on the factor Openness to Change–Conservation. Based on Russia's extremely high ratings for Security and extremely low ones for Self-Direction, Risk–Novelty, and Hedonism (the basic components of Openness–Conservation) one could expect that its ratings for this index would be markedly shifted in the direction of Conservation. To understand this apparent contradiction, it helps to know the complete structure of this factor described above, of which it is said that in this factor "Openness associated with Self-Enhancement" is opposed to "Openness associated with Self-Transcendence." It is precisely thanks to the additional values adjoining Openness–Conservation that Russia's place on this values axis was shifted toward the middle.

Thus, the values characterization of Russia's population obtained by comparing it with other countries on factor axes is consistent with the one given above based on comparing the seven second-level values indexes, but it is expressed in a more integral form. It proved useful to select integral characteristics using factor analysis: their greater complexity revealed the middle position of Russians on one of the two values factors and the similarity of Russians to the population of a considerable number of European countries.

Thus, according to the results of all of the values comparisons described in this section, the average Russian can be represented as someone who, compared with the residents of most other European countries included in the survey, places an extremely high value on security and protection provided by a strong government; he or she is less committed to the values of novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence, and values risk, fun, and pleasure less. Similar prominence of these values also typifies representatives of a number of other European countries, primarily postsocialist and Mediterranean ones.

The average Russia today is more strongly committed than residents of most European countries to the values of wealth and power, and also personal success and social recognition. A strong orientation to personal self-enhancement leaves less space in his or her consciousness for concern about equality and justice in the country and the world, tolerance, nature, and the environment, and even for worry and concern about their immediate milieu. In the countries that were surveyed, some turned out to be close to Russia in the prominence of these values.

We turn our attention to the fact that strong commitment to the values of personal success and wealth is not combined, in the consciousness of Russians, with equally pronounced boldness and willingness to act in a new way, to take risks and make independent decisions. Even for the sake of success and wealth, people are not willing to step outside the bounds of diligent routine in ways that require increased expenditures of energy and emotion.[18]

The thesis that Russia conforms to patterns common to other countries does not mean that we should not take a critical view of the existing difficulties and problems (which, to a significant extent, we have in common with countries that are similar to us in their level of development) and make efforts to solve them. In this case, our study results show that serious concern about the low level of altruistic, solidary values in Russian society and, on the other hand, the hypertrophy of individualistic orientations that pundits, scholars, and public figures express is fully justified.[19]

The rejection of communist ideology and the creation of market economy institutions in our country led to a change in moral priorities: the pursuit of personal interest and participation in competition were no longer condemned but became approved values, while concern for the welfare of others, on the contrary, lost its former moral halo.[20] But, as we see from the data cited above, in the majority of capitalist countries

of Europe, market organization of the economy and the noncommunist nature of ideology are quite compatible with a stronger (often much stronger) commitment of the population to altruistic values than in Russia. Hence, the current balance that has been established in our country between the values of competitive individualism and solidarity quite possibly can be shifted in the direction of solidarity, as long as society makes adequate efforts to do so.

In the comparisons described above, each country was represented by one rating of a particular value, and we intentionally ignored differences between individuals within the countries, at the same time creating favorable conditions for revealing differences between the countries. Even using this method of comparison, we were able to reveal similarity between countries, and this similarity will become even more noticeable when we switch from aggregated (country) analysis of the data to individual- and group-level analysis.

Deconstruction of countries, or comparison of countries considering their internal heterogeneity with respect to values

Various people committed to different values live in each country. In analyzing values, this allows us not only to represent countries in the form of their average ratings but also to more fully take into account other distinctive characteristics of distributions within the country. To do this, we first constructed a comprehensive classification of all of the respondents participating in the study, based only on their values (disregarding in their countries of residence).

In constructing this classification, we took as the unit of analysis an individual respondent, and a statistical algorithm (*k*-means clustering) distributed the people in clusters (types) based only on their answers to the twenty-one original values questions (i.e., the first-level indexes, which were preliminarily centered), disregarding their country of residence. Using the gap statistic to determine the number of clusters,[21] we settled on a classification consisting of four clusters.[22]

Figure 5 shows the configuration of the four clusters in the space of the values factors (axes) Openness to Change–Conservation and Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement. As the figures shows, the respondents in Cluster I are characterized by the lowest values on the horizontal axis and almost the lowest on the vertical one, that is, the values of Openness

Figure 5. **Values Types** (clusters of residents of thirty-two European countries in the space of two values factors)

Note: The position of a cluster is determined by the average ratings of the respondents in it with respect to the two values factors. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of respondents in the cluster. The cluster analysis did not include the large number of nonresponses (those who did not answer more than half of the questions).

to Change are more prominent for them than for representatives of the other three groups (at the expense of the values of Conservation), and the values of Self-Transcendence are quite prominent (with a moderately high rating) (at the expense of the values of Self-Enhancement). The respondents in Cluster II are characterized by a middle position on the Openness–Conservation axis and the highest position on the Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement axis (which indicates a very strong commitment to the values of Self-Enhancement). Cluster III in Figure 5 is located almost opposite the second cluster, and the respondents in it are characterized by a middle position on the Openness to Change–Conservation axis (shifted a little bit more in the direction of Conservation than the second cluster's contingent) and an extremely pronounced orientation to the values of Self-Transcendence (at the expense of the values of Self-Enhancement). Cluster IV in Figure 5 is located on a diagonal from Cluster I and is characterized by extremely high importance of the values of Conservation (at the expense of the values of Openness to Change) as well as moderately high importance of the values of Self-Enhancement (at the expense of the values of Self-Transcendence). Thus, it turned out

that the four clusters are arranged at the vertexes of a rhombus: for each cluster, one of the two values factors is extreme (most or least prominent compared with the other clusters), and the other factor is moderately prominent for two clusters (Openness to Change–Conservation), while for the other two it is prominent to a moderately low or moderately high degree (Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement). The diagonal of the rhombus is elongated along the Openness–Conservation axis.

Certain patterns are traced in the distribution of residents of various countries among the clusters. Figure 6, which shows the percentages of the population of each country in each cluster, reveals that each of the thirty-two countries has representatives of all four values types, and the differences between countries in values are due to the fact that the population is distributed differently between these types in various countries.

Each cluster has leader countries and outsider countries, that is, those that contribute the greatest or least percentage of their population (in comparison with other countries) to the composition of a given cluster.

In Cluster I, the members are characterized on average by extremely high values of Openness and moderately high values of Self-transcendence, and the leaders are Austria, Iceland, Switzerland, and Denmark. They contribute at least one-quarter of their population to this cluster. The least contribution is made by postsocialist (Romania, Slovakia, and Poland) and Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Portugal, and Spain), each of which contributes no more than 10 percent of its population. On the whole, 16 percent of the sample was in this cluster, and it is the smallest of the four in size.[23]

In Cluster II, the members occupy a middle position on the Openness–Conservation axis and have an extremely high value of Self-Enhancement, and the leaders are Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Israel, Greece, and Portugal) as well as postsocialist ones (Romania, Slovakia, and Russia), each of which contributes approximately one-half to three-quarters of its population to the cluster. The least contribution (no more than one-fifth of its population) is made by Scandinavian and West European countries (Iceland, Finland, France, and Switzerland). This cluster is the largest, with 37 percent of the whole sample.

As we said, the respondents belonging to Cluster III are characterized by a middle position on the Openness–Conservation axis and an extremely high value of Self-Transcendence. The leaders in this cluster are France, Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland (they contributed 41–55 percent of their population), and the least contribution is made, once

Figure 6. **Distribution of the Population of Thirty-Two European Countries with Respect to Values Clusters** (% of each row)

Country	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV
Austria	33	28	26	13
Iceland	30	19	41	11
Switzerland	25	20	41	14
Denmark	25	26	37	13
Sweden	23	23	43	11
Netherlands	22	32	34	12
Latvia	22	43	11	24
Germany	21	21	39	19
France	19	13	55	13
Great Britain	19	27	33	21
Estonia	18	28	30	24
Norway	17	33	27	23
Finland	17	20	39	23
Luxembourg	17	25	37	20
Slovenia	17	36	29	18
Hungary	17	36	28	19
Ireland	16	31	28	24
Belgium	16	29	38	17
Czech Republic	16	44	17	23
Bulgaria	14	35	15	35
Croatia	14	38	16	32
Cyprus	14	36	20	30
Israel	14	57	12	16
Greece	13	54	15	18
Russia	13	48	6	33
Ukraine	12	42	8	38
Poland	9	41	13	38
Spain	9	21	34	37
Portugal	8	49	18	24
Slovakia	7	48	7	38
Romania	7	67	4	22
Turkey	4	74	4	17

Legend: Cluster I, Cluster II, Cluster III, Cluster IV

again, by four postsocialist countries (Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine) and one Mediterranean one (Turkey). The proportion contributed by of each of these is no more than 8 percent of their population, and their list partially coincides with the list of outsiders for the first cluster. This is an average-size cluster, consisting of about one-quarter of the sample.

The respondents in Cluster IV, which is approximately the same size, are characterized by an extremely high value of Conservation and a moderately high value of Self-Enhancement. The leaders in this cluster are four postsocialist countries (Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria) and one Mediterranean (Spain). These countries contribute 35–38 percent of their population to the cluster. The least represented are Scandinavian (Sweden, Iceland, Denmark) and West European countries (Austria, France, the Netherlands), each of which contributes 11–13 percent of its population.

Thus, residents of all of the countries are represented in each cluster, but not evenly. It is noteworthy that the same categories of countries are at the extremes in the size of their contributions to each cluster: postsocialist and Mediterranean countries, on the one hand, and Scandinavian and West European ones, on the other. And representatives of each of these categories alternately act as the leaders and the outsiders. Taking this circumstance into account, Figure 7 shows the typical distributions on with respect to values types not for individual European countries, but for enlarged groups: Scandinavian, West European, Mediterranean, and postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (not including Russia). This combined pattern confirms our conclusion based on analyzing the distributions for individual countries.

Just as the percentages of various countries are unevenly distributed within each cluster, each country is "invested" unevenly in the various clusters (see Figure 6). It is noteworthy that this unevenness of contributions to various clusters is especially pronounced for postsocialist and Mediterranean countries: each of them has two large contributions (in most cases, to the second and fourth clusters) and two appreciably smaller ones (generally to the first and third clusters).

Russia is also characterized by a similar unevenness. The majority of Russians (81 percent) fall into the second (48 percent) or fourth category (33 percent) clusters, in which postsocialist and Mediterranean countries are the leaders, but in Russia there is also a minority. It shares values that are atypical of Russians, but it is still quite considerable in size: one out

Figure 7. **Distribution of the Population of Russia and Four Groups of European Countries with Respect to Values Clusters** (% of each row)

Countries	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV
Scandinavian	21	25	38	16
West European	21	22	40	17
Postsocialist	11	45	12	32
Mediterranian	7	51	17	25
Russia	13	48	6	33

of eight Russians (13 percent) of the Russian sample is in the first value cluster, and another 6 percent is in the third. In both of these clusters the tone is set by representatives of the most developed European countries: Scandinavian and West European.

Recall that, if we look at the average indexes for the Russian population as a whole, without dividing it into clusters, then in comparison with the population of other countries it is characterized by a middle position on the Openness to Change–Conservation axis and an extremely high rating on the Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement axis (see Figure 4). This is precisely the combination of values that typifies the second cluster, into which the greater part of Russians (almost half) falls. These people embody what can be called the current Russian moral personality. Another 33 percent of Russians (they can arbitrarily be called "the second majority") are in the fourth cluster and are characterized by extremely high prominence of the values of Conservation and moderately high prominence of the values of Self-Enhancement. Thus, the Russian majority belongs to the values types that are distinguished by a stronger orientation than the representatives of other value clusters to the values of Self-Enhancement (at the expense of the values of Self-Transcendence). On the Openness to Change–Conservation axis, one part of this majority is characterized by a middle position, and the other by extreme prominence of the values of Conservation (at the expense of the values of Openness to Change). It is definitely *not* characteristic of this majority to surpass the representatives of other values types in their orientation to the values of Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change.

But these are precisely the values that typify the two other "factions" of Russian society, the minorities in the first and third clusters. For instance, the 13 percent of Russians who are in the first cluster are characterized by a highest orientation, in comparison with other values types, to Openness to Change (at the expense of Conservation) and moderately high orientation

to Self-Transcendence (at the expense of Self-Enhancement). The 6 percent of Russians who are in the third cluster are characterized by the opposite combination: a middle position on the Openness–Conservation axis and an extremely high level of Self-Transcendence in comparison with other values types.

Thus, by moving from the country level of analysis to an individual one and constructing a classification of individual respondents we were able, first of all, to differentiate the picture of the average Russian and show that in the Russian majority there are two values subtypes. Second, we were able to reveal two groups of values minorities that radically differ in their values from the values types that are dominant in Russia, but one out of five Russians belongs to one of these minorities.[24]

Since the same values types are represented in all European countries, Russia has something in common with each of them. For example, in their preferences the Russian values minorities are more similar to the values majorities in countries such as France, Switzerland, and Sweden than with their fellow citizens from the values majority. In turn, these countries have population groups that are closer in their values to the Russian values majority than to their compatriots who hold other convictions.

Refined cross-country comparisons of values: Results of multiple regression analysis

Based on previous comparative studies,[25] we assume that the similarities and differences between the average ratings of values in Russia and other countries that were examined above are due to two groups of factors. One includes characteristics of the countries (such as distinctive features of their economy or culture) that universally and approximately equally affect the values of each of their residents. The other group includes cross-country differences in the population with respect to individual characteristics that influence values (e.g., in one country the population is older, and in another it is younger). Regression analysis, which we now describe, enables us to determine what country influences proper will have an effect on values, while eliminating the effect of differences between individuals (both between and within countries). In addition, regression analysis enables us to reveal how these two groups of factors correlate in strength, and whether their configuration differs for various values.

Table 1 gives linear regression coefficients, where the two most inte-

gral values indexes—the factor axes Openness to Change–Conservation and Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement—are used as the dependent variables. Included in the regression as independent variables are the countries to which the respondents belong. This is the determinant of values at the center of our attention in this article.[26]

For each dependent variable, we constructed two versions of the regression equation, and the coefficients of each version are given in Table 1. In the first version—the main one—individual countries serve as the independent variables, while in the second one, instead of individual countries, their categories were used. The model's determination coefficient (R^2) varies in the range of 0.16 to 0.25.

Since the purpose of the regression analysis was to compare Russia with other countries, residence of the respondent in Russia was selected as the control group for estimating the influence of the country to which the respondent belongs. Thanks to this, the coefficients characterizing the influence of various countries show how a person's values are affected by living in a particular country in comparison with living in Russia.

Table 1 shows that differences between Russia and the other countries (or categories of countries) have a statistically significant effect on the respondents' individual ratings on both values axes. This means that the values differences between Russia and other countries described above do not disappear after smoothing out the sociodemographic composition of the countries being compared, that is, they are not reduced to differences in the composition of the population.

When we analyze the unrefined effect on the countries' average indexes on the values axes (see Figure 4), the residents of Russia had no statistically significant differences from the residents of particular countries in sixteen cases, while according to the results of regression analysis (with the given set of independent variables) there were only six such cases. Thus, controlling for the respondents' age, gender, and characteristics of family origin, the significant differences of Russian values from the values of other European countries did not lessen but, on the contrary, became greater. Figure 8 shows the country regression coefficients contained in Table 1, which indicates the magnitude and significance of Russia's refined values differences from other countries. It is noteworthy that even with respect to the regression coefficients the cross-country spread of European countries is smaller on the Openness–Conservation axis than on the Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement axis.

Significant regression coefficients indicate that Russia is characterized

Table 1

Coefficients of Regression Equations (dependent variables – respondent's individual ratings with respect to two values factors, $n = 57{,}501$)

	Version I—individual countries		Version II—categories of countries	
	Openness to Change–Conservation	Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement	Openness to Change–Conservation	Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement
	$R^2 = 0.23$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.16$
Country of residence (Russia is the control group)				
Austria	−0.417**	−0.894**		
Belgium	−0.144**	−1.017**		
Bulgaria	0.033	−0.387**		
Switzerland	−0.254**	−1.346**		
Cyprus	0.133**	−0.584**		
Czech Republic	−0.251**	−0.355**		
Germany	−0.193**	−1.149**		
Denmark	−0.399**	−1.213**		
Estonia	−0.164**	−0.760**		
Spain	0.396**	−1.037**		
Finland	−0.061*	−1.126**		
France	−0.162**	−1.512**		
Great Britain	−0.128**	−0.956**		
Greece	−0.124**	−0.395**		
Croatia	0.030	−0.441**		
Hungary	−0.204**	−0.633**		
Ireland	0.016	−0.784**		
Israel	−0.193**	−0.398**		
Iceland	−0.337**	−1.320**		
Luxembourg	−0.018	−1.043**		
Latvia	−0.415**	−0.107**		
Netherlands	−0.383**	−0.989**		
Norway	−0.145**	−0.775**		
Poland	0.144**	−0.343**		
Portugal	−0.302**	−0.450**		
Romania	−0.235**	0.160**		
Sweden	−0.360**	−1.175**		
Slovenia	−0.212**	−0.697**		

	Version I—individual countries		Version II—categories of countries	
	Openness to Change–Conservation	Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement	Openness to Change–Conservation	Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement
	$R^2 = 0.23$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.16$
Slovakia	0.068*	−0.134**		
Turkey	−0.107**	−0.103**		
Ukraine	0.037	−0.038		
Enlarged categories (Russia is the control group)				
Postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe			−0.113**	−0.305**
Mediterranean countries			−0.045*	−0.487**
Western European countries			−0.196**	−1.069**
Scandinavian countries			−0.244**	−1.095**
Gender of respondent (Female—1, male—0)	0.275**	−0.173**	−0.270**	−0.167**
Age of respondent (14–20 years old is the control group)				
21–25	0.108**	−0.030	0.121**	−0.037*
26–30	0.301**	−0.022	0.325**	−0.038*
31–35	0.453**	0.001	0.471**	−0.015
36–40	0.527**	0.005	0.539**	−0.019
41–45	0.630**	−0.006	0.635**	−0.025
46–50	0.699**	−0.037*	0.707**	−0.057*
51–55	0.834**	−0.037*	0.838**	−0.058*
56–60	0.908**	−0.005	0.921**	−0.031
61–65	1.029**	0.016	1.035**	−0.017
66–70	1.164**	0.061*	1.168**	0.028
71 and older	1.338**	0.186**	1.348**	0.125**

(continued)

Table 1 *(continued)*

	Version I— individual countries		Version II— categories of countries	
	Openness to Change– Conservation	Self- Transcendence– Self-Enhancement	Openness to Change– Conservation	Self- Transcendence– Self-Enhancement
	$R^2 = 0.23$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.22$	$R^2 = 0.16$
Characteristics of family of origin				
When respondent was 14 years old, the father was absent	0.004	−0.071**	−0.010	−0.090**
When respondent was 14 years old, the mother was absent	0.020	−0.004	0.014	−0.003
At least one of the parents has a higher education	−0.192**	−0.126**	−0.206**	−0.102**
When respondent was 14 years old, at least one of the parents had subordinates	−0.085**	−0.107**	−0.080**	−0.129**
At least one of the parents is an immigrant	0.041**	0.052**	0.11	0.29*
Constant	0.631**	−0.782**	0.626**	−0.798**

*Indicates significance at $p < 0.05$; **indicates significance at $p < 0.001$.

by greater prominence of orientation to Conservation and less prominence of Openness in comparison with most of the other countries (now there are twenty-two such countries, while there were thirteen in the unrefined comparisons). Judging from the regression, Russia still had nonsignificant differences in this parameter with only five countries, while in the unrefined comparisons there were thirteen. And in comparison

with four other countries (Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Spain), Russia is characterized by less orientation to Conservation, as it was in the unrefined comparisons (before the comparisons were refined, this group also included Bulgaria).

Thus, differences between Russia and other countries in population composition moderate the strong orientation to the values of Conservation characteristic of our country that is found among Russians when regression analysis is used to control for these differences.

The best-known of Russia's differences is its younger population.[27] Therefore, when age is not controlled for, the overall Russian average shifts in the direction of greater Openness to Change, which is typical of youth, diminishing the distance between Russia and other European countries in values. The differences between the results of the refined and unrefined comparisons are most noticeable for the factor Openness–Conservation precisely because it is the most closely related to the respondent's age.

The country's comparative youth (like the youth of an individual person) is a distinctive feature that, unfortunately, passes with time. And therefore the refined differences between Russia and other countries on the Openness to Change–Conservation axis show that, unless special measures are taken to develop the values of Openness, over time the overall average ratings will shift toward the values of Conservation. (Consequently, Russia's position on the horizontal axis of the chart presented in Figure 4 will gradually come closer to its position on the chart presented in Figure 8.)

In relation to the values axis Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement, control for sociodemographic variables using regression analysis did not significantly change the picture found when the country averages were compared: the regression coefficients indicate that in comparison with almost all of the other countries Russia is characterized by higher ratings on this axis—that is, by greater prominence of Self-Enhancement and less prominence of Self-Transcendence (now there are thirty such countries, while there were twenty-seven in the unrefined comparisons).

Turning to the second version of the regressions, which looks not at individual countries, but categories of them, enables us to show the distinctiveness of Russia more succinctly (see Table 1). According to the results of these comparisons, in all cases, Russians are more committed to the values of Conservation and Self-Enhancement. In its basic values, Russia's population statistically significantly differs from the residents

Figure 8. **Regression Coefficients Characterizing Russia's Refined Differences from Other European Countries with Respect to the Values Factors Openness to Change–Conservation and Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement**

of all four categories of countries, but the regression coefficients for the various categories are not the same. With respect to Conservation, Russians farthest surpass the residents of Scandinavian and West European countries, while the representatives of Mediterranean countries are the closest to Russians in this values parameter (although Russians significantly surpass them also). With respect to Self-Enhancement, Russians farthest surpass Scandinavians and West Europeans, and appreciably less so the population of Mediterranean countries, while the residents of Central and East European postsocialist countries are the closest to Russians (although even in comparison with them Russians are more strongly oriented to the values of Self-Enhancement). We turn our attention to the fact that the regression equations with country categories confirm the hypotheses stated at the beginning of the article that in its values Russia would be closer to postsocialist and Mediterranean countries, with which it shares recent historical experience and/or level of economic development.

Combining the country and sociodemographic variables in one analysis also enabled us to draw a conclusion about the correlation of the influence of these groups of variables on the basic values. As we can see from the values of R^2 given in Table 1, the cumulative strength of the influence of all of the independent variables included in the regression on the two values factors is not much different. But the correlation of the influence of different variables varies sharply depending on which values factor we are talking about.[28]

In regard to position on the Openness to Change–Conservation axis, the strongest determinant is the respondents' age, while the country to which they belong (either Russia or one of the other countries) has less influence. The average coefficient of the influence of age on the factor Openness to Change–Conservation is 0.73, the coefficient of the influence of gender is 0.27, and the average coefficient of country influences (with respect to absolute value) is 0.20. Position on the values axis Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement depends appreciably more strongly on the country to which the respondent belongs than on age (or on gender or characteristics of the respondent's family of origin). The average coefficient (with respect to absolute value) of the age parameters is 0.4, the coefficient of gender parameter is –0.17, and the average value (in absolute magnitude) of the regression coefficient of the country parameter is 0.72. Thus, if we rely on the independent variables at our disposal, then to predict an individual's values orientation with respect to the factor

Openness–Conservation, it is more important to know his or her age, while to predict orientation with respect to the Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement factor, it is more important to know in the respondent's country of residence.

This pattern is graphically confirmed when we change the set of predictors in the models under consideration. If only age parameters are left as predictors in the model for Openness to Change–Conservation, then the value of R^2 estimating the amount of variance that is predicted is 0.22, while if only the country parameters are left, then the value of R^2 declines noticeably and is only 0.10. In the model for Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement, the relationship is reversed: if only age is left as a predictor, then R^2 is very low (0.02), while when only country predictors are used, then the value of R^2, on the contrary, is high.

Completing our analysis of the regression equations, we briefly describe the statistically significant relationships between sociodemographic characteristics and basic values. The regression coefficients show that the values of Conservation and Self-Transcendence are more pronounced for women than for men. The influence of characteristics of the respondent's family of origin is significant: absence of the father when the respondent was an adolescent increases the importance of Self-Transcendence, and if the respondent's parents have a higher education, that influences both of the values ratings, increasing the importance of Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence. The parents' supervisory status during the period of the respondent's socialization has the same effect, while the presence of an immigrant parent increases the importance of the opposite values: Conservation and Self-Enhancement.

We dwell especially on the influence of age. In relation to Openness–Conservation, as we already mentioned, this influence is very strong and unidirectional: each age group older than age twenty is characterized by greater commitment to the values of Conservation in comparison with the youngest group, fourteen- to twenty-year-olds. The values of the regression coefficients rise steadily with age—that is, there is a linear relationship between the respondent's age and the rating of this values factor. The situation is more complicated with the prominence of Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement. As we already said, this influence is not very strong, but nevertheless there are some statistically significant coefficients. They indicate that commitment to the values of Self-Transcendence grows (in comparison with youth) at the age of forty-six to fifty-five (at the expense of Self-Enhancement) and that a shift in the

opposite direction (toward the values of Self-Enhancement) occurs among the oldest respondents (age sixty-six and older). This actually means that there is a curvilinear dependence, albeit not very pronounced, in which Europeans forty-six to fifty-five years old are the most committed to the values of Self-Transcendence in comparison with younger age groups as well as with the oldest residents of Europe. The reasons for this dependence and how it works require special study. Note that such differences in values fully agree with the general institutional arrangement of contemporary life, in which greater responsibility for the public interest is entrusted to mature age groups than to the youth and elderly.

Thus, regression analysis confirmed the influence of the country to which a person belongs on his or her values, which remains—and even strengthens—after controlling for the influence of the country's sociodemographic composition. The task of further work in this direction is to determine what characteristics of the countries influence the values in question.

Existing studies, in particular, the work of Inglehart and his colleagues,[29] show that one of the key determinants of values at the country level is the level of economic development. Continuing this line of analysis, we compared the country averages for the two values factors with the level of per capita gross national income (GNI).[30]

As Figures 9 and 10 show, the average country ratings for the values of Openness to Change–Conservation and the level of per capita GNI are slightly correlated (the correlation coefficient is –0.29, $R^2 = 0.09$), while the prominence of the values of Self-Enhancement (at the expense of the values of Self-Transcendence) clearly declines with a rise in GNI (the correlation coefficient is –0.81, $R^2 = 0.65$). The latter fully agrees with Inglehart's conclusions regarding determination of materialist and postmaterialist values and, of course, the ideas of Abraham Maslow[31] about the strengthening of higher-level needs as physiological and safety needs are met.[32]

Figure 10 confirms the thesis presented at the beginning of the article that "Russia is a normal country." We can see here that the point characterizing the prominence of the values of Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement for the average Russian lies on the trend line typical of the whole set of European countries and indicates that these values are approximately as prominent, on average, for Russians as they are for the residents of other countries with a similar level of per capita GNI.

But this conclusion does not mean there are no other ways, unrelated to

Figure 9. **Correlation of Level of Gross National Income (GNI) and Average Country Ratings of the Values Factor Openness to Change–Conservation**

Note: Correlation coefficient = –0.29.

Figure 10. **Correlation of Level of Gross National Income** (GNI) **and Average Country Ratings of the Values Factor Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement**

Note: Correlation coefficient = –0.81.

GNI, of pushing Russian values in the direction of increased importance of Self-Transcendence. Even if we think that the direction of the correlations is correctly indicated and the level of wealth produced by a country is indeed the cause and values are the consequence, the determination is still not 100 percent (recall that the coefficient R^2 is 0.65). This leaves enough room for active efforts on the part of social figures: leaders who are willing to affirm altruistic values by their personal example, government officials in control of schools, the mass media, representatives of civil society, and so on.

In conclusion, without repeating the conclusions drawn above, we note the fact that the self-transcendent values of concern for others, tolerance, and equality are less prominent among Russians than among most Europeans, and on the other hand, an orientation to competitive values of personal success, power, and wealth typical of a zero-sum game are more strongly manifested than among most Europeans, which confirms the validity of the moral criticism heard in our country today regarding mainstream values and mores.

Even the comparatively low commitment of Russians to the values of Openness to Change and, on the other hand, strong orientation to Conservation, which is especially clearly manifested when the influence of age differences between countries is eliminated, can be considered alarming. This is a serious cultural barrier blocking the development of an innovation economy and social development as a whole.[33]

In addition to the changes in values that are occurring as a result of improvement of people's general living conditions, we need deliberate efforts by responsible representatives of the elite, and simply concerned citizens, to create the values of Openness and Self-Transcendence in Russian society.

Notes

1. A. Shleifer and D. Treizman [Treisman], "Rossiia–normal′naia strana," *Rossiia v global′noi politike*, 2004, no. 2 ["A Normal Country," *Foreign Affairs*, 2004, March/April].

2. R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1997); idem, "Measuring Culture and Cultural Change: An Introduction," paper presented at the Samuel Huntington Symposium: Culture, Cultural Change and Economic Development, Moscow, May 25, 2010; R. Inglehart and W.E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review*,

2000, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 19–51; S.H. Schwartz, *Cultural Value Orientations: Nature and Implications of National Differences* (Moscow: State University–Higher School of Economics Press, 2008); S.H. Schwartz and A. Bardi, "Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on Value Priorities in Eastern Europe," *Political Psychology*, 1997, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 385–410.

3. See www.europeansocialsurvey.org; www.ess-ru.ru. See R. Jowell et al., eds., *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally: Lessons from the European Social Survey* (London: Sage, 2007). In Russia, the European Social Survey is conducted by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI), and the national coordinator of the ESS in Russia is A.V. Andreenkova (www.cessi.ru).

4. See, for example, P. Norris and J.A. Davis, "A Continental Divide? Social Capital in the US and Europe," in Jowell et al., *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally,* pp. 239–64.

5. Geographically, Israel and Turkey are not part of Europe, but they are often included in European comparisons.

6. V. Magun and M. Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti rossiiskogo naseleniia: skhodstva i otlichiia v sravnenii s drugimi evropeiskimi stranami," *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia. Dannye. Analiz, Diskussii*, 2008, no. 1; idem, "Skhodstva i otlichiia bazovykh tsennostei rossiian i drugikh evropeitsev," in *Rossiia v Evrope. Po materialam mezhdunarodnogo sravnitel′nogo sotsiologicheskogo proekta "Evropeiskoe sotsial′noe issledovanie,"* ed. A.V. Andreenkova and L.A. Beliaeva (Moscow: Akademiia, 2009).

7. S.H. Schwartz, A. Lehmann, and S. Roccas, "Multimethod Probes of Basic Human Values," in *Social Psychology and Culture Context: Essays in Honor of Harry C. Triandis* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1999); S.H. Schwartz et al., "Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement," *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 2001, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 519–42; S.H. Schwartz, "A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations across Nations," Questionnaire Development Package of the European Social Survey, 2003; available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=126&Itemid=80. The respondents were shown twenty-one descriptions of people who have particular values and were asked to rate each of these portraits on a six-point scale: "very much like me" (six points), "like me" (five points), "somewhat like me" (four points), "a little like me" (three points), "not like me" (two points), and "not like me at all" (one point). In the article, a higher number of points indicates greater significance of the value (in the ESS questionnaire and in the initial ESS data array the points of this scale are numbered differently). For example, the values index Security is constructed based on the respondent's rating of two value portraits: "It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety," and "It is very important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected." For the complete list of the values portraits shown to the respondents, see Magun and Rudnev, "Skhodstva i otlichiia bazovykh tsennostei rossiian i drugikh evropeitsev."

8. S.H. Schwartz, "Universals in Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 25 (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1992), pp. 1–66; S.H.

Schwartz and W. Bilsky, "Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and Structure of Values: Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1990, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 878–91.

9. E. Davidov, P. Schmidt, and S. Schwartz, "Bringing Values Back In: The Adequacy of the European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 Countries," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2008, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 420–45.

10. In most cases, when first- and second-level values are used in an article, they are first subjected to a process called "centering," and exceptions are specially stipulated. Schwartz has suggested a centering algorithm. See S.H. Swartz, "Instructions for Computing Scores for the 10 Human Values and Using Them in Analyses," Documentation for ESS-1, 2003; available at ess.nsd.uib.no/doc/ess1_human_values_scale.pdf; S.H. Schwartz, M. Verkasalo, A. Antonovsky, and L. Sagiv, "Value Priorities and Social Desirability: Much Substance, Some Style," *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 2009, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 780–92.

11. See also M. Verkasalo, J.-E. Lönnquist, J. Lipsanen, and K. Helkama, "European Norms and Equations for a Two Dimensional Presentation of Values as Measures with Schwartz's 21-Item Portrait Values Questionnaire," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 2009, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 780–92.

12. In contrast to the axes distinguished by Schwartz, these factor axes do not depend on each other (i.e., they do not have significant correlation), and, as it turned out, each of them has a more complex structure than the value axes suggested by Schwartz. Moreover, they can be used to obtain results that cannot be obtained usingthe axes constructed according to Schwartz's algorithm (Magun and Rudnev, "Skhodstva i otlichiia bazovykh tsennostei rossiian i drugikh evropeitsev").

13. The statistical significance of differences between Russia and these countries, which is indicated in the figures, was determined using the Tamhane test ($p < 0.05$) and single-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA).

14. The conclusion regarding the slight prominence of Self-Direction agrees with previously obtained data on the persistently low (in comparison with developed capitalist countries) prominence of "initiative" in Russians' labor values (V.S. Magun, "Dinamika trudovykh tsennostei rossiiskikh rabotnikov: 1991–2004 gg.," *Rossiiskii zhurnal menedzhmenta*, 2006, no. 4).

15. To check the results of comparing Russia with other countries on the seven values indexes, we turned to the respondents' answers to the individual questions (to first-level values) of which the respective values indexes are composed. In almost all cases, comparing these answers gave the same results as comparing the indexes, which confirms the validity of using these indexes.

16. A.V. Andreenkova, "Materialisticheskie/postmaterialisticheskie tsennosti v Rossii," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 1994, no. 11; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization;* Inglehart and Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values."

17. Magun, "Dinamika trudovykh tsennostei rossiiskikh rabotnikov."

18. This conclusion coincides with the results of a study of Russians' labor values. See Magun, "Dinamika trudovykh tsennostei rossiiskikh rabotnikov." On the whole, the characterization of the average Russian that is given is close to that given for a generalized representative of Ukraine according to the results of the second round of surveys (V. Magun and M. Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniia Ukrainy: sravnenie s 23 drugimi evropeiskimi stranami," *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia.*

Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii, 2007, no. 3–4 [for the English translation, see Vladimir Magun and Maksim Rudnev, "The Life Values of the Russian Population: Similarities and Differences in Comparison with Other European Countries," *Sociological Research,* vol. 49, no. 4 (July–August 2010), pp. 3–57].)

19. It is important to emphasize that we are talking about the extremely strong prominence not of all individualistic values, but only the values of Self-Enhancement that are directly related to competition between people (a zero-sum game) and therefore are most clearly opposed to the values of Self-Transcendence. On the other hand, as was shown above, other individualistic values—Hedonism and Self-Direction—are less strongly expressed among Russians, for now, than among most other Europeans.

20. V.S. Magun, "Tsennostnyi revansh v sovremennom Rossiiskom obshchestve," in *Kuda idet Rossiia? Al´ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia* (Moscow: Interpraks, 1994).

21. R. Tibshirani, G. Walther, and T. Hastie, "Estimating the Number of Clusters in a Dataset via the Gap Statistic," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* 2001, vol. 63, pp. 411–23.

22. In all, 59,885 respondents participated in the analysis: 9,649 respondents (16 percent) in Cluster I, 21,963 (37 percent) in Cluster II, 14,593 (24 percent) in Cluster III, and 13,680 (23 percent) in Cluster IV. As the results of applying k-means clustering showed, there are two ways of dividing the respondents that made up our array into four types (clusters). These two versions do not differ significantly from each other, but we selected the classification in which membership in a particular cluster is more closely related to other significant characteristics of the respondents.

23. In all of the clusters, the percentages of the leader countries are significantly different from those of the outsider countries (with $p < 0.05$ or a stricter level of significance).

24. This values minority has some distinctive socioeconomic characteristics. On the whole, it is the more active and modernized part of the population. There are more men in the first and third clusters than in the second and fourth (47 percent as opposed to 35 percent, the differences are significant at $p < 0.05$). The Russians in them are younger (40 percent of them are younger than thirty, while in the second and fourth clusters only 10 percent are that young). We can also point out that the proportion of respondents from the second and fourth clusters that lives permanently in a rural area is significantly larger than the proportion in the first and third clusters (27 percent vs. 19 percent). Representatives of the values minority are also distinguished by a higher level of education: 28 percent of them have a higher education, while among representatives of the majority this proportion is 18 percent.

25. V.S. Magun, "Trudovye tsennosti rossiiskogo naseleniia: Sotsialisticheskaia model´ i postsotsialisticheskaia real´nost´," in *Kuda idet Rossiia? Al´ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia*, no. 2, ed. T.I. Zaslavskaia (Moscow: Aspekt-press, 1995).

26. Gender, age, and characteristics of the respondent's family of origin were also included in the regression as control variables. All of these characteristics may influence the respondent's values, but values cannot have an inverse effect on them, that is, these are exogenous variables. There is another group of parameters—a

respondent's level of education, place of residence (urban/rural), characteristics of his or her occupation or job—on which the prominence of particular values may depend. But in relation to them the respondent's values themselves can act as factors (albeit with less probability), and therefore we did not include these parameters in the regression analysis at this stage.

27. A.G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 2006: Chetyrnadtsatyi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Izdatel´skii dom GU VShE, 2008), pp. 51–58.

28. Since all of the independent variables included in the regression are expressed on the same binary scales, on the basis of these regressions we can not only estimate the significance of the influences and their sign but also compare the influences with respect to their strength.

29. Inglehart and Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values."

30. A population's level of per capita GNI is measured according to the Atlas method, using World Bank data for 2008 (World Development Indicators Database; available at data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD).

31. A.H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

32. The difference in the correlation of the two values factors with GNI is consistent with the differences in their determination described above: the prominence of the values factor Openness–Conservation depends comparatively little on one's country of residence, and thus depends little on the specific characteristics of the respondents' countries of residence (provided that these characteristics are not related to age, which does strongly influence the rating of this factor).

33. L. Kharrison [Harrison], *Kto protsvetaet? Kak kul´turnye tsennosti sposobstvuiut uspekhu v ekonomiki i politike* [Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success] (Moscow: Fond Liberal´naia missiia, Novoe izdatel´stvo, 2008); E.G. Iasin and M.V. Snegovaia, *Tektonicheskie sdvigi v mirovoi ekonomiki. Chto skazhet factor kul´tury* (Moscow: Izdatel´skii dom GU VShE, 2009).