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VLADIMIR MAGUN AND MAKSIM RUDNEV

The Life Values of the Russian Population

Similarities and Differences in Comparison with Other European Countries

Based on the results of an international comparison, today's average Russian is characterized by a higher degree of caution (or even fear) and a more pronounced need to be protected by a strong state; and is an individual who has less need for novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence and is less inclined to take risks. At the same time, Russians exhibit a strong sense of self-interest, personal success, and power rather than concern for others, which may be the result of a rapid abandonment

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This article is the first Russian publication based on data of the European Social Survey, an international comparative project that is being carried out in twenty-five European countries (www.europeansocialsurvey.org.) In Russia, the European Social Survey is being carried out by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (TsESSI), with A.V. Andreenkova as the national coordinator—www.cessi.ru. The authors express their deep gratitude to the Institute of Comparative Social Research (TsESSI) and to V.G. Andreenkov and A.V. Andreenkova for carrying out the European Social Survey in Russia. The authors are also grateful to V.E. Gimpel′son, M.S. Zhamkoch′ian, A.L. Luk′ianova, G.A. Monusova, and Shalom H. Schwartz for valuable comments and suggestions. Naturally, the authors bear all responsibility for any shortcomings in the article.

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of Soviet welfarism. In general, though, data do not show Russians to be uniquely submissive to authority. Magun and Rudnev conclude that the current balance between the values of competitive individualism and solidarity in Russian society is not optimal.

The present article is devoted to a comparison of today's values of Russians with those of people living in the other countries of Europe. Many publications have broadly discussed the question of similarities and differences in the cultural and psychological characteristics of Russians and other Europeans, and these discussions represent part of a broader polemic concerning the paths of Russia's development. New opportunities to make well-founded comparisons between the populations of Russia and other European countries have emerged because of our country's participation in the European Social Survey (ESS), a large-scale international project in which all of the participants have to work in accordance with strict methodological requirements.[1] Russia joined this international project in the third round. Surveys in this round have been carried out in twenty-five European countries; they were launched in September 2006 and completed at the beginning of 2007. In Russia the survey took place in September 2006–January 2007, with 2,437 respondents taking part.

This study makes it possible for the first time to sketch a values portrait of the population of Russia in comparison with a major portion of the population of Europe. For the purposes of the comparison it is important that the survey was participated in by the "old" capitalist countries as well as by the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including three countries of the former Soviet Union.

In Russia, a stratified multistage sample was put together; in the final stage, random numbers were used to select a respondent in a household. Special efforts were made to ensure that all of the planned respondents were included in the sample; in order to reach each of them the interviewers had to make up to five approaches.

To correct any sample biases with respect to the master aggregate set, the files of the majority of the countries were weighted.[2] One way to avoid any possible sample distortions is to conduct an intercountry comparison controlling for the gender, age, and other "questionnaire" characteristics of the respondents, a measure that eliminates the issue of correlating representatives of the corresponding groups in the aggregate file. This control is an essential point of regression analysis, and the results of this analysis are presented in this article.

In this article, values are defined as the human being's conviction of the significance (or the importance) to himself personally of some object or phenomenon, and on the basis of this it is reasonable to say that what we are studying here are individual values. (Such an assertion does not conflict with the fact that a person's convictions of this kind may be socially determined, or with the fact that what is being studied are the convictions not of a particular individual but of large groups of people).

The term "value" is thus synonymous with a person's not being indifferent to one or another aspect of reality. A value is generally sensed and experienced in two cases, either in a situation where an object essential for the individual's preservation and development is lacking, or in a situation where the person has what is necessary, but this possession is not perceived as stable—a given once and for all. An individual's values are not identical to his actions, but under certain circumstances they may prompt him to take action to make these values a reality. Indeed, this is just one of their functions. No less important is the influence of an individual's values on his verbal acts and, through those acts, also on the verbal and practical actions of other people.

Not long ago we carried out a similar project based on materials of the second round of the European Social Survey (2004–5),[3] in which the values of the populations of other European countries were compared with those of people living in Ukraine. We concluded that in terms of their values, people in Ukraine differ from the populations of most European countries: in Ukraine, the average importance of the majority of the values in question turned out either to be among the highest or the lowest range of the levels of the twenty-four countries. It is reasonable to assume that the Russian values also differ significantly from the life priorities of those living in the other European countries that have developed capitalist economies and long democratic traditions. This hypothesis is also prompted by the conclusions of comparative international surveys using data that directly concern Russian values.[4] But all of these conclusions were constructed on the basis of aggregated data, where a whole country was depicted in the form of a point corresponding to the mean ratings of its population on one or several value parameters. This article aims to go beyond the analysis of the general country averages and to take a more detailed look at which specifically in-country subgroups the Russian population consists of from the standpoint of the values that they share. In general, we assume that a comparison of values at the level of individual

people and groups will reveal much more commonality between people in different countries than is the case of a country-level analysis.[5]

A modified version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire devised by Shalom Schwartz was used to measure values in the framework of the ESS.[6] As in his other methods,[7] the questionnaire is constructed on the basis of the classification of values worked out by Schwartz (see Table 1). Its key element is the delineation of ten typological indexes, which Schwartz calls "latent motivational types of values."[8]

The respondents were presented with twenty-one descriptions of people that are characterized by particular values (Table 1), and were told to rate each of the portraits on a six-point scale: "is very similar to me" (six points), "is similar to me" (five points), "is quite similar to me" (four points), "is slightly similar to me" (three points), "is not similar to me" (two points), "is not similar to me at all" (one point).[9] The value of Universalism was measured on the basis of three descriptions, while all the other values were measured based on two descriptions each.

From the presented list of value judgments it is clear that the values of formulations in Schwartz's method are more general than they are in other international surveys, and that his method is distinguished by affording a broader coverage of various aspects of human life and activity, as well as by it having been more explicitly designed specifically to discern people's individual, personal values.[10]

Twenty-five countries participated in the third round of ESS surveys in 2006–7, but this article examines the data for only twenty European countries, which had been published by the time this article was written. We compare the values of Russians with those of people living in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

In the course of the analysis we found it useful to divide the Estonian sample along ethnic lines based on the respondents' answer to the question of the preferred language of communication in the home. Accordingly, a separation was made between ethnic Estonians, meaning "Estonian speaking" or Estophone, and those who are ethnic Russian inhabitants of Estonia ("Russian speaking" or Russophone).[11] This distinction is also made frequently in other sociological surveys. In this case the purpose was to be able to check the extent to which the sense of ethnic community on the part of ethnic Russian Estonians with Russians living in Russia might affect the commonality of their values.[12]

The number of respondents who answered the questions in Schwartz's method varied as a function of the content of the question. In Russia, for example, the value index of Power [Authority] was calculated for 2,413 respondents, while the index of Hedonism was calculated only for 2,395 (it should be kept in mind that the total Russian sample was 2,437 respondents). For Cyprus, the number of those responding to the different value indexes ranged from 983 to 995; in Germany, it ranged from 2,889 to 2,896. In all cases in which we indicate the number of respondents in a country or a region we will be oriented toward the lowest number of respondents.

Based on the survey results, for every respondent we obtained twenty-one ratings of the significance of each of the values included on the questionnaire, on a scale from one to six. In some calculations we used these initial ratings, but since they are interconnected we also used them as a basis for calculating the ten typological value indexes that have already been mentioned.

To calculate the indexes it is not enough simply to calculate the average or mean on the basis of two (or three) components that make it up. The fact is that researchers investigating subjective phenomena discovered long ago that every respondent has a particular style of reaction that is expressed in his inclination to group different ratings on one and the same segment of the scale, for example, a tendency to give only very low, only very high, or only medium ratings.[13] It thus becomes necessary to "purge" the content indicators to eliminate the influence of this style of reaction. As the indicator that characterizes the respondent's preferred segment of the scale, Schwartz recommends taking the average of all of the respondent's answers to the twenty-one questions that relate to his values; this indicator has been given the designation MRAT.[14] The adjustment for this indicator is made by calculating the MRAT indicator from the averages for two (or three) initial ratings. This procedure has been given the designation centering (or mean correction). And so, the figures for each of the ten value indexes represent the mean corrected averages of two or three initial ratings, while in terms of content they represent the comparative importance, to the respondent, of a particular value with respect to the mean significance that he attributes to all of the values included on Schwartz's list. In other words, the basic object of the analysis in the work with Schwartz's method is the degree of priority status of a particular value in the respondent's intra-individual value hierarchy.

Table 1

Hierarchy of Value Indicators as Measured by the Schwartz Method

Consolidated value categories	Typological value indexes	Initial statements presented to respondents*
		Factor: Openness to change—Conservation
Conservation	Security	For him it is important to live in a secure environment. He avoids everything that might threaten his safety.
		For him it is important that the state ensure his security in all things. He wants the state to be strong and able to protect its citizens.
	Conformity	He is convinced that people should do what they are told. He believes that people should always follow the rules, even if no one is watching them.
		For him it is important to always conduct himself properly. He tries not to commit any acts that other people might condemn.
	Tradition	For him it is very important to be simple and modest. He tries not to attract attention to himself.
		He values traditions. He tries to follow religious and family customs.
Openness to change	Self-direction [Independence]	For him it is important to come up with new things and to approach everything creatively. He likes to do everything in his own original way.
		For him it is important to make his own decisions about what to do and how to do it. He likes to be free and not dependent on others.
	Stimulation [Risk and novelty]	He likes surprises, he always tries to find something new for himself to do. He believes it is important for him to try many different things in life.
		He looks for adventure and likes to take risks. He wants to live a life that is full of events.

	Hedonism	For him it is important to have a good time. He likes to pamper himself.
		He looks for any opportunity to have fun. For him it is important to do things that give him pleasure.
	Factor: Self-transcendence—Self-enhancement	
Self-enhancement	Achievement	For him it is important to show his capabilities. He wants people to take delight in what he does.
		For him it is very important to be very successful. He hopes that people will recognize his achievements.
	Power [Authority and wealth]	For him it is important to be wealthy. He wants to have a lot of money and own expensive things.
		For him it is important to be respected. He wants people to do what he says.
Self-transcendence	Benevolence	For him it is very important to help those around him. He wants to take care of their well-being.
		For him it is important to be faithful to his friends. He would like to devote his life to those close to him.
		For him it is important for every person in the world to be treated the same. He is convinced that all people should have equal opportunities in life.
	Universalism	For him it is important to listen to the opinions of others who are different from him. Even when he does not agree with them, he still wants to understand their point of view.
		He firmly believes that people should take good care of the natural world. For him it is important to take care of the environment.

*In the wordings of the questions for the female respondents, the feminine pronouns were used.

Inasmuch as we are working with mean-corrected indicators it is not surprising that significance of value indexes is often characterized by negative figures. A negative figure means that the significance level of a given value is lower than the average significance of the value (MRAT) that characterizes a given individual; accordingly, a positive figure means that the significance level is higher than the average.

In most cases we have used mean-corrected value indicators; it is explicitly indicated when non–mean-corrected indicators have been used. Thus, for example, in calculating the integral value factors we have used non–mean-corrected indicators, because the factor analysis itself functions autonomically, "purging" the content characteristics of the values of the features of reaction style.

Previous studies by Schwartz have shown that the ten typological indexes are also linked among themselves in a certain way. They are combined into four larger categories of values (see Table 1), the pairs of which, in turn, are linked by reciprocally reverse relations: with a rise in the significance of one category of values, the significance of the other category goes down.

The category "Conservation" includes the values "Security," "Conformity," and "Tradition"; the category that is the opposite in meaning, "Openness to change," includes the values "Risk and Novelty [Stimulation],"[15] "Self-direction" [Independence] and "Hedonism," and these two categories form the first value axis: "Openness to change versus Conservation." The second axis—"Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement"—reflects the opposition between the value categories "Self-enhancement" (which includes the values "Authority and wealth [Power]"[16] and "Achievement") and "Self-transcendence" (which includes the values "Universalism" and "Benevolence").

Table 1 presents the hierarchy of the value indicators discerned via Schwartz's method, from the initial judgments contained in the questionnaire to the indexes for the integral value axes.

The hierarchy of value indicators depicted in Table 1 has been constructed on the basis of previous surveys by Schwartz. We checked to determine the extent to which the structure of these indicators is reproduced in the files of the second[17] and third rounds of the ESS. In both files, the factor analysis of the twenty-one initial value indicators demonstrated the presence of the two integral value factors that coincide with the value axes described by Schwartz in terms of basic content. The content pivot of the first factor is the opposition between the values of

Openness to change and Conservation, while the basic significance of the second factor is the opposition between the values of Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement.

A number of possibilities thus exist in regard to intercountry and interindividual comparisons, which can be made on the basis of the initial inquiries on the questionnaire (i.e., twenty-one of them), on the basis of the consolidated value types (i.e., ten of them), and further, on the basis of the four, even more consolidated, value categories, and finally, making use of only two bipolar value factors or axes. In plotting the ten typological indexes we follow Schwartz's algorithm, while we construct the integral factor indexes on the basis of the structure obtained in the course of factor analysis of the initial data found directly in the given file.[18]

Comparison of Russia with the other European countries according to the ten typological value indexes, integral value axes (factors), and value profiles

We compare Russia with individual European countries according to each of the ten typological value indexes as described above. For Russia, the mean level of each of the ten value indexes was matched by pairs with the analogous averages for each European country using the ANOVA [analysis of variance] procedure of single-factor dispersion analysis. The statistical significance of the intercountry differences was determined via the Tamhane criterion, with $p < 0.05$.

Table 2 describes the results of these comparisons. This description reveals that with respect to the value indexes most of Russia's differences with the other European countries are statistically significant, and, consequently, these value indicators of the average Russian, as expected, differ from the values of the "average" representatives of other countries more often than they coincide with them.

In eight out of the ten value indexes, Russia occupies an extreme or close to extreme position among the twenty European countries, and therefore in each of these eight cases the majority of the differences between the Russian population and the population of other countries are unidirectional. Thus, for example, on the value Authority and wealth, Russians differ from seventeen out of nineteen countries, and also from ethnic Estonians, and all of these differences are in the direction of greater significance of the value Authority and wealth for the Russian population. Indeed, it must be kept in mind that Russia, as a rule, does share its position

Table 2

Mean Levels of Ten Typological Value Indexes in Russia and the Results of Comparison of Russia with Other Countries by Means of the ANOVA Procedure

Consolidated value categoriehs	Typological value indexes	Mean value indexes, in points, Russia (n = 2,395)	Characterization of Russia's position in comparison with the other European countries on the basis of mean levels*
		Factor: Openness to change—Conservation	
Conservation	Security	0.72	Russia is ahead of all countries except for Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Spain, with which there are no significant differences. There are also no significant differences with the Russophone Estonians.
	Conformity	–0.15	Russia occupies a middle position, it does not lean toward opposite poles; it is behind seven countries and the ethnic population of Estonia; it is ahead of five countries; it has no significant differences with six countries—Denmark, Slovenia, Belgium, Great Britain, Sweden, and Portugal, and also with the Russophone Estonians.
	Tradition	0.08	Russia occupies a middle position, it does not lean toward opposite poles; it is behind six countries and is ahead of six others; there are no significant differences with seven countries—Slovenia, Hungary, France, Belgium, Estonia (including both ethnic Russians and Estonians), Romania, and Switzerland.
Openness to change	Self-direction	0.18	Russia has shifted to the lower edge of the range of the European countries, which are ordered in accordance with the mean level of that value. It is behind twelve countries and ahead of only one—Bulgaria. There are no significant differences with five countries—Belgium, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, and Portugal, and also Russophone Estonia. Ethnic Estonians, like most respondents of the other countries, are ahead of the Russians with respect to the prominence of that value.

	Risk and novelty	–0.88	Russia has shifted to the lower edge of the range, it is behind the population of twelve countries, and also behind the Estophone Estonians. There are no significant differences with the populations of six countries—Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Romania, Spain, and Hungary, and also Russophone Estonia.
	Hedonism	–0.66	Russia has shifted to the lower edge of the range, it is behind the population of fourteen countries of Europe, and also Estophone Estonians. It is ahead of the population of two countries, Romania and Poland. There are no significant differences with the populations of Bulgaria, Slovakia, and also Russophone Estonia.
		Factor: Self-transcendence–Self-enhancement	
Self-enhancement	Achievement	–0.11	Russia is characterized by almost the highest significance of this value among the European countries, being ahead of fourteen, and also the ethnic population of Estonia. These values are expressed more strongly than among the Russians only in Bulgaria and Romania. There are no significant differences between Russia and Slovenia, Portugal, and Russophone Estonia.
	Authority and wealth	–0.20	Together with Romania and Russophone Estonians, Russia has the highest levels and is ahead of the seventeen other countries, and also the ethnic population of Estonia.
Self-transcendence	Benevolence	0.37	Russia (along with Slovakia, Romania, and also Russophone Estonia) is characterized by the lowest levels among the European countries. It is behind the sixteen other countries, and also ethnic Estonians.
	Universalism	0.41	Russia (along with Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus, and also Russophone Estonia) is characterized by the lowest levels among the European countries, and it is behind the twelve other countries, as well as ethnic Estonians.

*The characterization is based on statistically significant differences according to the Tamhane criterion ($p < 0.05$). In all cases, mean errors do not exceed 0.04 points.

with other countries. For example, on the mean significance of the index of Security, Russia occupies third place among the other countries. In actuality, however, this is an extreme position, since the two countries that are formally ahead of Russia do not differ from Russia statistically (the Tamhane criterion, $p < 0.05$). Russian-speaking Estonians also do not differ significantly from Russia, nor do the populations of Cyprus and Spain; these populations rank in fourth, fifth, and sixth places on the value Security.

Figures 1 through 10 provide graphic accompaniment for Table 2. These figures present the mean levels of the value indexes in each of the twenty countries that are included in the European Social Survey. In the graphs, the countries are ranked in descending order of importance of the corresponding value; the sample sizes range from 983 in Cyprus to 2,889 in Germany. The bar graphs show with which countries Russia has statistically significant differences and with which countries it does not.

In Figure 1 and Figures 4 through 10, Russia is skewed toward one of the edges, and this means that with respect to the corresponding values Russia's mean or average indicators are, as a rule, either larger than the same indicators of the other countries or, as a rule, smaller than these indicators. But in Figures 2 and 3 (the values "Conformity" and "Tradition"), Russia is located approximately in the middle of the range, which means that for each of these values there is a fairly large number of countries that, in terms of statistical significance, are ahead of Russia and countries that are behind Russia with respect to the mean level of the value index.

Based on paired comparisons of the Russian population with the populations of the other countries we conclude as follows.

1. For the values that form the axis "Openness to change versus Conservation":

Russia is ahead of most of the countries on the prominence of the value index "Security" included in the category "Conservation," but it occupies a middle position on the prominence of the other two values, "Conformity" and "Tradition," included in the same category. On the other hand, on the prominence of the values included in the category "Openness to change," Russia is behind the majority of the countries (see Figures 4 through 6 for graphs of the values "Self-direction," "Hedonism," and "Risk and novelty").[19]

Moreover, it is important to note that for all of the values that pertain to this axis, the mean Russian ratings, each time, turn out to be

Figure 1. **Mean Levels of the Value Index "Security" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 2. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Conformity" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 3. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Tradition" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 4. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Self-Direction" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 5. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Risk and Novelty" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 6. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Hedonism" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 7. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Achievement" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant difference with Russia

Figure 8. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Authority and Wealth" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 9. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Benevolence" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

Figure 10. **Mean Levels of Value Index "Universalism" in Twenty European Countries**



Note: There are no statistically significant differences with Russia

indistinguishable from a considerable number of other countries; this indicates a substantial degree of commonality between the Russians and the other Europeans on this group of values.

2. For the values that form the axis "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement":

On the average prominence of each of the four value indexes of this axis (Figures 7 through 10), Russia occupies positions at or close to the extreme edges. The values "Authority and wealth" and "Achievement" (which make up the category "Self-enhancement") are more strongly expressed by Russians than by inhabitants of most of the other countries under examination, while the values "Universalism" and "Benevolence" (which make up the opposite category—"Self-transcendence"), are expressed more weakly than in the majority of the other countries. The conclusion that the value "Authority and wealth" is more strongly expressed by Russians agrees with the fact that throughout the 1990s Russia remained solidly in place among the world leaders on the value indicators "materialism" and "orientation toward survival," which were formulated by Ronald Inglehart.[20] This is also consistent with conclusions that predict further strengthening of the "materialistic" motivation of Russians in the new century.[21]

It is also important to note that for all of the values (except Universalism) pertaining to this axis, the mean Russian ratings differ significantly from almost all of the countries under examination; this indicates the significantly specific character of today's Russia in terms of the degree of the prominence of these values.

Having described the results of the paired comparisons between the average Russian and the average representatives of the European countries on the basis of the ten typological value indexes, we turn to comparisons of the value axes (factors) pertaining to the highest level of integration of value characterizations (see Table 1). This will allow us to arrive at a more integrated characterization of the Russian population.

Figure 11 shows the position of Russia and nineteen other European countries in the space of two-value factors. As we move along the horizontal axis, the mean indicators of the countries change with respect to the factor "Openness to change versus Conservation": the farther to the right the point is located on the graph, the more significant to the population of the corresponding country are the values of Conservation and the less significant the values of Openness to change. As we move along the vertical axis, the indicators change with respect to the factor "Self-transcendence

Figure 11. **The Position of Twenty European Countries in the Space of Two Integral Value Factors, Mean Ratings by Countries**



versus Self-enhancement": the higher the point is located on the graph the more significant to the population of the corresponding country are the Self-enhancement values and the less significant the Self-transcendence values.

As we can see, Russia occupies close to the extreme upper position on the vertical axis, while on the horizontal axis it occupies a middle position. In other words, the population of Russia (compared with the populations of the other countries on the basis of mean ratings) is characterized by a middle position for the value opposition "Openness to change versus Conservation" and one of the highest orientations for the Self-enhancement values (at the expense of the Self-transcendence values).

At the same time, on the prominence of the parameter "Openness to change versus Conservation," the average Russian is similar to the representatives of a large number of other countries: the Russian average for this value factor does not yield statistically significant differences from the mean ratings of thirteen other countries! In terms of the degree of prominence of the values Openness to change versus Conservation, Russians fall into a category that also includes countries that are very different: Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Great Britain, Slovenia, Belgium, France, Portugal, Romania, Estonia (including both Russophone Estonians and ethnic Estonians), Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia.

As for the values "Self-transcendence" versus Self-enhancement," the average Russian is much more distinctive. Russia has no statistically significant differences only with the Russophone inhabitants of Estonia.[22]

On the whole, as we see, the value characterization of the population of Russia obtained on the basis of the intercountry comparison of the integral factors agrees with the one presented above based on the comparison of the ten typological value indexes, and is an integral expression of it. As in the case of the index comparisons, the factor comparisons show that for one group of values ("Openness to change versus Conservation"), Russia today is similar to a broad range of European countries, whereas for another group of values ("Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement") Russia differs a significantly from the majority.

We have thus made a paired comparison of Russia with the other countries in terms of the particular value indexes and the integral value indicators (axes or factors). To what extent do the profiles compiled of the ten value indexes, that is, the value hierarchies, coincide or differ in the different countries?

Figure 12 presents the value profiles of the population of Russia and some other countries that participated in the survey. This figure shows

Figure 12. **Hierarchies of Values of the Populations of Russia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, France, Denmark, and Sweden** (mean levels of ten value indexes, by countries, ranked in descending order)





Slovakia



N = 1,745

Romania



N = 2,108


Estonia (Estophone)
Benevolence
Universalism
Security
Self-direction
Tradition
Conformity
Hedonism
Risk and novelty
Achievement
Authority and wealth
–1.50
–1.00
–0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00

N = 949


France
Universalism
Benevolence
Self-direction
Hedonism
Security
Tradition
Conformity
Risk and novelty
Achievement
Authority and wealth
–1.50
–1.00
–0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50

N = 1,983

Denmark



N =1,464

Sweden



N = 1,606

that the most significant value to the population of Russia is Security, while second and third place rankings are shared by Universalism and Benevolence, with Self-direction in fourth place and Tradition in fifth place. The mean levels of all of these values, which occupy the upper half of the value hierarchy, are positive; consequently, on the whole, in comparison with the overall national Russian average, Russians attribute greater significance to all ten values (for the mean-corrected indicators this figure is equal to zero).

The mean levels of the next five values that are located in the lower half of the value hierarchy are negative. This means that on the whole, in comparison with the overall national Russian average for all ten values (i.e., with the country background), Russians assign less significance to them. Sixth, seventh, and eighth places are shared by Achievement, Conformity, and Authority and wealth, respectively, while the values Hedonism and Risk and novelty are ranked in ninth and tenth places, respectively.

It should be noted that the comparative significance of one value versus other values within a country often does not coincide with its comparative importance vis-à-vis the importance of the same value in other countries. In other words, the hierarchical position of a value in any particular country is not equivalent to its "geographical" position. As the Russian profile in Figure 12 shows, Universalism and Benevolence are more important to the average Russian than are Authority and wealth and Achievement, but in comparison with other countries, the significances of Universalism and Benevolence are more weakly expressed in Russia, while Authority and wealth and Achievement are more strongly expressed (see Figures 7 through 10). (Linked to this latter fact are the differences in the degree of the priority status of values in the different countries. In particular, Universalism and Benevolence are more important than Authority and wealth and Achievement, not only to Russians but also to residents of the other European countries, including Denmark and Sweden. But if we compare the value profiles of these countries, which are also depicted in Figure 12, with the Russian profile, it is strikingly apparent that in Denmark and Sweden the first two values surpass the second pair of values much more strongly than in Russia.)

For the purpose of comparison with Russia, a selection was made of the countries whose profiles, judging from the coefficients of rank correlation, are especially similar to the Russian profile or, on the contrary, are the most different. For example, the gamma coefficients between the value profiles of the average Russian and those of the respondents

who are especially similar to the average Russian, equal 0.96 (along with the Russophone population of Estonia), 0.91 (with the inhabitants of Slovakia), and 0.86 (with the population of Romania). All of these coefficients are significant where $p < 0.001$. The coefficients of the gamma rank correlation between the profile of the average Russian and the profiles of the respondents most similar to the average Russian are significantly lower: 0.42 (with the Swedish respondents), 0.42 (with the Danish respondents), and 0.55 (with the French respondents). Where $p < 0.05$, the first two coefficients are not statistically significant, while the third coefficient is statistically significant. The gamma coefficient between the average Russian and the average ethnic Estonian equals 0.64 (which is statistically significant where $p < 0.01$).

In general, as we see, even the value profiles that are the least similar to the Russian profile are still quite close to it; evidence for this is provided by the positive signs on all the gamma coefficients of correlation between the Russian value profile and the profiles of the other European countries. (In principle, this coefficient can also take a negative value, up to and including –1; in this case, it varies from 0.42 to 0.96, and moreover the majority of the coefficients are statistically significant where $p < 0.01$ or at more rigorous significance levels).[23]

Thus, based on the results of all of the value comparisons described in this section we can represent today's average Russian as the kind of individual who, in comparison with people in the majority of the other countries of Europe included in the survey, is characterized by a higher degree of caution (or even fear) and a more pronounced need to be protected by a strong state; an individual who has less need for novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence and is less inclined to take risks or to seek fun and pleasure. At the same time, a similar degree of prominence of these values also characterizes the representatives of a number of other European countries, and not only in the postsocialist countries.

In comparison with the inhabitants of most of the European countries under examination here, the average Russian today is more strongly inclined to pursue wealth and authority as well as personal success and social recognition (but at the same time, neither success nor the means by which to achieve it are associated with innovation and creative endeavor). Naturally, given a stronger orientation toward individual self-enhancement than other countries, the average Russian has less room in his consciousness for any concern about equality and justice in the country and the world, about tolerance, about the natural world

and the environment (the figures for "Universalism" are lower than they are in the other countries), and even about any worry or concern in regard to the people in his immediate environment (lower values of "Benevolence"). In the total file being examined here it turns out not many countries are similar to Russia in the degree of prominence of this complex of values.

The above characterization is similar to the one we gave to the generalized representative of Ukraine based on the findings of the previous round of surveys,[24] but the average Russian's difference is seen in his somewhat lower degree of conformity and his smaller emphasis on modesty and following traditions and, in addition, an orientation toward equality and tolerance in dealings with other people that is less prominent than that of Ukrainians. Like the average Russian, the average Ukrainian differs less from the representatives of the other countries on the value axis "Openness to change versus Conservation" than on the values "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement," but the degree of commonality with other Europeans in this regard is even higher among the Russians.

Public affairs journalists, scientists, and public figures these days have expressed serious concern over the low level of altruistic values of solidarity in Russian society and, on the other hand, concern over Russians' exaggerated individualistic orientations. Often the intensity of moral criticism is not linked to the actual state of people's mass mores and orientations, but in this case, it is not so: our survey results confirm that the problem does in fact exist. The comparison of Russia with the other countries of Europe clearly shows that today's average Russian has an extremely weakly developed sense of values over and beyond himself, values relating to concern for the well-being of other people, a sense of equal rights and a tolerant attitude toward them, and also any concern about the environment. On the other hand, the average Russian attributes extremely high significance to the opposite values of "selfishness."[25]

After the breakup of the Soviet paternalistic system, the state shifted all of its social obligations onto the shoulders of the individual, which led to a rise in individualism as the individual's sense that he is personally responsible for his own and his family's well-being.[26] Against this background, moral priorities also underwent change: a person's pursuit of his own interests and his participation in competition were no longer perceived as things to be condemned but became included in the category of approved values, while concern for the well-being of others lost its former moral aura.[27] The fact that today Russia is ahead of almost all

of the other countries on the indicator "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement" is a symptom that Russian society's shift in the direction of the competitive values of individual success, power and wealth, has been immoderate, and that the current balance between the values of competitive individualism and solidarity is not optimal.

The results of the empirical diagnosis of the values relating to the categories "Openness to change" and "Conservation" correlate to everyday perceptions in a different way. Today's empirical data do not confirm the inclination commonly attributed to "the Russian national character" to be submissive and obedient, any more than a desire to follow customs and traditions. Furthermore, in regard to this entire group of values that are so essential to the country's development there is also no confirmation of the notion of the uniqueness or "specialness" of Russian society. For each of the six value indexes pertaining to this or, much less, to the integral value factor "Openness to change versus Conservation," the average Russian does not differ from the representatives of a number of other European countries, thus demonstrating Russia's commonality not only with the postsocialist countries but also with certain developed capitalist countries.

This section has been devoted to a comparison of the mean levels of values in Russia and other countries. In this method of analysis, each country was represented by one number, and we deliberately ignored in-country differences between individuals, thus creating, at the same time, conditions favorable to the detection of intercountry differences. But even in the course of using this method of comparison it became possible to discern similarities between the countries on the bases of the ten typological indexes as well as the two integral value axes (factors). It seems evident that these similarities will become even stronger as we proceed from the aggregated (country) analysis of the data to the analysis on the level of individual people.

"Deconstructing the countries," or a typology of the respondents without considering their country affiliation

In the comparisons and classifications described in the previous section, the aggregated objects, whole countries, were taken as the units of analysis. We were taking for granted the idea that the values of the individual respondents to the inquiries on the questionnaire are determined by the country in which they live. But what happens if, in the course of classifying people on the basis of their values, we get away

from this country-focused presumption and look at the individual survey participants as independent units, and from the outset, do not link them to a particular country identity? We assume that with this approach, it is absolutely not the case that people will necessarily be united among themselves in accordance with the country principle. And this is exactly the kind of classification have attempted to make using cluster analysis (by the *k*-means clustering method).

We took the individual respondent as the unit of analysis, and the statistical algorithm distributed the respondents by clusters only on the basis of their indicators with respect to the ten mean-corrected value indexes, regardless of the country of residence. We focused on a typology that consists of four clusters, since in this case they were filled to a relatively uniform degree, and, moreover, any differences between them were well described in terms of the integral value factors. Cluster I turned out to include 6,770 respondents (18 percent); Cluster II included 13,074 (36 percent); Cluster III included 8,870 (25 percent); and Cluster IV included 7,334 (20 percent).

Figure 13 shows the arrangement of the four clusters in the space of the integral value indicators that are already known to us: "Openness to change versus Conservation" and "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement." As Figure 13 shows, the respondents making up Cluster I are characterized by the lowest levels on the horizontal axis and almost the lowest on the vertical axis, that is, they exhibit the highest degree (in comparison with the representatives of the other three types) of prominence of the value Openness to change (at the expense of the Conservation values) and a very strongly pronounced (medium-high) prominence of the Self-transcendence value (at the expense of the Self-enhancement values). The respondents making up Cluster II are characterized by medium prominence of the factor "Openness versus Conservation" and the strongest (in comparison with the representatives of the other clusters) prominence of the value factor "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement." Cluster III in Figure 13 is located almost opposite Cluster II; the respondents belonging to it are also characterized by a middle position on the axis "Openness versus Conservation" (just slightly more than in the case of the Cluster II contingent, which is shifted in the direction of Conservation) and an extremely pronounced orientation toward the Self-transcendence values (at the expense of the Self-enhancement values). Cluster IV in Figure 13 is located diagonally from Cluster I and is characterized by an extremely high significance

Figure 13. **Position of the Four Clusters in the Space of Value Factors**



Note: The position of a cluster is determined by the mean ratings of the respondents that are included in it; the size of the "bubbles" is proportional to the number of respondents in the clusters.

given to Conservation values (at the expense of Openness to change), and also by a medium-high significance of the Self-enhancement values (at the expense of the Self-transcendence values). Thus, it turns out that the four clusters are arranged in the space of the value factors approximately in the tops of a rhombus: in each cluster, one of the two factors is expressed to an extreme degree (to the greatest or the least degree in comparison with the other clusters), while the other factor is expressed to a medium degree in the two clusters (this is the factor "Openness to change versus Conservation"), while for the other two it is expressed to a medium-low or medium-high degree (this is the factor "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement"). The diagonals of the rhombus correspond approximately to the direction of the two value axes, and, moreover, the longer diagonal stretches along the axis "Openness versus Conservation."

As has already been pointed out, in the course of distributing the respondents by clusters we considered only the degree of prominence, in their case, of the ten value indexes, while we did not consider their country affiliation. It is, nonetheless, interesting to determine whether there is any pattern in the distribution of the clusters of inhabitants of the different countries. The answer to this question is shown in Table 3, which presents the percentages of the population in each country that ended up in a given cluster.

Table 3

Distribution of the Population of Each of the Twenty Countries by Clusters, Based on Classification of the Respondents According to Their Values (%)

Country	Cluster I: Extremely high value of "Openness" and medium high value of "Self-transcendence"	Cluster II: Middle position on value axis "Openness—Conservation" and extremely high value of "Self-enhancement"	Cluster III: Middle position on value axis "Openness—Conservation" and extremely high value of "Self-transcendence"	Cluster IV: Extremely high value of "Conservation" and medium high significance of values of "Self-enhancement"	No.
Belgium	23	31	34	12	*1,797*
Bulgaria	15	37	16	32	*1,370*
Great Britain	24	31	27	18	*2,367*
Hungary	18	41	29	13	*1,476*
Germany	25	32	28	16	*2,900*
Denmark	30	*25*	33	12	*1,469*
Spain	12	27	34	28	*1,868*
Cyprus	14	39	23	23	*995*
Norway	23	31	22	23	*1,564*
Poland	*8*	46	11	36	*1,711*
Portugal	14	51	14	21	*2,219*
Russia	15	48	*6*	31	*2,421*
Romania	*9*	60	*4*	27	*2,118*
Slovakia	*9*	52	*9*	30	*1,752*
Slovenia	23	43	20	14	1,466
Finland	22	*24*	36	19	*1,660*
France	22	*19*	48	*11*	*1,984*
Switzerland	26	*24*	41	*9*	*1,799*
Sweden	27	27	37	*9*	*1,617*
Estonia (Russophone)	11	49	11	29	*532*
Estonia (ethnic population)	17	26	35	21	*957*
Entire sample	18	36	25	20	36,048

*The percentages of the countries that are the leaders in a given cluster have been underlined; the percentages of the countries that are the outsiders in a given cluster have been rendered in italics.

As Table 3 shows, each of the four clusters contain representatives of all of the countries, and, conversely, inhabitants of each of the twenty countries are represented in all of the clusters. In addition, each cluster includes leader countries and outsider countries—countries that, so to speak, "contribute" to the particular cluster, respectively, the largest or the smallest percentage of their population (in comparison with the other countries).

In Cluster I, whose members, are on average characterized by an extremely high value of "Openness" and a medium-high value of "Self-transcendence," Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany are the leaders, "contributing" to the cluster more than a quarter of their populations, while three postsocialist countries—Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—contribute the smallest proportion of their population (in comparison with the other countries); the contribution made by each is less than 10 percent of the population. On the whole, this cluster had 18 percent of the entire sample; in size, it is the smallest among the four.[28] In Cluster II, in which the participants occupy a middle position on the axis "Openness versus Conservation" and have an extremely high level of the value "Self-enhancement," the leaders and the outsiders have partly changed places, postsocialist Romania and Slovakia, as well as Portugal, which has joined them, are in the lead (each of them "contributes" more than half of its population to the cluster!), while on the other hand, the smallest contribution (not more than a quarter of their population) is made by Denmark and Switzerland, and also France and Finland (on the whole, this cluster is the largest, including 36 percent of the entire sample). The participants in Cluster III are characterized by a middle position on the axis "Openness versus Conservation" and by an extremely high level of the value "Self-transcendence." The leaders in the cluster are France, Switzerland, and Sweden ("contributing" 37–48 percent of their population), while the smallest contribution once more, as in the case of Cluster I, is made by three postsocialist countries—Romania, Slovakia, and Russia (the contribution of each is less than 10 percent of their population). This cluster is of medium size, and includes a quarter of the entire sample. In the final cluster, Cluster IV, which includes the respondents characterized by an extremely high level of the value "Conservation" and a medium-high value of "Self-enhancement," three postsocialist countries—Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia—are the leaders. These countries "contribute" about one-third of their population to the cluster, while Sweden, Switzerland, and France have "invested" the

smallest proportion in it (each one's contribution is about 10 percent). In terms of size, this cluster is similar to Cluster I, and includes one out of five respondents.

Thus, the inhabitants of all of the countries are represented in each cluster, but not represented uniformly—certain ones "contribute" a quite substantial proportion of their population to the cluster, while others contribute a very small proportion.

It is remarkable to note that each time, the exact same categories of countries turn out to be polar opposites in terms of the size of their contributions—namely, the postsocialist countries and the "old" capitalist countries—and, moreover, the representatives of each of these categories take turns serving in the roles of leaders and outsiders.

And exactly in the same way that the proportion of the different countries are represented nonuniformly within each cluster, each country is nonuniformly "represented" in the different clusters. Remarkably, this nonuniformity of contributions to the different clusters is reflected with special clarity specifically in the case of the postsocialist countries: each of these countries makes two major contributions (in most of the cases, to Cluster II and Cluster IV) and two contributions that are substantially smaller in size (as a rule, to Cluster I and Cluster III).

Such nonuniformity also characterizes Russia. A majority of Russians (almost 80 percent) fall into Cluster II (48 percent) and Cluster IV (31 percent), in which the postsocialist countries are the leaders, but at the same time there is also a minority. Even though this minority shares values that are not typical of Russians, it is nonetheless quite substantial in terms of numbers: one out of seven Russians (15 percent of the Russian sample) is included in Cluster I, and another 6 percent are included in Cluster III (in both of these clusters, the tone is set by the representatives of the old capitalist countries).

We now look at what these four types of Russians represent from the standpoint of their values. Keep in mind that if we look at the average Russian population, without dividing it into clusters, in comparison with other countries' populations, it is characterized by a middle position with respect to the integral factor "Openness versus Conservation" and by an extremely high level of figures in the factor "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement" (see Figure 11). This combination of values characterizes Cluster II, into which the largest portion (almost half) of our fellow countrymen fall; the Russians included in this cluster embody what might be called today's modal Russian personality. Another one-third or so of

Russians (31 percent), who might well be called a "second majority," were included in Cluster IV and, in comparison with Cluster II, were skewed in the direction of the values of "Conservation" and in the direction of "Self-transcendence" (albeit more weakly). Thus, a majority of Russians belong to the value types that, in comparison with the representatives of the other value types, are distinguished by stronger orientations toward the "Self-enhancement" values (at the expense of the values "Self-transcendence"). On the axis "Openness to change versus Conservation," one portion of this majority is characterized by a middle position, while the other portion is characterized by an extremely strong prominence of "Conservation" (at the expense of "Openness to change").

There is something that is definitely not characteristic of this majority: the fact that the representatives of the other value types lead with respect to the orientation toward the values "Self-transcendence" and "Openness to change." But these values characterize the other two "factions" of Russian society, the "minorities" that have been included in Cluster I and Cluster III. For example, in comparison with the other value types, 15 percent of the Russians included in Cluster I are characterized by the highest orientation toward the value "Openness to change" (at the expense of "Conservation") and by a medium-high orientation toward "Self-transcendence" (at the expense of "Self-enhancement").[29] And another 6 percent of Russians included in Cluster III are characterized by the reverse combination—a middle position on the axis "Openness versus Conservation" and an extremely high (in comparison with the other value types) value "Self-transcendence."

Thus, as a result of turning from the country level to the individual level of analysis and as a result of the construction of the classification of particular respondents, it has been possible, first, to break down the image of the average Russian and to show that within the makeup of the Russian majority there are two value subtypes. Second, it has been possible to detect two groups of value minorities whose values differ radically from the dominant value types in Russia, but to which, nonetheless, one out of five Russians belongs.[30]

Some factors that influence people's life values: The results of multiple regression analysis

Clearly, we do not have enough information to arrive at conclusions about the entire complex of the social, economic, and cultural factors influencing

people's life values. In particular, we do not have enough repeat observations tracing the value phenomena of the exact same people and social groups over long periods of time. Nonetheless, however, it is possible to solve some of these issues by carrying out regression analysis on the data file we have. The main advantage of this method is that it makes it possible to determine the role of a particular factor "in pure form," in isolation from the effect of other factors, when the influences of these other factors on the indicators of interest to us are controlled.

Continuing our study of the question posed in this article concerning the similarities and differences between Russia and other countries, we now attempt to separate out (to "purge") the previously detected country influences from the effects of other variables, and also to compare and the country and "noncountry" influences in terms of their strength.

As independent variables in the regression equations, in addition to the respondents' country of affiliation we also include the characteristics whose connection with values has been detected many times over in previous surveys, namely, gender, age, membership in an ethnic minority, and characteristics of the parental family, such as did either of the respondent's parents have a higher education? When the respondent was fourteen years old, did he have a father? Did the respondent's mother have a job? What was the status of the respondent's parents when he was fourteen years old—did his father or mother have people working for them? Was either parent an immigrant? All of these characteristics can influence the respondent's values, but there is no way that values can have a reverse influence on them (such variables are called exogenous).[31]

We analyze two types of regression models, ordered probit regression and linear regression. As independent variables in the first group of models we use the ten value indexes whose scales we examine as ranking scales,[32] and, in the second group, the two integral factor indexes that were constructed on the basis of the stronger assumption that the initial value indicators (twenty-one points on Schwartz's questionnaire) are measured on the metric scale.

Table 4 shows the coefficients of ordered probit regression for ten regression equations. The high significances of the Wald chi square statistic (for all ten models, $p < 0.0001$) indicate that the constructed models are of acceptable quality.

The first, and most important, conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of these regression equations, concerns the overall configuration of the various influences on the values under examination.

The basic demographic characteristics of the respondents, namely, gender and age, have a statistically significant influence on all ten of the values examined here. A respondent's membership in an ethnic minority has a significant influence on only four value indexes. When it comes to influences on values, the characteristics of a respondent's parents do not play as active a role as his age and gender, but, nonetheless, the influence of some of these characteristics is quite appreciable—in particular, whether at least one of the parents has a higher education, and the professional status of the respondent's father (whether his father has people working under him).

What happens in the case of the influence exerted by a respondent's country affiliation? To assess this, we selected the affiliation of the respondent of Russia as the control group. As a result, the coefficients that characterize the influence of countries gave an indication of how a change in the respondents' country affiliation from Russian to some other affiliation affects their values. Table 4 shows that differences between Russia and the other countries noticeably affects the individual levels of all ten values. Almost all of the regression coefficients pointing to the influence of the respondents' country of residence are statistically significant at a high level, $p < 0.001$. Thus, the influence of a respondent's country affiliation on individual value levels (when these influences have been purged of the influences of age, gender, and particular characteristics of the parental family), turn out to be statistically significant much more frequently than are intercountry influences on average group levels that have "not been purged" of the influences of extraneous features (these influences were discussed in the second section of this article). When an analysis was made of the "unpurged" (gross) influences on the mean levels of the ten values, it turned out each time that the inhabitants of Russia do not have statistically significant differences with the inhabitants of any particular group of countries. At the same time, the results of regression analysis (with the given set of independent variables) show that such cases are rare: only 10 out of 200 coefficients are nonsignificant.

The second group of conclusions based on the results of the ordered probit regressions concerns the specific direction of the statistically significant influences that have been detected. The older the respondent the more strongly he is oriented toward Security, Tradition, and Conformity as well as Benevolence and Universalism, that is, toward the values of the two categories "Conservation" and "Self-transcendence." And, conversely, the younger the respondent the more strongly pronounced

Table 4

Coefficients of Ordered Probit Regression for the Ten Regression Equations

	Security	Tradition	Conformity	Benevo-lence	Universal-ism	Self-direction	Risk and novelty	Hedonism	Achieve-ment	Authority and wealth
Age of respondent	0.01**	0.02**	0.02**	0.01**	0.01**	–0.004**	–0.02**	–0.02**	–0.01**	–0.01**
Male gender	–0.21**	–0.18**	–0.04*	–0.31**	–0.22**	0.11**	0.22**	0.13**	0.19**	0.22**
Country of residence										
Russia (control group)										
Belgium	–0.79**	–0.07**	–0.10**	0.65**	0.28**	0.03*	0.29**	0.99**	–0.40**	–1.03**
Bulgaria	–0.11**	0.14**	0.26**	0.40**	–0.02*	–0.27**	0.36**	0.24**	0.58**	–1.47**
Switzerland	–0.82**	–0.22**	–0.65**	0.73**	0.60**	0.52**	0.24**	1.04**	–0.44**	–0.99**
Cyprus	–0.10**	0.16**	–0.25**	0.48**	–0.08**	0.22**	0.27**	0.47**	–0.49**	–0.71**
Germany	–0.57**	–0.26**	–0.27**	0.67**	0.25**	0.45**	0.13**	0.76**	–0.24**	–0.90**
Denmark	–1.23**	–0.56**	0.03*	1.04**	0.33**	0.45**	0.37**	1.04**	–0.54**	–0.91**
Spain	–0.17**	0.04*	0.10**	0.80**	0.57**	0.20**	0.03	0.33**	–0.79**	–1.09**
Finland	–0.45**	–0.38**	0.15**	0.61**	0.60**	0.34**	0.53**	0.54**	–0.72**	–1.29**
France	–0.69**	–0.08**	–0.32**	0.72**	0.85**	0.20**	0.33**	1.12**	–0.86**	–1.33**
Great Britain	–0.52**	–0.26**	–0.19**	0.63**	0.25**	0.29**	0.50**	0.56**	–0.36**	–0.99**
Hungary	–0.10**	–0.14**	–0.55**	0.26**	–0.02*	0.18**	0.13**	1.17**	–0.11**	–0.83**
Norway	–0.77**	–0.40**	0.40**	0.74**	0.32**	0.29**	0.39**	0.34**	–0.48**	–0.89**
Poland	–0.27**	0.12**	0.53**	0.23**	0.26**	–0.06**	0.21**	–0.18**	–0.28**	–0.61**
Portugal	–0.52**	–0.06**	–0.29**	0.37**	0.08**	–0.06**	0.33**	0.57**	0.03*	–0.61**
Romania	–0.38**	–0.21**	0.36**	–0.21**	–0.03**	–0.04**	0.13**	–0.07**	0.21**	0.05**
Sweden	–1.14**	–0.28**	–0.20**	0.68**	0.40**	0.42**	0.47**	1.01**	–0.63**	–0.89**
Slovenia	–0.71**	–0.01	–0.15**	0.07**	–0.01	0.14**	0.55**	0.80**	–0.01	–0.91**
Slovakia	–0.19**	0.13**	0.33**	–0.05**	0.00	0.05**	0.20**	–0.10**	–0.16**	–0.45**

Estonia (ethnic population)	–0.36**	–0.17**	0.06**	0.61**	0.38**	0.27**	0.48**	0.48**	–0.63**	–1.19**
Estonia (Russophone)	–0.21**	–0.23**	0.03	–0.09*	–0.02	–0.05	0.07*	0.31**	–0.02	–0.04
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his FATHER had people working under him	0.04*	–0.03*	0.00	0.02	0.06*	0.01	–0.01	–0.03	–0.04*	–0.04**
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his MOTHER had people working under her	0.00	–0.05	–0.04	0.06*	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01	–0.06*
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his FATHER was absent	0.07*	–0.05	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	–0.02	–0.04	–0.04
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his MOTHER was not working	0.01	–0.01	–0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	–0.02	–0.02
One of his parents is an immigrant	0.00	–0.01	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.00	–0.10*	0.08**	–0.02
At least one of his parents has a higher education	–0.27**	–0.24**	–0.22**	0.00	0.08*	0.22**	0.16**	0.09*	0.15**	0.09**
The respondent belongs to an ethnic minority	0.12	0.18**	0.07**	–0.03	–0.08	–0.18**	–0.09	–0.12*	0.02	0.08
Number of observations	30,997	31,011	30,970	30,990	31,030	30,986	30,972	30,980	30,962	31,019
Wald χ^2 (significant at 0.0001)	159,450	261,248	238,115	905,943	443,558	281,314	116,780	172,570	393,587	424,634
Log pseudolikelihood	–52,701	–52,589	–52,542	–53,420	–54,530	–54,530	–52,576	–51,698	–52,770	–53,057

Notes: Dependent variables—ten mean-corrected value indexes; the scale of each index is broken down into six gradations, into each of which equal percentages of the respondents fell.

*The coefficient is significant where $p < 0.05$.

**The coefficient is significant where $p < 0.001$ or with a more rigorous level of significance.

are the levels of the values of "Openness to change" (Risk and novelty, Hedonism, and Self-direction) and "Self-enhancement" (Achievement and Authority and wealth).

The influence of the respondent's gender is also very definite. More strongly pronounced for men are the values of Self-direction, Risk and novelty, Hedonism, Achievement, and Authority and wealth, which belong to the categories "Openness to change" and "Self-enhancement." More strongly pronounced for women, on the other hand, are the values of the opposite categories of "Conservation" (Security, Tradition, and Conformity) and "Self-transcendence" (Benevolence and Universalism).

When it comes to the influences exerted by country affiliation, two groups of facts stand out. A portion of the significant regression coefficients that characterize these influences coincide in direction with the significant differences seen in the intercountry comparison of the mean levels of values by means of the ANOVA procedure (see Figures 1 through 10, and commentary on them in Table 2). But, as has already been pointed out, the regression coefficients turned out to be more sensitive to differences than did the procedure of comparing mean country levels: they often turned out to be significant also in relation to the countries with which, in the course of comparing the mean levels of values using the ANOVA procedure, Russia did not yield significant differences. It is worth noting that in these cases as well, the signs of the regression coefficients almost always coincide with the directions of the "nonsignificant" differences found in the case of the intercountry comparisons of the mean levels.

Table 5 presents the coefficients of linear regression equations in which two integral value indicators were used as dependent variables—the factors "Openness to change versus Conservation" and "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement." (The same indicators as in the previously described equations of the ordered probit regressions were used as the independent variables in these equations.) Both regression equations are statistically significant: R^2 for the factors "Conservation" and "Self-enhancement" equal 0.26 and 0.23, respectively.

Here again, as in the analysis of the probit regressions, we find the influence ("purged" of a number of other variables) of the respondents' country affiliation on the content of their values, and, once more, regression analysis brings to light more statistically significant intercountry differences than does the ANOVA analysis (see its results above in Figure 11). In addition, the standardized beta coefficients that are also presented

in Table 5 afford additional possibilities for analysis—they make it possible not only to rate the significance of the influences and their signs but also to compare these influences with one another in terms of strength. As a result, in addition to the conclusions that were reached earlier on the basis of the ordered probit regressions it is possible to draw certain conclusions concerning the relative influence exerted by the different categories of independent variables.

As Table 5 shows, the two value factors being examined differ fundamentally with respect to what influences them. For the value factor "Openness to change versus Conservation," the stronger determinants are the gender and, especially, the age of the respondents, while their country affiliation ("Russia OR some other country") also exerts a statistically significant influence,[33] but to a lesser degree. The standardized coefficient of the influence exerted by age on the indicator "Openness to change versus Conservation" equals 0.43, while the coefficients of the country influences do not exceed 0.09 in absolute level. For the levels of the value factor "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement," on the other hand, the country affiliation of the respondent (to Russia OR some other country) has an appreciably stronger influence than do gender and age. The standardized coefficient of the gender indicator equals 0.08; for the age indicator the figure is 0.01, while the average (per module) level of the standardized regression coefficient for the country indicators equals 0.16. Thus, leaving aside other independent variables, it turns out that in order to predict an individual's value orientation along the axis "Openness versus Conservation" it is most important to know his age and gender, while to predict his orientation along the axis "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement" it is most important to know the country in which he lives.

As a result of the regression analysis we were able to confirm the influence of an individual's country affiliation on his values. This influence persists and even grows stronger after controlling for the influence exerted by a number of other independent variables. But the following question arises: Which of the characteristics of country affiliation and which qualities of the countries influence the values being examined here?

The term "country" can be looked at as a set of particular characteristics that include its level of wealth, its properties of political organization, its cultural parameters, the characteristics of its gene fund, and so on. Among these country characteristics, certain ones are susceptible to measurement, for example, based on the size of per capita gross domestic

Table 5

Coefficients of Linear Regression for Two Regression Equations

	Dependent variable: individual levels of the integral value factor "Openness to Change–Conservation"; $R^2 = 0.26$		Dependent variable: individual levels of integral value factor "Self-transcendence–Self-enhancement"; $R^2 = 0.23$	
	Nonstandardized coefficients (B)	Standardized coefficients (Beta)	Nonstandardized coefficients (B)	Standardized coefficients (Beta)
(Constant)	–0.87		0.63	
Male gender	–0.26**	–0.13**	0.15**	0.08**
Age of respondent	0.02**	0.43**	0.00*	0.01*
Country of residence				
Russia (control group)				
Belgium	–0.14**	–0.03**	–0.98**	–0.21**
Bulgaria	–0.04	0.01	–0.36**	–0.06**
Switzerland	–0.24**	–0.05**	–1.28**	–0.28**
Cyprus	0.06*	0.01*	–0.62**	–0.10**
Germany	–0.25**	–0.06**	–0.91**	–0.23**
Denmark	–0.42**	–0.08**	–1.06**	–0.21**
Spain	0.33**	0.07**	–1.02**	–0.22**
Finland	–0.09**	–0.02**	–1.04**	–0.24**
France	–0.11**	–0.02**	–1.53**	–0.33**
Great Britain	–0.21**	–0.05**	–0.88**	–0.21**
Hungary	–0.20**	–0.04**	–0.68**	–0.13**
Norway	–0.16**	–0.04**	–0.73**	–0.16**

Poland	0.26**	0.06**	–0.23**	–0.05**
Portugal	–0.19**	–0.04**	–0.53**	–0.12**
Romania	–0.08**	–0.02**	0.23**	0.05**
Sweden	–0.42**	–0.09**	–1.05**	–0.23**
Slovenia	–0.21**	–0.04**	–0.69**	–0.13**
Slovakia	0.08*	0.02*	–0.11**	–0.02**
Estonia (ethnic population)	–0.13**	–0.02**	–0.93**	–0.14**
Estonia (Russophone)	–0.20**	–0.02**	–0.08	–0.01
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his FATHER had people working under him	0.03*	0.02*	–0.05**	–0.02**
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his MOTHER had people working under her	–0.00	–0.00	–0.05*	–0.03*
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his FATHER was absent	0.01	0.00	–0.02	–0.00
When the respondent was fourteen years old, his MOTHER was not working	–0.00	–0.00	–0.01	–0.01
One of his parents is an immigrant	0.04*	0.02*	–0.01	–0.00
At least one of his parents has a higher education	–0.22**	–0.08**	–0.12**	–0.04**
The respondent belongs to an ethnic minority	0.11**	0.03**	0.18**	0.04**

Notes: Dependent variables are the individual levels of the respondents with respect to two integral value factors.
*The coefficient is significant where $p < 0.05$.
**The coefficient is significant where $p < 0.001$ or with a more rigorous level of significance.

product, indexes of political freedom, the development of a civil society, and so on, and, consequently, the corresponding independent variables can be included in the equations instead of just the undissected indicators of country affiliation. This is among the tasks of further work in the search for factors that influence people's life values.

Conclusion

The authors have undertaken an analysis of the values of the Russian population and their comparison with the values of the populations of nineteen European countries. The survey was based on data obtained using Schwartz's method in the framework of the third round of the European Social Survey. This method measures indicators of different levels of integration: on the most elementary level, the answers given by the respondents to the twenty-one questions on the questionnaire, which are further combined into ten typological value indexes. These indexes, in turn, are integrated into four value categories that are arranged on the opposite poles of two value axes (factors).

As a result it has been determined that:

1. The most significant value to the population of Russia (if we can judge on the basis of mean indicators) is "Security," with "Universalism" and "Benevolence" sharing second and third place rankings, "Self-direction" in fourth place, and "Tradition" in fifth place. Ranking in the lower portion of the Russian value hierarchy are the values "Achievement," "Conformity," and "Authority and wealth" (sharing sixth- through eighth-place rankings), while the values "Hedonism" and "Risk and novelty" are ranked ninth and tenth.

2. The paired intercountry comparisons of the mean levels for the ten typological value indexes showed that the average Russian, in comparison with the inhabitants of the other countries, is characterized by a higher level of caution (or even fear) and the need to be protected by a strong state; he has a less strongly pronounced need for novelty, creative endeavor, freedom, and independence, and he has less inclination to take risks and to pursue fun and pleasure. In regard to the significance of the listed values, the average Russian is similar to the average representatives of a number of other countries, in particular the postsocialist countries.

When it comes to the significance of the other group of values, the average Russian stands rather more apart, and, as a rule, is similar to the representatives of only a quite small number of the countries in question.

This refers to his strong striving for wealth and authority, and also for personal success and social recognition (it is true, of course, that neither the success that he desires nor the means by which to achieve it are associated with innovation and creative effort). This kind of person's strong orientation toward individual self-enhancement leaves less room in his consciousness (compared to the representatives of the other countries) for any concern about equality and justice in the country and in the world, less room for tolerance, less room for concern about the natural world and the environment, and even for any worry or concern about the people in his immediate circumstances.

3. The paired intercountry comparisons of the mean levels with respect to the two integral value factors showed that the population of Russia, in comparison with the populations of the other countries, occupies a middle position on the value axis "Conservation versus Openness to change" and is characterized by one of the highest orientations toward the values of Self-enhancement (at the expense of the values of Self-transcendence). In the case of the prominence of the parameter "Openness to change versus Conservation," the average Russian is similar to the representatives of thirteen other European countries. At the same time, when it comes to his orientation toward Self-enhancement (in opposition to the values of Self-transcendence), the average Russian is much more distinctive and falls into the same category as the Russophone population of Estonia. As a result, the comparison of Russia with the other countries on the level of the integral indicators, in the same way as the comparison on the level of value indexes, has shown that with respect to one group of values ("Openness to change versus Conservation") Russia today is similar to a broad range of European countries, whereas for the other group of values ("Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement") Russia differs noticeably from the majority.

4. In addition to comparing the mean indicators by the different countries, attitudes toward values were also compared on the level of the individual respondents. The classification of all of the respondents participating in the survey, which was done only on the basis of their values (and regardless of which country they belong to) made it possible to combine the respondents into four clusters whose names reflect their position with respect to one another in the space of the integral value factors: Cluster I shows an extremely high level of prominence of the values of "Openness" and a medium-high prominence of the value of "Self-transcendence." Cluster II shows a medium position with respect

to the value axis "Openness versus Conservation" and an extremely high prominence of the value "Self-enhancement." Cluster III shows a medium position with respect to the value axis "Openness versus Conservation" and an extremely high level of prominence of the value of "Self-transcendence." Cluster IV shows an extremely high level of prominence of the values of "Conservation" and a medium-high significance of the values of "Self-enhancement."

Each of the four clusters turned out to include representatives of all of the countries, and, conversely, inhabitants of each of the twenty countries are represented in all of the clusters. A majority of the Russians (almost 80 percent) ended up in Cluster II (48 percent) and Cluster IV (31 percent), in which the postsocialist countries are the leaders. In addition, a significant minority of Russians share values that are not typical of the majority of Russians: one out of seven Russians (15 percent of the Russian sample) is included in value Cluster I, and another 6 percent are included in Cluster III (in both of these clusters the majority consists of the representatives of the "old" capitalist countries).

Thus, as a result of turning away from the country level to the individual level of analysis, and of constructing the classification of the individual respondents, it was possible to separate out the image of the "average Russian," and to show that there are two value subtypes included in the Russian majority. Second, it became possible to discern two groups of value minorities whose values differ radically from the dominant value types in Russia but that nonetheless include one out of five Russians.

5. As a result of plotting ordered probit regression and linear regression, we were able to detect statistically significant influences of gender and age on all of the values in question, and also the influences of the other independent variables characterizing the respondent's parental family on particular value indicators. At the same time, the influences of respondents' country affiliation (i.e., the differences between the values of Russians and the inhabitants of the other European countries), as these were discerned earlier on the basis of the results of comparison of the averages (the ANOVA procedure) not only persisted but became even more explicit.

It turned out that two integral value factors, "Openness to change versus Conservation" and "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement" differ fundamentally in terms of the factors that influence them. In regard to the prominence of the value factor "Openness to change versus

Conservation," gender and, especially, the age of the respondents turn out to be stronger determinants, while their country affiliation (to Russia OR some other country) has a smaller influence. When it comes to the levels of the value factor "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement," however, conversely, the country affiliation of the respondent (to Russia OR some other country) has an influence that is noticeably stronger than that of gender and age. Thus, leaving aside the other indicators, it turns out that in order to predict the value orientation of an individual along the axis "Openness versus Conservation" it is essential first and foremost to know his age and gender, while in order to predict his orientation along the axis "Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement" it is most important to know which country he lives in.

6. The fact that in the case of the intercountry comparisons the Russian population, compared to the inhabitants of the majority of the other European countries, are found to have suprapersonal values that are more weakly prominent, and, conversely, they are characterized by stronger orientations (in comparison with the majority of the countries) toward competitive values of personal success, authority, and wealth (competitive in the sense of a "zero-sum game"), confirms the partial validity of the current widely prevalent moral criticism of the values and morals of the Russian masses.

7. When it comes to comparing the countries with respect to the values of "Openness versus Conservation," the empirical data today specifically fail to confirm the inclination that is widely attributed to the "Russian national character" of submissiveness and obedience, any more than any strong tendency to obey customs and traditions. In addition, with respect to this entire group of values, the notion of any uniqueness or "specialness" of Russian society is not confirmed.

Notes

1. R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, and G. Eva, eds., *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally: Lessons From the European Social Survey* (London: Sage, 2007).

2. There are fewer males in the Russian sample than in the aggregate general population of Russia, and in comparison to the general aggregate set the sample is skewed toward the older age groups. It is true that within the framework of the European Social Survey the study of the influence of weights that correct for sample biases of the participating countries owing to the unavailability of the respondents, showed that as a rule the weighting has little influence on the results of the data analysis. See Vasja Vehovar and Tina Zupanic, "Weighting in the ESS—Round 2"

(2007); Jaak Billiet, "Population Base Weights as Estimation and Adjustments for Bias R1 and R2. Review and Some Results" (2007).

3. V. Magun and M. Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniia Ukrainy: sravnenie s 23 drugimi evropeiskimi stranami," *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia. Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii,* 2007, nos. 3 and 4.

4. See, for example, R. Inglehart and W.E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review,* 2000, vol. 65, pp. 19–51.

5. This was already apparent in the process of analyzing the Ukrainian data: in the course of intercountry comparisons of individual population groups (e.g., males or young people), the number of statistically significant differences between Ukraine and other countries, with respect to certain values, decreased substantially (see V. Magun and M. Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniia Ukrainy").

6. S.H. Schwartz, A. Lehmann, and S. Roccas, "Multimethod Probes of Basic Human Values," in *Social Psychology and Culture Context: Essays in Honor of Harry C. Triandis,* ed. J. Adamopoulous and Y. Kashima (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1999); S.H. Schwartz, G. Melech, A. Lehmann, S. Burgess, and M. Harris, "Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values With a Different Method of Measurement," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 2001, vol. 32, pp. 519–42.

7. A description of these in Russian is found in a work by V.N. Karandashev, *Metodika Shvartsa dlia izucheniia tsennostei lichnosti: kontseptsiia i metodicheskoe rukovodstvo* (St. Petersburg: Rech′, 2004). Experience in the use of these methods, adapted for Russian-speaking respondents, has been described by N. Lebedeva, "Tsennostno-motivatsionnaia struktura lichnosti v russkoi kul′ture," *Psikhologicheskii zhurnal,* 2001, vol. 22, no. 3; also by M. Bobneva and E. Dorofeev, "Izmenenie tsennostnykh sistem lichnosti v period preobrazovaniia obshchestva," in *Tsennostnoe soznanie lichnosti v period preobrazovaniia obshchestva,* ed. E.D. Dorofeev and L.A. Sedov (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo IP RAN, 1997), pp. 32–46; by E. Belinskaia, "Sistema tsennostei lichnosti v perspektive tolerantnosti," www.tolz.ru/library/?id=436/ (accessed January 23, 2008); and by O.A. Tikhomandritskaia and E.M. Dubovskaia, "Osobennosti sotsial′no-psikhologicheskogo izucheniia tsennostei kak elementov kognitivnoi i motivatsionno-potrebnostnoi sfery," *Mir psikhologii,* 1999, no. 3, pp. 80–90.

8. S.H. Schwartz and W. Bilsky, "Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and Structure of Values: Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1990, vol. 58, pp. 878–891; S.H. Schwartz, "Universals in Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* ed. M.P. Zanna (San Diego: Academic Press, 1992) vol. 25, pp. 1–65.

9. It must be pointed out that for more convenient perception the gradations on the scale have been changed so that a greater significance of a value is also designated by a higher score. The numbering of the points on that scale is different in the ESS questionnaire and in the original ESS data file.

10. On this latter point, Schwartz's method is different, for example, from Inglehart's method. In the well-known questions formulated by Inglehart for the purpose of diagnosing values, the respondent was asked not about what was important to him personally but rather what goals, in his opinion, "our country

should set." Incidentally, it should not be ruled out that in this case as well the individual is projecting onto the country things that are personally significant to himself (see R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997]).

11. For a more detailed look at the differences in values between the Estophone and the Russophone inhabitants of Estonia, see M. Rudnev, "Vliianie vnutristranovykh etnicheskikh razlichii na zhiznennye tsennosti (po materialam sravneniia russkogo i estonskogo naseleniia Estonii)," in *Sbornik rabot molodykh uchenykh IS RAN* (Moscow: Tsentr sotsiologicheskogo obrazovaniia IS RAN, 2008).

12. For the analysis of values, the population of the Baltic countries was divided on the basis of ethnic affiliationbased on Schwartz's advice. Our attempts to divide the population of Ukraine on a regional basis, just as the attempt to divide the German sample into East German and West German segments, did not yield such clear-cut differences in the course of comparing the values.

13. For a recent survey on this topic, see P.B. Smith, "Acquiescent Response Bias as an Aspect of Cultural Communication Style," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 2003, vol. 20, no. 10.

14. S.H. Schwartz, "Instructions for Computing Scores for the 10 Human Values and Using Them in Analyses," *Documentation for ESS-1,* 2003. MRAT stands for "mean rating." Judging from the data being examined in this article, the inhabitants of Sweden, Norway, France, and Estonia (ethnic Estonians) are the least inclined to say that they are similar to other people, while the inhabitants of Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, and Poland are most inclined to do so; the inhabitants of Russia, along with those of Germany, Great Britain, Slovakia, Switzerland, Romania, and Bulgaria are characterized by average levels of the MRAT indicator.

15. In Schwartz's terminology, this value is called "Stimulation."

16. In Schwartz's terminology, this value is called "Power."

17. Magun and Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniia Ukrainy," no. 4.

18. Because of insufficient space we do not present a factor matrix here. It is available from the authors upon request.

19. The conclusion that "Self-direction" is weakly prominent is in agreement with data obtained earlier reflecting the consistently low (in comparison with the developed capitalist countries) level of prominence of initiative in Russians' work values (see V.S. Magun, "Dinamika trudovykh tsennostei rossiiskikh rabotnikov: 1991–2004 gg.," *Rossiiskii zhurnal menedzhmenta,* 2006, no. 4).

20. A.V. Andreenkova, "Materialisticheskie/postmaterialisticheskie tsennosti v Rossii," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia,* 1994, no. 11; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization;* Inglehart and Baker, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values.*

21. Magun, "Dinamika trudovykh tsennostei rossiiskikh rabotnikov."

22. All of the comparisons described here of the averages with respect to the integral value factors were carried out by means of the ANOVA procedure; the Tamhane criterion was used, $p < 0.05$.

23. In general, all of the value profiles of the European countries being examined here are in positive correlation and, as a rule, are statistically significant.

24. Magun and Rudnev, "Zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniia Ukrainy."

25. It is essential to emphasize that not all of the individualistic values are meant

in this case but, instead, only the values of Achievement and Authority and wealth, which are the most obviously linked to competition between people (the "zero-sum game"), and which, therefore, are the most explicitly in opposition to the values of Benevolence and Universalism. The other individualistic values—"Hedonism" ("have a good time," "pamper oneself," "do things that give pleasure," etc.), and "Self-direction" ("make decisions on one's own," "do everything in one's own original way," etc.)—as has been shown above, are more weakly expressed in Russians than in the majority of the other Europeans.

26. See L.E. Kesel′man and M.G. Matskevich, *Sotsial′noe prostranstvo narkotizma* (St. Petersburg, 2001), pp. 101–7 (see also www.narcom.ru/ideas/socio/35.html#5/, sections 5 and 6); N.I. Lapin, "Kak chuvstvuiut sebia, k chemu stremiatsia grazhdane Rossii," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia,* 2003, no. 6, p. 80.

27. V.S. Magun, "Tsennostnyi revansh v sovremennom rossiiskom obshchestve," in *Kuda idet Rossiia? Al′ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia. Vyp. 1,* ed. T.I. Zaslavskaia and L.A. Arutiunian (Moscow, 1994).

28. In this cluster and all of the other clusters the percentages of the leading countries differ in a statistically significant way from the percentages of the outsider countries (where $p < 0.05$ or in the case of a more rigorous level of significance).

29. This characterization of Cluster I is clearly reflected in its value profile, which differs significantly from the profiles of the other clusters and the Russian population as a whole. It is sufficient to note that in this profile first-place ranking is held by "Self-direction," followed by "Hedonism" and "Risk and novelty" (sharing second and third places), and also "Achievement" (in fourth place). "Security," on the other hand, ends up in the lower half of the hierarchy (in sixth through eighth places with "Universalism" and "Authority and wealth"). Recall (see Figure 12) that in the overall Russian sample the hierarchy of values was completely different: "Security" was ranked in first place, while "Self-direction" came in at only fourth place, "Achievement" was sixth through eighth, and "Hedonism" and "Risk and novelty" had to be "content" with ranking in the last two places in the hierarchy.

30. Several social and demographic characteristics of this minority of Russians differ in terms of values from the more prevalent value types. On the whole, these differences generally characterize the more actively involved and modernized portion of the population. There are more males in Cluster I and Cluster III than there are in Cluster II and Cluster IV (55 percent compared to 43 percent; the differences are significant where $p < 0.05$). The Russians who ended up in these clusters are younger (50 percent are younger than thirty, whereas in Cluster II and Cluster IV the respondents in that age group total only 22 percent, but on the other hand 60 percent of the respondents in this cluster are older than thirty-nine, compared to just 29 percent in Cluster I and Cluster III). It should also be noted that a significantly large proportion of the respondents in Cluster II and Cluster IV have a permanent residence in a rural area, compared to the respondents in Cluster I and Cluster III (22 percent compared to 1 percent). When it comes to the professional affiliation, level of education, and also the region in which the respondent lives, it has not been possible so far to detect any clear-cut and consistent differences between the "majority" and the "minority." This possibly suggests evidence of a relative uniformity of distribution of this minority between the different regions and social strata.

31. Yet another group of parameters—namely, the level of education of the

respondent, the type of community (urban or rural) in which he lives, and the characteristics of his professional and job position—may also constitute factors that influence the prominence of his values. But in regard to these parameters (though with less probability, to be sure) the values themselves may serve in the role of such factors, and we have therefore not included the parameters in the regression analysis at the present stage of the analysis.

32. Since these were mean-corrected value indexes with a large number of gradations, prior to inclusion in the equation the gradations were consolidated: the range of variations of each of the indexes was broken down into six parts, according to the principle of an equal number of respondents for each of the gradations.

33. Nineteen out of the twenty country coefficients are statistically significant.