Trust and Legitimacy in Police & Legal System A Comparative Perspective
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BACKGROUND

Breakdown in trust appears to be recently at the heart of problems with our political, state and legal institutions.

The crisis of trust is related to sectarian and religious conflict, and is also one of the consequences of the financial crisis facing Europe and other countries.

It is not surprising, therefore, that criminologists have also become interested in questions about trust in justice, the legitimacy of justice institutions, and people's commitment to the rule of law.

KEY QUESTIONS

The Key question to this issue is:
"why do people obey the law" or in other words
"why do people break the law"

The traditional answer is:

that the risks of punishment are too low, or that insufficiently tough sentences are imposed.

This has been examined from much broader perspectives:

The first set centres upon self-interest; it is based upon an individual weighing up the risks and costs of detection and punishment (if one were to commit a crime). This is called also the **Instrumental** approach.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to a fundamental property
of legal institutions – the right to govern and
the recognition by the governed of that right.[2]

When citizens see criminal justice institutions as legitimate, they recognise the system's authority to determine the law, to govern through the use of coercive force, to punish those who act illegally, and to expect cooperation and obedience.

[2] Beetham, D (1991) The Legitimation of Power. London: Macmillan

Why Israel

The structure of the Israeli society with the divisions between Jews and Arabs, Orthodox and Non-Orthodox, settlers and the general Jewish population creates an almost natural laboratory to look at variation in legal culture within the various groups.

The Purpose of the study is to examine how the cultural, religious and ideological differences between the various groups are being reflected in their attitudes towards the law and the legal system.

 are these attitudes consistent and embedded in cultural roots of any group or sector in the Israeli Society?

Sampling scheme

Population								2010	2011	2012
Jews								587	673	
Orthodox								86	109	
Settlers								244	238	
Immigrants			-	-				138	-	-
Arabs								353	353	

Sampling error   2.62%

Figure 2: Procedural justice-based model of legitimacy in the <u>Jewish</u> population and the effect of religiosity

Notes: Control variables: education, income, age, sex. Maximum likelihood estimation; unstandardized coefficients; **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

**Figure 3: Procedural justice-based model of legitimacy in the Israeli Arab population and the effect of religiosity**

Notes: Control variables: education, income, age, sex. Maximum likelihood estimation; unstandardized coefficients; **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Figure 1: Procedural justice-based model of police legitimacy

**Figure 2: Views on how often police make fair and impartial decisions: by country**

■ Not at all or not very often (as opposed to often or very often)

Figure 6: Consent to police authority and perceptions of shared moral values (% agree)

N=2576

Russia

Chi square	2212.6
DF	291
p value	.000
GFI	.9 5
AGFI	.9
RMSEA	.0 3
PCLOSE	1.000
SRMR	.0 7

Red -Unstandardized coefficients
Blue -Standardized coefficients

Procedural fairness

.709***
.357***

Police cooperation

.020*
.051*

Police legitimacy

1.737***
.613***

.104***
.149***

-.008*
-.067*

Police performance

Police compliance

*Note: *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 ns=not significant*

Israel

N=2272

Red -Unstandardized coefficients
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Chi square	2212.6
DF	291
p value	.000
GFI	.9 5
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RMSEA	.0 3
PCLOSE	1.000
SRMR	.0 7

Procedural fairness → .782*** / .399*** → **Police legitimacy**

Procedural fairness → 1.219*** / .548*** → **Police performance**

Police performance → .150*** / .170*** → **Police legitimacy**

Police legitimacy → .003 (ns) / .007 (ns) → **Police cooperation**

Police legitimacy → -.015*** / -.101*** → **Police compliance**

*Note: *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 ns=not significant*

Procedural Fairness

plcrspc	How often do police treat people in country with respect
plcfrdc	How often do police make fair, impartial decisions
plcexdc	How often do the police explain their decisions and actions when asked

Police performance

plcarcr	How quickly would police arrive at a violent crime/burglary scene near to where you live
plccbrg	How successful police are at catching house burglars in country
plcpvcr	How successful police are at preventing crimes in country

Police legitimacy

trstplc	Trust in police
plcrgwr*	Police have the same sense of right and wrong as me
plcipvl*	Police stand up for values that are important to people like me
gsupplc*	I generally support how the police act

Police cooperation

caplcst	How likely to call police if you see a man get his wallet stolen
widprsn	How willing to identify person who had done it
wevdct	How willing to give evidence in court against the accused

Police compliance

flsin5y*	How often made an exaggerated or false insurance claim last 5 years
bstln5y*	How often bought something that might be stolen last 5 years
troff5y*	How often committed a traffic offence last 5 years

Model Estimates for Hungary (N=1557)

Effect on…		Effect of…	B	β	S.E.
Police performance	<---	Procedural fairness	1.430***	.573***	.109
Police legitimacy	<---	Procedural fairness	.921***	.455***	.087
Police legitimacy	<---	Police performance	.147***	.181***	.032
Police compliance	<---	Police legitimacy	-.020***	-.173***	.005
Police cooperation	<---	Police legitimacy	.044*	.073*	.018

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001   B=*unstandardized estimates* β =*standardized estimates*

Model Estimates for Russia (N=2576)

Effect on…		Effect of…	B	β	S.E.
Police performance	<---	Procedural fairness	1.737***	.613***	.176
Police legitimacy	<---	Procedural fairness	.709***	.357***	.067
Police legitimacy	<---	Police performance	.104***	.149***	.025
Police compliance	<---	Police legitimacy	-.008*	-.067*	.003
Police cooperation	<---	Police legitimacy	.020*	.051*	.009

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001   B=*unstandardized estimates* β =*standardized estimates*

Model Estimates for Israel (N=2272)

Effect on…		Effect of…	B	β	S.E.
Police performance	<---	Procedural fairness	1.219***	.548***	.109
Police legitimacy	<---	Procedural fairness	.782***	.399***	.061
Police legitimacy	<---	Police performance	.150***	.170***	.028
Police compliance	<---	Police legitimacy	-.015***	-.101***	.004
Police cooperation	<---	Police legitimacy	.003	.007	.011

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001   B=*unstandardized estimates* β =*standardized estimates*

KEY FINDINGS

Procedural fairness has a positive effect on police legitimacy and police performance in all countries

Police performance has a positive impact on police legitimacy in all countries.

Police legitimacy has a negative effect on the police compliance variable (meaning that the higher the legitimacy that is given to the police there is less involvement in police/legal compliance). This is valid to all countries.

Police legitimacy has a positive effect on police cooperation only in Hungary and in Russia. In Israel this effect is insignificant.

Thank You For Your Attention

Спасибо за внимание