Lecture 1: Consistency and its converse: a general introduction.

The principle of consistency has played a fundamental role in axiomatic analysis, and a converse of this principle has also been important.
In this lecture, I introduce the principles and a number of variants.
I present a number of model-free observations concerning them.
I state two structural lemmas that illuminate the structure of the class of consistent rules for any class of problems and that of the class of conversely consistent rules.

Lecture 2: Applications

I present selected applications of consistency and of its converse to a variety of classes of problems in game theory, economics, and political science. They are bargaining problems, coalitional games, both with and without transferable utility, and strategic games; bankruptcy and taxation problems, quasi-linear cost allocation problems, fair division in classical economies, in economies with indivisible goods, with and without money, in economies with single-peaked preferences; apportionment problems, and finally matching problems, one-to-one or several-to-one, with money or without money.

Background references are

Thomson, W., ``Consistency and its converse: an introduction", Review of Economic Design 15 (2011), 257-291.

Thomson, W., ``Consistent Allocation Rules", Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2018.