On Thursday, November 28 a Meeting and a Scientific Seminar of the International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis was held
Speaker: Franz Hubert (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Topic: "Measuring bargaining power in networks"
Topic: "Measuring bargaining power in networks"
Abstract
We compare different solutions for cooperative games to evaluate bargaining power in the Eurasian network for natural gas. When assessed with the Shapley Value, new pipelines such as Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco affect bargaining power by increasing transit and supply competition. We also find a robust ranking of pipelines projects according to their strategic relevance, which is in line the observed investments. For the nucleolus in contrast, all these pipelines are completely irrelevant. We also find striking differences between the two solutions for the liberalization of network access within the European Union. When fully effective, open access to trunc pipes and distribution netweorks would diminish the power of local champions such as Gaz du France, ENI, and E.On Ruhrgas. For the Shapley Value, ”cutting out the middlemen” helps both, local customers and outside producers such as Gazprom, with producers receiving roughly a third. For the nucleolus, in contrast, outside producers gain nothing while all the benefits are captured by the customers. Overall, it appears to be easier to find an intuitive economic interpretation when measuring bargaining power with the Shapley Value.
Address: HSE building (Building 3, 4. 26 Shabolovka Str.), Room 5307.