On Thursday, June 27 a Scientific Seminar of the International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis was held
Speaker: Constantine Sorokin (Senior Research Fellow, International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis)
Topic: "The role of information in an escalation games" (joint work with Eyal Winter)
Topic: "The role of information in an escalation games" (joint work with Eyal Winter)
Abstract
We consider a continuous incomplete information escalation game. Following Nalebuff (1986) we assume that two competitors are engaged in a brinkmanship game – at any moment each of them can either continue escalation or back down; if escalation level reaches some (unknown) threshold, the war outbreaks. We derive two comparative statics results. First, as contesters become less certain about the value of the benefit from winning the conflict, the probability of war increases; second, as player’s signals grow more affiliated the probability of war increases as well. We provide some intuitive implications for these results in the context of international conflict resolution.
Address: HSE building (Building 3, 4. 26 Shabolovka Str.), Room 4413.