We use cookies in order to improve the quality and usability of the HSE website. More information about the use of cookies is available here, and the regulations on processing personal data can be found here. By continuing to use the site, you hereby confirm that you have been informed of the use of cookies by the HSE website and agree with our rules for processing personal data. You may disable cookies in your browser settings.

✖
  • A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
For visually-impairedFor visually-impairedUser profile (HSE staff only)SearchMenu
HSE University
User profile (HSE staff only)Search
Advanced search

Course Syllabus

Course Syllabus


 

Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!

Master 2023/2024

Basic Theory of Two-sided Matching

Type: Elective course (Economics and Economic Policy)
Area of studies: Economics
Delivered by: Department of Theoretical Economics
Where: Faculty of Economic Sciences
When: 2 year, 1 module
Mode of studies: offline
Open to: students of one campus
Instructors: Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
Master’s programme: Economics and Economic policy
Language: English
ECTS credits: 3
Contact hours: 28

Course Syllabus

Ask Question

Abstract

The goal of the class is to introduce students to formal modeling in two-sided matching and suggest some interesting directions for future research. We will discuss decentralized matching markets (e.g., the marriage market), their stable matching properties and mechanisms to find this stable matching. Furthermore, We study the shortfall of these stable mechanisms. At the end, we study the matching markets that involve contracts between two sides at the time of the match.