Minimal Conditions of Intellectual Ethos in British Agnosticism

In this work, I propose to consider a set of problems within the scope of modern epistemology associated with aretaic approaches and, more specifically, with virtue epistemology. Namely, I consider the project of virtue epistemology from the perspective of a more general group of research approaches which use the model of virtue ethics. Based on an analysis of some problems of modern epistemology, I put forward a thesis about the significance of skepticism, and incorporate it into the epistemology through the model of normative epistemology. Then, on the basis of aretaic approach, virtue epistemology, and skepticism, I offer a sketch of a theory of knowledge based on skeptical basis and the concept of virtue. At the end of the paper I briefly consider the British agnosticism of T.H. Huxley as a historical example of the possible realisation of the sketch. The main result of the work is a proposition of a theory of virtue epistemology, which has not only theoretical, but also applied value. This sketch, although not a complete theory, represents a significant example in favor of attempts to build a normative epistemology. It abandons the concept of reliability in favor of axiological categories and uses, among other things, the tools of aretaic ethics being relied on skepticism.