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Globalisation and acculturation[☆]

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ABSTRACT

When groups of different cultural backgrounds and their individual members engage each other, a process of *acculturation* begins, leading to cultural and psychological changes in both parties. A second process (*globalisation*) is also initiated by intercultural contact and leads to cultural and individual change. Two long-held assumptions are that (i) these two processes induce more change among non-dominant peoples, and (ii) the eventual outcome will be the loss of distinctive cultural and behavioural features of non-dominant group members, leading to their absorption into a homogeneous society that resembles the original dominant group. The long-term outcome is thus believed to be one rather homogeneous global society, sharing beliefs, values, consumer preferences and social structures. In this paper these assumptions are challenged, employing an acculturation framework that posits highly variable cultural and psychological outcomes that follow from intergroup contact. In addition to the *assimilation* of non-dominant peoples into dominant societies (either within societies or internationally), this framework proposes that other outcomes are possible: *integration* results in the maintenance of existing cultures and behaviours while peoples engage in day-to-day interaction within an evolving civic framework; *separation* results in the cultural and psychological maintenance when groups and individuals avoid interaction as much as possible; and *marginalisation* results in cultural and psychological loss, particularly among non-dominant populations, along with their exclusion from full and equitable participation in the larger society. Examples of such variability are provided, using empirical studies of indigenous and diasporic peoples, immigrants, and nation states. It is concluded that, rather than assimilation and homogenisation resulting from intercultural contact, the more likely outcomes are either some forms of integration (exhibiting a high degree of cultural and psychological continuity and producing new social structures that incorporate interacting peoples), or separation (in the form of resistance and revitalisation of heritage cultures).

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1. Introduction

"We can easily conceive of a time when there will be only one culture and one civilisation on the entire surface of the entire earth... I don't believe that this will happen, because there are contradictory tendencies always at work – on the one hand towards homogenisation and on the other towards new distinctions" (Levi-Strauss, 1978, p. 20).

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"The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs" (Quincy Adams; 1811; quoted in Sidney Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1974, p. 3).

So, whose expectation has come to pass?

In this paper the concepts of *globalisation* and *acculturation*, and some of their relationships, are reviewed. While acculturation has been going on for milenia, and has been studied in anthropology and psychology for decades (Sam & Berry, 2006), globalisation is a relatively recent phenomenon, having been introduced to contemporary discourse by Marshall McLuhan in his book *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962). Despite their similarities, these two notions have not previously been linked; this paper attempts to do so.

Some current conceptions of globalisation are reviewed first, distinguishing between the *process* and the *outcomes* of globalisation. It is proposed that these two aspects have usually been conflated, based on the assumption that there is only one outcome to the process. This assumption has eliminated the possibility that a high degree of global involvement of societies (as a process) can have highly variable consequences for cultures, groups and individuals, rather than a single homogenised outcome. Second, some of the main features of anthropological and psychological literature on acculturation are presented, highlighting the distinction between the dimensions of *contact and participation* between cultural groups and individuals and the *maintenance of culture and identity*. These two dimensions are the basis of an acculturation strategies framework (Berry, 1974, 2005) in which cultural groups and individuals are seen as varying independently on these two dimensions. The use of two dimensions permits researchers to avoid the assumption that high contact necessarily leads to low cultural and psychological maintenance. Instead all four possibilities are available for consideration. Some of the evidence for this highly variable relationship between these two dimensions are reviewed, using empirical findings from published studies. There is no claim in this paper to represent all the available findings, nor to portray all the variations. Instead, the goal is to question the common assumption that high contact between dominant and non-dominant peoples inevitably leads to cultural and psychological loss among those who are dominated.

2. Globalisation

Although the concept of *globalisation* has come into widespread use, there is no single accepted definition of it. So, I adopt here one early definition to set the stage for its further elaboration:

"Globalisation refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation-states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a *process* (emphasis added) through which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Nowadays, goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, communications, crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions, and beliefs all readily flow across territorial boundaries. Transnational networks, social movements and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas of human activity from the academic to the sexual." (McGrew, 1992, pp. 65–66).

This definition refers to a complex *process*, rather than to the kinds of *outcomes*, which take place when societies engage in international contact. This process involves a flow of cultural elements (ideas, goods etc.), and the establishing of relationships and networks. It does not specify what societies and their individual members do in response to this process, nor identify the changes that take place among them. In contrast, popular usage often combines the process of globalisation and its consequences into one grand idea – that of the homogenisation of world cultures and peoples (e.g., [USAmerican] National Geographic, Special issue on Global Culture, 1999).

The distinction between process and outcome is further exemplified by Legrain (2002, pp. 4 and 9): "Globalisation is shorthand for how our lives are becoming increasingly intertwined with those of distant people and places around the world – economically, politically and culturally. . . (However) globalisation is a process, not a destination".

It is essential to make this distinction between process and outcome because the process can have highly variable consequences. Three general consequences of the process have been identified that undermine, even negate, homogenisation as an inevitable outcome. First, societies and individuals may react against any attempts to undermine, devalue or otherwise eliminate their cultural heritage and identity. This aspect has come to be known as *localisation*, as a counter process to globalisation. As Knight (2000, p. 242) has pointed out, "the technologies that make global culture possible also facilitate the dissemination and hence revival of distinctive local cultures". Second, the process of globalisation may lead to the fragmentation of extant societies into more culturally-specific nation states, rather than to larger more uniform cultural entities (e.g., the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into smaller, more culturally defined, nation states). Finally, there is now substantial psychological evidence (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002) that one of the consequences of intercultural contact, particularly when it is negative or discriminatory, is to react against it, and to increase one's identification with one's own cultural community.

The view of globalisation expressed in this paper, and the distinction between process and outcomes, derives largely from much thinking and empirical work on acculturation (reviewed below). It is now clear that the old belief that culture contact

inevitably leads to cultural and psychological homogenisation is no longer supportable. Cultural convergence can no longer be assumed.

3. Acculturation

The concept of acculturation came into psychology from the discipline of cultural anthropology. One formulation in particular has been useful in subsequent work: "Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups. . . under this definition, acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change, of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation. . ." (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936, pp. 149–152). Although this was not the first study of acculturation, it is the first comprehensive definition of the concept in anthropology.

For the purposes of this paper, the key ideas from this cultural-level definition are: acculturation is seen as just one aspect of the broader concept of culture change; it is considered to generate change in either or both groups; and it is distinguished from assimilation. Perhaps most important is the explicit recognition that acculturation is *not only assimilation*. A second important feature is that acculturation is *mutual*; it is a process that can bring about changes in both (or all) groups in contact, rather than only among non-dominant groups.

At the psychological level, Graves (1967) introduced the concept of *psychological acculturation*, and defined it as the set of psychological changes that take place in individuals who are members of cultural groups experiencing (group-level) acculturation. In parallel with the two features noted at the cultural level, psychological acculturation is considered to be not only in the direction of assimilation, but can also be reactive; and it can also lead to changes in the behavioural repertoire of individuals belonging to both groups.

The anthropological study of these non-assimilative ways of acculturating has produced numerous studies of what have been termed *reaffirmation* or *revitalisation* movements (see below). These social movements have arisen among indigenous and enslaved peoples in many parts of the world in response to their colonisation. They have the goal of reclaiming an earlier, or 'traditional', way of life, one that throws off many of the features brought by the colonial society. In the sociological literature on marginalisation, researchers have noted that many groups "swing about and reaffirm" (Park, 1928) their heritage cultures and identities, in part as a way to escape from being in a marginal situation. This move is one way of achieving *separation* of the revitalised group from major contact with the dominating group (see discussion of acculturation strategies below).

These revitalisation movements are collective attempts to reverse the process of cultural domination that has resulted from colonisation, and to regain (sometimes even to reinvent) the group's cultural heritage. Two frequently cited examples are the search for cultural rebirth by the Seneca people of New York (Wallace, 1970), and the cargo cults found in some Melanesian societies (e.g., Worsley, 1957). In the first case, the Seneca came to believe that their poverty and humiliation at the hands of colonisers could be reversed by adopting a set of religious beliefs and daily behaviours that were partly indigenous and partly rooted in Quaker beliefs. These included the rejection of alcohol use, the regaining of tribal territories and the achievement of social cohesion and a new morality. In the second case, the community came to believe that some external power would bring "cargo" that would make the people as well-off as the colonisers. Worsley considered this set of beliefs to be a reaction to colonial oppression. In both cases, there is a combined religious and political reaction to what is nowadays recognised as a form of 'globalisation'. And this reaction incorporates both a rejection of, along with a partial adoption of, features of the society that has come to dominate them.

A contemporary example can be found in the Rastafari movement (see Murrell, Spencer & McFarlane, 1998). In the West Indies, the long history of European domination of African peoples came to be resisted, and African cultures and religions were reclaimed. For Rastafari, "Babylon" is defined as the Western political and economic domination and imperialism, and "chanting down Babylon" is a set of actions designed to throw off (eliminate, reduce, or avoid), this domination. According to Murrell et al. (1998), in Jamaica, "Babylon refers to the ideological and structural components of Jamaica's social system, which institutionalises inequity and exploitation. In this respect, Babylon is the complex of economic, political, religious and educational institutions and values that evolved from the colonial experiment" (p.24). "At the highest level of generality, Babylon portrays the forces of evil arrayed against God and the righteous (Haile Selassie, Rastas and the poor, p. 25)". At the psychological level, "Rasta psychology is resistance and liberation psychology—the sum total of the organised and spontaneous campaign against racist subjugation, fired by the burning desire to be free from all forms of social, economic and political domination, p. 36)". Rastafari seeks to reaffirm their indigenous identities in Africa, emphasising the great civilisations that have flourished there. For Rastafari, "Ethiopia" is a term for all ancient Africa. They engage their lives with a strong religious fervour, seeking justification for their beliefs and actions in the one true word. However, Rastafari is fundamentally a peace movement, ("one love"), and stands in sharp contrast to other contemporary reaffirmation movements that seek to throw off colonial domination through the use of violence against those who have come to dominate them.

In addition to revitalisation as a way to resist cultural homogenisation, there are other forms of resistance to assimilation. The clearest example is that of the Jewish community world-wide. For over 2000 years, living a diasporic existence and facing dispersal, discrimination and the Holocaust, Jewish communities have not only survived, but also thrived. The concept of *long term acculturation* has been introduced by Gezentsvey (2007). She argues that "It is of vital importance to understand

how established ethno-cultural communities who have been living outside their native country for decades, centuries or thousands of years manage to both interact with the larger society and preserve their cultural heritage". She has developed two further concepts ('Ethno-Historical Consciousness' and 'Motivation for Ethno-cultural Continuity') to understand and assess the motivational basis for such long-term cultural maintenance. She finds that these variables predict the desire for endogamy: "... the intentions of ethno-cultural individuals to marry a person from the same ethnic group stem from a motivation to maintain their heritage culture; transmit it to their children and see their group endure". However, beyond this substantial cultural continuity in the diaspora, there has also been a 'revitalisation' component, for example in the Zionist movement and the advent of the state of Israel.

The collective and psychological reaction to global domination can also be exemplified by the rise of the *indigenous science* movement (e.g., Ziman, 2000), and more specifically by the *indigenous psychologies* movement (e.g., Allwood & Berry, 2006; Berry, Irvine, & Hunt, 1986; Enriquez, 1992; Kim & Berry, 1993; Sinha, 1997). In this movement, psychologists from many societies have come to realise that the psychological concepts, theories, methods and data that define the field represent only a small part of the available psychological phenomena world-wide. Indigenous psychologies are first of all a reaction to this domination of WASP ("Western Academic Scientific Psychology"), and second an attempt to develop culturally-appropriate concepts and findings that will allow for a more sensitive understanding and a useful and applicable knowledge base. Rather than accept the dominance of WASP, alternatives are being developed that are rooted in both the indigenous and the international features of the discipline. So, even in social and behavioural science, globalisation does not mean the acceptance of the one version that has come to dominate the discipline (see also Bhawuk, 2008).

4. Acculturation strategies

The concept of *acculturation strategies* was introduced by Berry (1997) as an extension of the earlier concept of *acculturation attitudes* (Berry, 1980). This concept refers to the various ways that groups and individuals seek to acculturate. Knowledge of these variations has increased substantially in recent years (see Berry, 2003), challenging the assumption that everyone would eventually assimilate and become absorbed into the dominant group (Gordon, 1964). The notion of *strategy* is based on the view that at the cultural level, the two groups in contact (whether dominant or non-dominant) usually have some notion about what they are attempting to do (e.g., colonial policies). At the individual level, persons will vary within their cultural group (e.g., on the basis of their educational or occupational background); and within their families, persons will vary according to their gender or position (e.g., mother, son). The more immediate outcomes of the acculturation process (including the behavioural changes and acculturative stress phenomena) are known to be a function, at least to some extent, of what people try to do during their acculturation; and the longer term outcomes (both psychological and sociocultural adaptations) often correspond to the strategic goals set by the groups of which they are members (Berry, 1997, 2005).

Four acculturation strategies have been derived from two basic issues facing all acculturating peoples. These issues are based on the distinction between orientations towards one's own group, and those towards other groups (Berry, 1980). This distinction is rendered as (i) a relative preference for "maintainance of one's heritage culture and identity" versus not maintaining them; and (ii) a relative preference for "seeking relationships with other groups" and participating in the larger society versus avoiding such relationships. It has now been well demonstrated that these two dimensions are empirically, as well as conceptually, independent from each other (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). This two dimensional formulation is presented in Fig. 1.

These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, shown as varying along bipolar dimensions, rather than as bald (positive or negative) alternatives. Orientations to these issues intersect to define four acculturation strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which ethnocultural group (the dominant or non-dominant) is being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant ethnocultural groups (on the left of Fig. 1), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining ones original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the evolving larger social network. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then Marginalisation is defined.

It is obvious that non-dominant groups and their individual members do not have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate. When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation, or constrains the choices of non-dominant groups or individuals, then other terms need to be used. Thus, Integration can only be "freely" chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity. Thus a mutual accommodation is required for Integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This strategy requires non-dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (e.g., education, health, labour) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society.

These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the non-dominant ethnocultural groups. However, since the original anthropological definition clearly established that both groups in contact would change and

ISSUE 1:

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


Fig. 1. Intercultural strategies in ethnocultural groups and the larger society.

become acculturated, a third dimension was added: that of the powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation would take place (Berry, 1974). The addition of this third dimension produces the right side of Fig. 1. Assimilation when sought by the dominant group is termed the Melting Pot. When Separation is forced by the dominant group it is Segregation. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant group it is Exclusion. Finally, Integration, when diversity is a widely-accepted feature of the society as a whole, including by all the various ethnocultural groups, it is called Multiculturalism.

With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their groups, and between non-dominant peoples and the larger society within which they are acculturating. The acculturation ideologies and policies of the dominant group constitute an important element of intercultural research (see Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997), while the preferences of non-dominant peoples are a core feature in acculturation research (Berry, 2006a; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989). Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are common sources of difficulty for those experiencing acculturation. For example this can occur when individuals do not accept the main ideology of their society (when dominant individuals oppose immigrant cultural maintenance in a society where multiculturalism is official policy), or when immigrant children challenge the way of acculturating set out by their parents. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, we observe the phenomenon of acculturative stress, with variations in levels of adaptation (Berry, 2006b).

5. Globalisation and acculturation: some empirical examples

If the two phenomena of globalisation and acculturation are distinct, it is legitimate and useful to ask what are the relationships between them. First, I view globalisation simply as *contact that provides the starting point for acculturation*. As we saw earlier, acculturation begins with contact between cultures, groups and individuals. Second, following the variations that were outlined in the discussion of acculturation strategies, we may conceive of four possible outcomes. One possibility is that globalisation will lead to the homogenisation of world cultures, most likely by non-dominant societies converging toward dominant ones (i.e., assimilation). Another possibility is that there is mutual change, leading to some convergence among both groups in contact, leading to some shared common qualities, while retaining distinctive features of both (i.e., integration). A third possibility is that non-dominant groups reject the influence of the dominant society, either by turning away from them at the outset (i.e., separation) or by shedding them once they have begun (i.e., revitalisation). Finally, it is possible that globalisation can lead to the destruction of non-dominant cultures, leaving their members without any cultural nexus in which to carry out their lives (i.e., marginalisation).

Large, dominant nation states obviously have an important role to play in the process of globalisation. The example of the Soviet Union reminds us of the strong influence of this state on the cultural features of those states that became formally incorporated into, or associated with, it. The language, the economic policies, the (non-) religious practices, and many other features of these states became highly dominated by Russian language and practice. In the most dominated states (such as the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) they were fully incorporated into the Soviet Union (unlike the more

autonomous countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland). Yet even under such influence, for example in Estonia (Berry, 2003), cultural ideals and values, and practices remained intact, despite a rise in the imported Russian-speaking population, initially making up less than 5% and rising to over 30% during the Soviet period. And this cultural continuity has provided the basis for an incredible cultural, political and economic resurgence in the 15 years since their independence, which is to some extent driven by a desire to distance themselves from the Russian past, and continued presence on their Eastern border.

Indigenous peoples also provide ample evidence for substantial cultural and psychological continuity in the face of generations of colonial domination. This continuity resembles both the “long term acculturation” phenomenon studied by Gezentsvey (2007), and the reaffirmation movements, both described above. For example, the *Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1999) published numerous research studies of the surviving and thriving of indigenous peoples in Canada. In one (*Aboriginal Peoples Survey, 1993*), language knowledge and use, and traditional practices showed remarkable persistence after 400 years of colonisation. This is confirmed by variations across indigenous groups. For “Indians on reserve” (those living in their home nations) 65% of adults, and between 45% and 57% of children, retained language and traditional practices. The proportion was higher among the Inuit (formerly called “Eskimo”) in the Arctic. It was lower among “Indians” living away from their home communities and among “Metis” (those of mixed “Indian” and French or Scottish origin). This pattern shows both continuity and change, largely associated with larger geographical distance allowing lesser contact and domination. However, formal schooling forced on those in remote communities (often by relocation to assimilationist-oriented church- and government-run institutions) had only limited impact on indigenous language and practice. There is not only cultural, but also psychological evidence to support this resistance to cultural absorption (Berry, 1999). Cultural identities were sampled in a number of indigenous samples, using the four-fold conception presented earlier. Of the four possible identities over three periods (claimed retrospectively in the past, at present, and projected into the future), it is clear that hundreds of years of colonisation have not diminished the perception of their aboriginal identity. An ‘Aboriginal’ cultural identity is above 75%, while all other identities fall below 10%. Moreover, the expectation by participants in the study was that, while it had been somewhat diminished in the past, they saw themselves as having an even stronger ‘Aboriginal’ identity in the future.

The most obvious example of a dominant society in the contemporary world is that of the United States of America. Within this global dominance, we may consider the case of influence on its northern neighbour, Canada. There are two conventional assumptions about the consequences of this situation. One is that because of its proximity and massive ownership and control of cultural and economic sectors of life in Canada (such as over 90% of films shown, and 80% of some key industries), many have assumed that Canadian society, particularly life values, are being changed inevitably toward US American (henceforth US) values. Second, the two societies are based on two distinct “foundation myths” or value sets: in Canada, it is the search for “peace, order and good government”, and in the US it is “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”. If these differences were present at the outset, have US values come to dominate Canadian values? Adams (2003) has documented precisely the opposite outcomes: there is a clear difference between the two societies in their value profiles, and this difference is becoming greater over time. Moreover, Canadian values appears to have become less conservative than the “order” value suggests, while US values appear to have become tighter and more conservative (in contrast to the “liberty” value).

Adams employed a survey instrument of 86 value statements at three times (1992, 1996 and 2000) in the two countries. His samples were representative of the population in the two countries, and totalled more than 14,000 individual respondents. Factor analyses of all responses provided evidence of two dimensions, which he termed *authority-individuality* and *survival-fulfilment*. The first dimension ranges individuals on a scale from the acceptance of the need for hierarchy in one’s life (authority) to more personal freedom (individuality). In more detail, by *authority*, Adams means “conformity to the expectations of authority figures. . . and a willingness to obey the customs and demands of institutions and ideologies, p. 22”. By *individuality*, Adams means those who are “unwilling to defer to authority. . . and instead want to make their own choices about all aspects of their life p. 23”. The second dimension ranges individuals on a scale from concern with meeting day-to-day basic needs (survival) to the quest for personal growth (fulfilment). By *survival*, Adams means those “who seek material gain, and engage in competition and zero-sum social interaction, p. 25”, who accept sexism, xenophobia and the use of violence, and have a rather ‘Darwinian’ view of life. By *fulfilment*, Adams means those who “are more concerned with the quality of life than with the standard of living. . . They are less interested in getting ahead and more interested in personal growth and well-being, as well as improving society at large, p.26”.

Crossing these two dimensions creates a *social values space* with four quadrants: *Status and Security* (obedience to traditional structures and norms); *Authenticity and Responsibility* (well-being, harmony and responsibility); *Exclusion and Intensity* (seeking stimulation and intensity); and *Idealism and Autonomy* (exploration and flexibility).

Combining data from the three time periods, Adams shows that US respondents are more highly represented than Canadian respondents in the first three quadrants (22% versus 13%; 30% versus 25%; and 24% versus 16%, respectively), while Canadian respondents are more highly represented in the fourth quadrant (Idealism and Autonomy; 45% versus 24%).

When the national samples are broken down into 15 regions (e.g., Deep South, Midwest, New England, Texarkana, and Pacific in the USA; Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia in Canada), a more fine-grained picture emerges. The ‘Deep South’, ‘Texarkana’ and the ‘South Atlantic’ regions (all in the USA) occupy the Status and Security quadrant; the ‘Midwest and ‘Plains’ regions (both in the USA) occupy the Authenticity and Responsibility quadrant; the ‘Mid Atlantic’ region of the USA occupies the Exclusion and Intensity quadrant; and all the Canadian regions, along with the US regions of

'Mountain', 'Pacific' and 'New England' occupy the Idealism and Autonomy quadrant. Note that the US regions that share this last quadrant with all Canadian regions are geographically adjacent to Canada. This suggests the possibility of mutual acculturation, but it is also possible that the values shared by all Canadian regions have influenced the US values, given the value disparity between these adjacent regions and other US regions.

Perhaps the most startling finding is the response to the value statement that "The father of the family must be master in his own house". Adams shows that these international and regional differences are not only strong, but increasingly diverging over the time period of the three surveys. With respect to value change over time, in 1992, percentage agreement was 26% in the Canadian national sample and 42% in the US national sample; the percentage agreement went down in Canada in 1996 and 2000 to 20% and 18%, while it went up in the US sample to 44% and 49%.

With respect to the strength of the difference, in the 15 regions, the percentage agreement with this statement ranged from 15% in Quebec to 21% in Alberta, and from 29% in New England to 71% in the Deep South: That is, all Canadian regions accepted this value to a lesser extent than all US regions.

A third example comes from a study of immigrant youth who have settled in 13 societies (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). This study sampled immigrant youth from 26 different cultural backgrounds and lived in 13 countries. We distinguished settler societies (Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States of America) from countries with fewer and more recent immigrants (e.g., France, Germany, Portugal, Sweden). In each country we sampled both national and immigrant youth. We attempted to sample the same cultural group in as many societies as possible, but there is wide variation in the groups studied because of the different immigrant groups that live in each country. Participants in the study were 7997 adolescents, including 5366 immigrant youth and 2631 national youth (ages 13–18; mean age = 15 years and 4 months for both groups). The sample included both first-generation (those who were born in country of origin and arrived after the age of 6; 34.7%) and second-generation (born in receiving country, or arrived before the age of 7; 65.3%) immigrant youth.

The questionnaire assessed a wide range of variables related to acculturation and adaptation. These variables were:

Acculturation attitudes: This scale assessed four acculturation attitudes: assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalisation.

Cultural identity: *Ethnic identity* was measured with items assessing ethnic affirmation; *National identity* was assessed with measures of national affirmation.

Language proficiency and language use: The scale for language proficiency inquired about a person's abilities to understand, speak, read and write the ethnic and national languages.

Ethnic and national peer contact: The two scales assessed the frequency of interaction with peers from one's own ethnic group, or from the national group.

Family relationship values: This scale consisted of two subscales. Items assessed acceptance of *family obligations*, and *adolescents' rights*.

Perceived discrimination: The scale assessed perceived frequency of being treated unfairly or negatively or being teased, threatened, or feeling unaccepted because of one's ethnicity.

Adaptation: *Psychological adaptation* was measured with three scales: life satisfaction, self-esteem, and psychological problems. *Sociocultural adaptation* was assessed using scales for school adjustment and behaviour problems.

Cluster analysis was carried out with all the variables associated with the acculturation process: the four acculturation attitudes, ethnic and national identities, ethnic and national language knowledge, language use, ethnic and national peer social contacts, and family relationship values. Four clusters were found, which we term *acculturation profiles*. These were: an *integration* profile (36.4% of immigrant youth), an *ethnic or separation* profile (22.5%), a *national or assimilation* profile (18.7%), and a *diffuse or marginalisation* profile (22.4%). All adolescents for whom we had complete data ($N = 4334$) fit one of the four profiles. The *integration* profile was the most frequent one. It consisted of 1576 adolescents who indicated relatively high involvement in both their ethnic and national cultures. They strongly endorsed integration and gave low endorsement to assimilation, separation, and marginalisation. These adolescents were high on both ethnic and national identities. They reported high national language proficiency and average ethnic language proficiency; and their language usage suggested balanced use of both languages. They had peer contacts with both their own group and the national group. They were near the mean on family relationships values. These adolescents appear to be comfortable in both the ethnic and national contexts, in terms of acculturation preferences, identity, language, peer contacts, and values.

The *ethnic/separation* profile consisted of 975 adolescents who showed a clear orientation toward their own ethnic group. They endorsed the separation attitude and scored low on assimilation, national identity and contacts with the national group. They had high ethnic identity, ethnic language proficiency and usage, and ethnic peer contacts. Their support for family relationship values was well above the average. They represent young people who are largely embedded within their own culture and show little involvement with the larger society.

The *national/assimilation* profile included 810 adolescents who showed a strong orientation toward the new society in which they were living. Their profile is a mirror image of the ethnic profile. These adolescents were high on assimilation and national identity, and very low on ethnic identity. They were proficient in the national language and used it predominantly. Their peer contacts were largely with members of the national group, and they showed low support for family obligations.

These adolescents appear to exemplify the idea of assimilation, indicating a lack of retention of their ethnic culture and identity.

The *diffuse/marginalisation* profile is not as easily interpretable. These 973 youth reported high proficiency in, and usage of, the ethnic language, but also reported low ethnic identity. They had low proficiency in the national language, and they reported somewhat low national identity and national peer contacts. They endorsed three contradictory acculturation attitudes, assimilation, marginalisation and separation. This inconsistent pattern suggests that these young people are uncertain about their place in society, perhaps wanting to be part of the larger society, but lacking the skills and ability to make contacts. This profile appears similar to young people described in the literature on marginalisation as being poised in psychological uncertainty between two social worlds; they are also similar to those youth portrayed in the identity formation literature as “diffuse,” characterized by a lack of commitment to a direction or purpose in their lives and who are often socially isolated.

From these profile distributions, we can conclude that the maintenance of young peoples’ heritage culture (combining separation and integration ways of acculturating) was substantial, whereas loss of heritage culture (combining assimilation and marginalisation) was minimal. The common assumption that youth will prefer to acculturate in ways that make them more like their peers from the larger society simply does not receive support.

The profiles were analyzed for differences in relation to three length-of-residence categories (less than 6 years, 6–12 years, and 12–18 years). The integration and national profiles were more frequent among those with longer residence; the proportion of integration and national profiles among those born in the new society or with 12 years or more of residence was more than double that of those with 6 years or less of residence. In contrast, the diffuse profile was dramatically less frequent in those with longer residence; over 45% of those with 6 years or less residence showed a diffuse profile, while only about 12% of those with the longest residence showed this profile. On the other hand, the ethnic profile was almost equally frequent in all length-of-residence categories. Thus, among the most recent arrivals, the diffuse profile dominated, while the national profile was very low. For those who lived in the society of settlement from birth or from their early school years on, the integration profile dominated, and the national profile was second in frequency. In spite of these differences, a substantial group of adolescents (20–25%) showed strong and enduring involvement with their ethnic culture regardless of length of residence. We may conclude that length of residence did not seriously diminish a person’s attachment to their heritage culture.

6. Discussion and conclusions

This paper has examined the relationship between two of the main concepts that are currently employed in study of intercultural relations: globalisation and acculturation.

It has emphasised the distinction between the *process* of intercultural contact, and the *outcomes* of such contact for societies and individuals. This distinction has allowed for the possibility that high degrees of intercultural contact and engagement (often identified as the core meaning of globalisation) can have highly variable outcomes for cultural communities and their individual members.

Bringing these two concepts together has permitted the cross-fertilisation of the two fields. In particular, the emerging common theme of the existence of variable outcomes to the processes unleashed by intercultural contact has been reinforced by their comparison. No longer should it be possible to easily claim that globalisation equals homogenisation. While this does occur in some cases, the findings from the acculturation literature provide a caution when making facile generalisations about any uniform consequences of globalisation.

Beyond this initial benefit of examining the two concepts together, the opportunity now exists to further explore (both conceptually and empirically) how intercultural contact can lead to greater interconnectedness across nation states and ethnocultural groups within states while not leading inevitably to cultural loss and psychological assimilation. As we have seen, forms of *separation* are evident almost everywhere in the globalising world. In particular, revitalisation and reaffirmation processes are being engaged, not only by small-scale cultural communities that were first examined in the anthropological literature, but now also in large-scale nation states that seek to re-establish their cultural independence from international entertainment and other forms of corporate domination (for example in film, music, and other consumer products). Evidence for these reactions is widespread, ranging from popular consumer resistance movements (e.g., “No Logo”; Klein, 2002), to formal international action (e.g., UNESCO, 2005 “Convention on Cultural Diversity”).

The critical theoretical questions are: how is this resistance possible, what cultural and psychological resources are needed to support such resistance, and what are the collective and personal costs of such resistance? The critical empirical requirement is to carry out comparative research that examines contemporary situations that vary from high to low intercultural engagement and structural interconnectedness, and then to examine the cultural and psychological consequences of these varying conditions.

Some of the conceptual and empirical evidence reviewed in this paper provides initial evidence for this variable relationship. Research findings from anthropology, sociology and religious and political studies have revealed evidence for variations in the cultural and psychological consequences of intercultural contact among indigenous peoples, immigrant youth and national populations. These selected studies show clearly that cultural loss and homogenisation (which are often the assumed single consequence of globalisation as a process) do not inevitably occur. Indeed, the studies reveal that cultural loss and individual assimilation, while evident, are not the most common outcomes of a high degree of contact and

domination. Such evidence should alert us to the dangers of accepting the wide-spread assumption that globalisation means only homogenisation. However, future research needs to further elaborate the conceptual foundations for such variation, and to carry out controlled comparisons to empirically demonstrate the variable relationships between globalisation (as a process) and acculturation consequences.
