Master
2022/2023
Mechanism Design
Category 'Best Course for Broadening Horizons and Diversity of Knowledge and Skills'
Type:
Elective course (Applied Economics and Mathematical Methods)
Area of studies:
Economics
Delivered by:
Department of Economics
When:
2 year, 1 module
Mode of studies:
offline
Open to:
students of all HSE University campuses
Instructors:
Aleksei Kondratev
Master’s programme:
Applied Economics and Mathematical Methods
Language:
English
ECTS credits:
6
Contact hours:
38
Course Syllabus
Abstract
Mechanism design is a science of how to construct economic mechanisms (rules, environments, institutions) with desirable properties. While the usual microeconomic approach aims at understanding how agents behave in certain environments given certain rules, Mechanism design aims at finding "good" rules that lead to desirable outcomes. At the same time the rules themselves have to be simple and non-manipulable, i.e. provide incentives to participate sincerely. Mechanism design uses game theory tools and can be considered as its most applied part. The range of applications is very broad: from auctions and internet marketplaces to admission of young students to colleges, voting mechanisms, online dating services, and many others.
Learning Objectives
- overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
- provide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
- rovide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
Expected Learning Outcomes
- Able to define and apply fair division, assignment, matching and voting mechanisms
- Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
- know properties of these mechanisms
- Know Revenue Equivalence Theorem, its assumptions and applications
- Know standard auction forms and able to find optimal bidding functions
- Know types of games and solution concepts
- Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design
Course Contents
- Introduction to voting. Basic voting rules and their properties.
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives and its relaxations. Arrow's impossibility theorem.
- VCG--mechanisms. Auctions.
- Matching and assignment mechanisms: dictatorships, core, serial, deferred, and immediate acceptance.
- Introduction to Computational social choice.
- Bargaining. Claims problem.
Interim Assessment
- 2022/2023 1st module0.6 * Exam + 0.1 * Test 3 + 0.1 * Test 2 + 0.1 * Test 1 + 0.1 * Test 4
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice. (2016). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Maurice Salles. (2017). Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Œconomia, (4), 609. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsdoj&AN=edsdoj.36f5aed642d4bd999af031217bc8811
- Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1