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Regular version of the site
2023/2024

Random Assignment Problems

Type: Mago-Lego
When: 2 module
Open to: students of one campus
Instructors: Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
Language: English
ECTS credits: 3
Contact hours: 28

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The goal of the course is to prepare students to do cutting edge research, and solve industry and policy problems in market design. While discussing engineering aspects of designing several matching markets, we will get an overview of matching theory in several special markets such as random assignment problems and organ donation exchanges. Moreover, we study the effect of a pre-match investment and the effect of endogenous effort choice after the matching stage on the design of an efficient matching market. At the end, we will cover the large market models in order to study the trade of stability and strategyproofness.