2024/2025

Axiomatic Mechanism Design

Type: Mago-Lego

Delivered by: Department of Mathematics

When: 1, 2 module

Open to: students of one campus

Instructors: Emre Dogan

Language: English

ECTS credits: 6

Contact hours: 56

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Collective decision making is a challenging process for a society. Oftentimes it is delegated to carefully crafted rules or mechanisms which becomes well working institutions in the long run if they meet certain axioms testing the desirability of outcomes. The goal of the course is to give the students a broader sense of understanding of at times seemingly not very related branches of literatures within theoretical microeconomics from the unifying perspective of axiomatic mechanism design. We start with an introduction to social choice theory, mechanism design, and implementation of social choice functions. Then, we move on to discussing the well-known solutions in the literature for all the following problems and their axiomatic analysis on the basis of various versions of fairness, efficiency, consistency and incentive compatibility criteria: Assignment, random assignment, congested assignment, matching, school choice problems, fair allocation of goods and objects with and without transfers, cooperative game theory, and cost sharing problems.