Бакалавриат
2021/2022
Экономика информации
Кто читает:
Департамент теоретической экономики
Когда читается:
4-й курс, 3 модуль
Формат изучения:
без онлайн-курса
Охват аудитории:
для всех кампусов НИУ ВШЭ
Преподаватели:
Смирнов Алексей Сергеевич
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
3
Контактные часы:
40
Course Syllabus
Abstract
The goal of this course is to introduce students to the role of information in Economics, and to cover related theories and applications. The course is divided into two parts. The first part deals with classical static models of strategic communication, disclosure, signaling and screening. The second part is focused on social learning and strategic experimentation. The main purpose of this part is to learn how these theories can be used to study interesting practical questions. The primary language of the course is English (conditional on no foreign students we can easily switch to Russian). Students should possess basic knowledge of calculus and probability theory.
Learning Objectives
- Understand the role of information in Economics
- Being acquainted with classical and modern ways to model information in Economics
- Be able to solve basic and modified models covered in the course
- Apply the concepts of the course to real world frameworks
Expected Learning Outcomes
- Know the classical results of Information Economics
- Understand how the economic agents experiment and learn unknown fundamentals.
- Understand how the information is transmitted between the economic agents.
Assessment Elements
- Midterm Exam 1
- Final ExamThe topics covered in the exam and in the midterms do not overlap. For the students who have a valid reason for not taking one of the midterms the final exam absorbs the weight of the respective midterm
- Midterm Exam 2
Interim Assessment
- 2021/2022 3rd module0.29 * Midterm Exam 1 + 0.29 * Midterm Exam 2 + 0.42 * Final Exam
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Bengt Holmstrom. (1981). Moral Hazard in Teams. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann, & Juuso Valimaki. (2006). Bandit Problems. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
- Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 123.
- Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
- George A. Akerlof. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (3), 488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
- Jung, W., & Kwon, Y. (1988). Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146.
- Lones Smith, & Peter Sørensen. (1999). Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning.
- Martin Cripps, Godfrey Keller, & Sven Rady. (2005). Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits.
- Michael Spence. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
- Stephen Morris, & Hyun Song Shin. (2006). Global Games: Theory and Applications.
- Vincent P. Crawford, & Joel Sobeli. (1982). Strategic information transmission.
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Callander, S. (2011). Searching and Learning by Trial and Error. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2277–2308. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2277
- Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer, & Andrzej Skrzypacz. (2013). Not Only What But also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure ∗.
- Strategic experimentation. (1999). Econometrica, 67(2), 349–374.
- Viral V. Acharya, Peter M. DeMarzo, & Ilan Kremer. (2010). Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements. NBER Working Papers.