Бакалавриат
2023/2024
Институциональная экономика
Статус:
Курс по выбору (Совместная программа по экономике НИУ ВШЭ и РЭШ)
Направление:
38.03.01. Экономика
Где читается:
Факультет экономических наук
Когда читается:
4-й курс, 1, 2 модуль
Формат изучения:
без онлайн-курса
Охват аудитории:
для своего кампуса
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
6
Контактные часы:
64
Course Syllabus
Abstract
What are institutions? Do they matter for economic outcomes? If so, why? And if they matter, then what determines "good" institutions? In this course we will go through the main lessons learnt from the last 15 years of research, which have witnessed an explosion of empirical and theoretical work on institutions that revolutionized several fields of economics. The journey will start with a macro perspective: do institutions matter for economic growth? It will continue with the distinction between political institutions (e.g., elections) and economic institutions (e.g., property rights) and the interplay between the two. We will then adopt a more micro perspective: which institutional features matter? First, we will review the evidence concerning the effect of economic institutions such as property rights and courts contract enforcing contracts. Second, we will review the evidence concerning political institutions and how they shape the selection and incentives in office of politicians. Third, we will review the evidence about bureaucrats, i.e., those civil servants who implement policy-making but are not elected (differently from politicians) and are often invisible to citizens (differently from, say, teachers or doctors). Finally, we will return to the macro perspective: what determines the breakdown of the state and the emergence of conflict? What do we know about the long-term consequences of conflict? Can we explain simultaneously the economic choices of the state (such as public service delivery and investments in legal and fiscal capacity) as well as political choices regarding the use of violence, which in turn determine peace, repression or conflict? The course will be based primarily on the critical review of empirical work guided by simple economic theory.
Learning Objectives
- The main objective of this course is to demonstrate how institutions work in various spheres, what happens if they become weak or inefficient. We will talk about the institution of property rights and about contracts, will look for historic examples and analyze modern cases, will find evidence of the fact that institutions are vitally important for the prosperity of countries as well as for making the simplest transactions between citizens possible.
Expected Learning Outcomes
- After learning the course, students will be able to: - apply received knowledge to the practical cases; - write essays on economic issues; - understand and critically discuss economic literature.
- After learning the course, students will have skills of: - extracting ideas from theoretical literature and apply them to the real cases; - writing essays on economic issues; - analysing articles and scientific papers on the institutional topics.
- After learning the course, students will know key concepts and methodology of institutional theory; how new institutional theory was developed; main instruments and approaches institutional economists use.
Course Contents
- Introduction and Macro Perspective
- Unpacking Institutions
- Political Institutions and Politicians
- Institutions and the (invisible) Bureaucracy
- Back to the Macro Perspective
Assessment Elements
- quizzes (and maybe homework)
- research proposal (for an empirical project)
- descriptive statistics
- final project (or final test)
- for active participation in class
- bonus for optional presentation research project
Interim Assessment
- 2023/2024 2nd module0 * bonus for optional presentation research project + 0.12 * descriptive statistics + 0.4 * final project (or final test) + 0.1 * for active participation in class + 0.3 * quizzes (and maybe homework) + 0.08 * research proposal (for an empirical project)
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Alberto Alesina, & Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln. (2007). Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People. American Economic Review, (4), 1507. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1507
- Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.DBD7E352
- Olken, B. A. (2006). Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Public Economics, (4–5), 853. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.pubeco.v90y2006i4.5p853.870
- Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz, & Vikrant Vig. (2012). Private Returns to Public Office. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.18095
- Toke S. Aidt, & Raphaël Franck. (2015). Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. Econometrica, 505. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.wly.emetrp.v83y2015ip505.547
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009). Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.1CC27F24
- Claudio Ferraz, & Frederico Finan. (2011). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. American Economic Review, (4), 1274. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
- Di Tella, R., Galiant, S., & Schargrodsky, E. (2007). The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.EEF9EF66
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.E930B5F7
- Frederico Finan, & Laura Schechter. (2012). Vote-Buying and Reciprocity. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.F6849742
- Fuchs-Schündeln, N., & Schündeln, M. (2015). On the endogeneity of political preferences: Evidence from individual experience with democracy. Science, 347(6226), 1145–1148. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa0880
- Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. (2015). Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv042
- King, G., Pan, J. J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000014
- Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, & Roberto Galbiati. (2016). Earthquakes, Religion, and Transition to Self-Government in ItalianCities. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (4), 1875. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw020
- Michael Callen, & James D. Long. (2015). Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.A0716D58
- Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra. (2015). On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.B0094C3C
- Rema Hanna, & Shing-Yi Wang. (2017). Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, (3), 262. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029