Микроэкономика-2 (углубленный курс)

Бакалавриат 2024/2025

Статус: Курс по выбору (Экономика и анализ данных)

Направление: 01.03.02. Прикладная математика и информатика

Кто читает: Департамент теоретической экономики

Где читается: Факультет экономических наук

Когда читается: 2-й курс, 1, 2 модуль

Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса

Охват аудитории: для своего кампуса

Преподаватели: Букин Кирилл Александрович, Смирнов Алексей Сергеевич, Табашникова Дарья Игоревна

Язык: английский

Кредиты: 6

Full Syllabus

Abstract

The course examines the organization of markets from a microeconomic perspective, the principles of microeconomic policy and the role of government in allocating scarce resources. The topics include: perfect competition, pricing in the presence of market power, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, game theory and factor markets, general equilibrium and efficiency, markets with asymmetric information, externalities and public goods. The course continues Microeconomics–1; however, it can also be treated as an independent discipline for exchange students. Module 1 (2) of this course corresponds to Module III (IV) of a generic undergraduate course in microeconomics. Prerequisites: Multivariable calculus; Microeconomics–1, including: consumer behaviour, intertemporal choice, uncertainty, production, perfectly competitive markets.

Learning Objectives

to acquire the profound knowledge of the microeconomic theory, to acquire the skills of the microeconomic analysis and get the grasp of the logic of the microeconomic modeling.

Expected Learning Outcomes

 analyse a variety of price discrimination policies that a monopolist can employ
 analyse Stackelberg leadership
 analyse tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game
 analyse tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Cournot game
 analyse the demand for insurance and show the relationship between insurance and premium
 analyse the problem of adverse selection in the market for lemons
 analyse the problem of price discrimination by a monopolist under adverse selection
 analyse the proﬁt-maximising choice by the monopolist and the associated deadweight loss
 derive the marginal revenue curve associated with any demand curve
 derive the Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand game
 derive the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot game
 explain the concept of diversiﬁcation
 explain the diﬀerent risk attitudes and what they imply for the vN–M utility function
 explain the diﬀerent types of asymmetric information problems
 explain the nature of the vN–M utility function and calculate the expected utility from a gamble
 explain the problem of eﬀort choice and analyse eﬀort choice in a principal-agent model
 explain the trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and eﬀort incentives in the principal-agent model and analyse the optimal risk-sharing arrangement under full and asymmetric information
 explain the types of problems that arise under adverse selection
 explain the types of problems that arise under moral hazard
 analyse separating and pooling equilibria in the signalling model of education
 explain the relationship between marginal revenue and price elasticity of demand as well as Lerner’s index
 calculate the Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion and use it
 explain informally the impact of moral hazard in a variety of settings

Course Contents

Choice under uncertainty
Game theory
Monopoly and price discrimination
Oligopoly
Asymmetric Information
Communication Models
Basic Auctions
Social Choice
Matching

Assessment Elements

Home Assignment 1
Midterm
Мидерм 1 сдается в период сессии первого модуля, но не является финальным элементом контроля для всего курса
Home Assignment 2
Домашнее Задание 2 загружается тремя частями по мере прохождения тем во втором модуле. Сдавать все части нужно до установленного дедлайна в конце второго модуля.
Final Exam

Interim Assessment

2024/2025 2nd module
0.45 * Final Exam + 0.15 * Home Assignment 1 + 0.15 * Home Assignment 2 + 0.25 * Midterm

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 123.
Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
Microeconomic theory, Mas-Colell, A., 1995
Theory and application of intermediate microeconomics, Nicholson, W., 2010
Vincent P. Crawford, & Joel Sobeli. (1982). Strategic information transmission.
Микроэкономика. Принципы и анализ : учебник, Коуэлл, Ф., 2011

Recommended Additional Bibliography

Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2004). Kidney Exchange. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382157

Authors

Bukin Kirill Aleksandrovich
SMIRNOV ALEKSEI Сергеевич

Course Syllabus