Бакалавриат 2024/2025

Прикладной дизайн механизмов

Статус: Курс по выбору (Экономика и анализ данных)

Направление: 01.03.02. Прикладная математика и информатика

Кто читает: Департамент теоретической экономики

Где читается: Факультет экономических наук

Когда читается: 3-й курс, 3 модуль

Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса

Охват аудитории: для своего кампуса

Преподаватели: Баранов Олег Валерьевич

Язык: английский

Кредиты: 3

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The class offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows to analyze a broad setof situations (including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation) and forces students to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems (i.e., "economist as engineer" approach). The class focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the class accessible to undergraduate students, special effort is made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuition, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples.

Learning Objectives

• Understand and solve stylized market design models
• Develop critical thinking about market design problems
• Understand the basic principles of strategic interactions among market participants
• Understand basic real world markets and describe them with formal models
• Evaluate different market designs and assess their effectivness

Expected Learning Outcomes

• Understand and solve stylized market design models
• Develop critical thinking about market design problems
• Understand the basic principles of strategic interactions among market participants
• Understand basic real world markets and describe them with formal models
• Evaluate different market designs and assess their effectivness

Course Contents

• Introduction to Matching Markets
• Stable Matching and Orderly Markets
• House Allocation and Kidney Exchange
• School Choice
• Introduction to Auction Theory
• Designing Good Auctions
• Common Value Auctions
• Multi-Unit Auctions
• Sponsored Search Auctions
• Combinatorial Auctions
• Large-Scale Auctions for Radio Spectrum
• Master Section for Applied Market Design

Assessment Elements

• Problem Sets
  Regular Problem Sets
• Weekly Exercises
  Weekly Activities
• Online Tests
  Online Tests vis Smart LMS
• Offline Quiz
  Mini test (10-15 minutes) administered in class.
• Midterm
  Regular offline midterm
• Final Exam
  Regular Final Exam

Interim Assessment

• 2024/2025 3rd module
  0.25 * Final Exam + 0.2 * Midterm + 0.1 * Offline Quiz + 0.15 * Online Tests + 0.15 * Problem Sets + 0.15 * Weekly Exercises

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Haeringer, G. (2018). Market Design: Auctions and Matching. The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.mtp.titles.0262037548
• Market design : auctions and matching, Haeringer, G., 2017

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• The handbook of market design, , 2015
• Who gets what―and why: the new economics of matchmaking and market design, Roth, A.E., 2016

Authors

• BARANOV OLEG VALEREVICH