2024/2025
Аукционы: теория и приложения
Статус:
Маго-лего
Кто читает:
Департамент теоретической экономики
Охват аудитории:
для всех кампусов НИУ ВШЭ
Преподаватели:
Андреянов Павел Павлович
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
3
Контактные часы:
36
Course Syllabus
Abstract
In this course, we will get acquainted with the main auction models: first price, second price, English, scoring, asymmetric and "common value"; we will learn how to find and compare profits. The main textbook is "Krishna, Auction Theory".
Learning Objectives
- Find equilibria in I- and II- price auctions.
- Find equilibria in affiliated values auctions
- Find equilibria in scoring auctions
- Compare revenue and bidder surplus across various formats
- Learn to use theory to estimate an auction model
- Discuss other auction models: asymmetric, with binding constraints.
Expected Learning Outcomes
- be able to estimate and simulate simple auction models
- be able to make a presentation
- be able to set and solve simple auction models
Course Contents
- Equilibria in private value auctions
- Introduction to mechanism design
- Efficiency vs optimality
- Scoring auctions, Double auctions
- English auctions, common value
- Collusion, Corruption
- Confronting your model with the data
- Course overview and auctions taxonomy
Assessment Elements
- HomeworksThere will be 4 written homeworks, equally weighted. Some problems may be ungraded. The main goal of homeworks is self-practice.
- Final exam
- MidtermWritten assigniment
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- An introduction to auction theory, Menezes, F. M., 2005
- Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2002
- Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2010
- Auctions: theory and practice, Klemperer, P., 2004
- Che, Y. K. (1991). Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.att.wimass.9123
- Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062
- Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1
- Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 518. https://doi.org/10.1086/261885
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Auctions, Hubbard, T. P., 2015