Магистратура 2024/2025

Аукционы: теория и приложения

Статус: Курс по выбору (Экономика и экономическая политика)

Направление: 38.04.01. Экономика

Кто читает: Департамент теоретической экономики

Где читается: Факультет экономических наук

Когда читается: 2-й курс, 2 модуль

Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса

Охват аудитории: для всех кампусов НИУ ВШЭ

Преподаватели: Андреянов Павел Павлович

Прогр. обучения: Экономика и экономическая политика

Язык: английский

Кредиты: 3

Course Syllabus

Abstract

In this course, we will get acquainted with the main auction models: first price, second price, English, scoring, asymmetric and "common value"; we will learn how to find and compare profits. The main textbook is "Krishna, Auction Theory".

Learning Objectives

• Find equilibria in I- and II- price auctions.
• Find equilibria in affiliated values auctions
• Find equilibria in scoring auctions
• Compare revenue and bidder surplus across various formats
• Learn to use theory to estimate an auction model
• Discuss other auction models: asymmetric, with binding constraints.

Expected Learning Outcomes

• be able to estimate and simulate simple auction models
• be able to make a presentation
• be able to set and solve simple auction models

Course Contents

• Equilibria in private value auctions
• Introduction to mechanism design
• Efficiency vs optimality
• Scoring auctions, Double auctions
• English auctions, common value
• Collusion, Corruption
• Confronting your model with the data
• Course overview and auctions taxonomy

Assessment Elements

• Homeworks
  There will be 4 written homeworks, equally weighted. Some problems may be ungraded. The main goal of homeworks is self-practice.
• Final exam
• Midterm
  Written assigniment

Interim Assessment

• 2024/2025 2nd module
  0.5 * Final exam + 0.25 * Homeworks + 0.25 * Midterm

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• An introduction to auction theory, Menezes, F. M., 2005
• Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2002
• Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2010
• Auctions: theory and practice, Klemperer, P., 2004
• Che, Y. K. (1991). Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.att.wimass.9123
• Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062
• Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1
• Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 518. https://doi.org/10.1086/261885

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Auctions, Hubbard, T. P., 2015

Authors

• Мальбахова Диса Анзоровна
• Andreianov Pavel Pavlovich